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STRUCTURES OF SUBORDINATION: WOMEN OF
COLOR AT THE INTERSECTION OF
TITLE VII AND THE NLRA. NOT!
Elizabeth M. Iglesias*
I. Law as Structural Violence
"Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death."'
Thus begins a remarkable essay in which Robert Cover admonishes legal scholars to mark the difference between legal interpretation and literary theory and to remember that legal meanings are
articulated in the context of an organized practice of violence.
Taking issue with the characterization of law as a system of meanings, 2 a culture of argument, 3 or "a normative universe ... held
together by . . . interpretative commitments, ' 4 Professor Cover
insists that "there is a radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and the organization of law as meaning. '5 While law is most certainly a system of meanings, "the
'significance' or meaning that is achieved [in legal discourse] must
be experienced or understood in vastly different ways depending
upon whether one suffers that violence or not. '6 Drawing upon
Professor Cover's work, Anthony Alfieri articulates a notion of
"interpretative violence," the silencing effected by lawyers who
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. B.A., University
of Michigan, 1984; J.D., Yale Law School, 1988. Thanks to David Abraham, Terry Anderson, Alex Aleinikoff, Tom Baker, Peter Bayer, Ken Casebeer, Mary Coombs, Michael
Fischl, Patrick Gudridge, Don Jones, Marnie Mahoney, Rob Rosen, Steve Schnably, and
John White. Lea Brilmayer and the N.Y.U. Faculty Workshop have my warmest gratitude
for hearing me out in the earliest stages of this project. Susan Notarius, Alex Suarez and
Ardyth Walker provided able research assistance in its early stages. Detra Shaw, Anthony
Lauriello, and Reed Slogoff have been indispensible to its completion. I would also like to
give special thanks to my colleague Ken Casebeer. But for the impact he has had at
different points in my life, this Article would probably never have been written. Finally, I
dedicate this Article, with all my love, to John Iglesias-Boothman, who taught me to say
NOT.
I Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
2 RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 47 (1986).
3

See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING (1984).

4 Cover,

supra note I, at 1602 n.2 (quoting Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7 (1983) [hereinafter Cover,
Nomos and Narrative]).
5 Id. (quoting Cover, Nomos and Narrative,supra note 4, at 18).
6

Id.
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ignore client stories and plug client problems into pre-existing
conceptual slots of legal precedent, thereby suppressing the trans-7
formative potential of client experiences and self-understandings.
These two accounts of the violence of law focus on the communicative relationship between judges and litigants and the interpretive relationship between judges and the legal materials they
deploy. In doing so, both accounts neglect the extent to which
legal interpretation allocates power within and across the many
institutional arrangements through which current practices of subordination are repeatedly challenged and cumulatively reconstituted. These accounts suggest that the structure of race and gender
subordination can be legally transformed through "sensitivity training" and the articulation of more compelling appeals to the empathy of legal decisionmakers. A radical reallocation of institutional power is simply not called for.
To be sure, increasing respect for the voices and perspectives
of the oppressed represents a progressive development in legal
scholarship. 8 However, as a strategy for achieving substantial social change, this "sensitivity training for the privileged" ignores
the more fundamental question of institutional power-the distribution of power which determines who must be persuaded to listen
to whom in the many contexts that construct our social reality and
regulate our daily lives. By contrast, I wish to explore the relationship between law and the social reality of subordination
through the concept of "structural violence," a term I draw from
liberation theology. 9
The critique implicit in the concept of structural violence
entails a commitment to structural justice, defined here as a commitment to the evolution of institutional arrangements in which
7 Anthony Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107 (1991).

8 For a particularly fine example of this approach, see Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real

Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection
for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992). See also T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, A Case for Race Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060 (1991).

9 In that discipline, structural violence refers, among other things, to a situation in
which the dominant systems of a society, whether that be its legal, political or economic
institutions, suppress the avenues of internal transformation and repress the agency of
those whom the society subordinates and exploits. See, e.g., DOMINIQUE BARB, GRAcE
AND POWER: BASE COMMUNITIES AND NONVIOLENCE IN BRAZIL 70-77 (John Pairman
Brown trans., 1987); GUSTAVO GUTIERREZ, LIBERATION THEOLOGY: THE TRUTH SHALL

MAKE You FREE (1986); Jost PORFIRIO MIRANDA, MARX AND THE BIBLE: A CRITIQUE
OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF OPPRESSION (John Eagleson trans., 1974).
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relations of domination can be effectively transformed through the
agency of those whom the society subordinates. Liberation the-

ology expresses this commitment to structural justice as "a preferential option for the poor."'10 This "preferential option" constitutes a conscious choice to view the world and its processes from
a perspective that affirms the interdependency and fundamental
equality of all human persons in the mind of God.1 It is not,

however, an end in itself' 2 but a first step in an ever more demanding commitment to actively reconstruct the relations of power

through which individuals are devalued and oppressed. Rather
than attempting to develop more satisfying accounts of "the requirements" of justice or more compelling appeals to the empathy
of the powerful, this "preferential option" locates the attainment
of objective justice in the material empowerment of the
oppressed.13
I invoke the concept of structural violence to examine how

legal interpretation constructs institutional power and how the
organization of institutional power obstructs our liberation from
the relations of oppression that are constituted through the socially
constructed categories of race and gender.14 I am primarily con10See

GUTIERREZ, supra note 9, at 8-11.

11Id.
2 Id. at 12-13.
13 Some

liberation theologists have argued, "no justice, no peace," see, e.g., NICHOLAS

WOLTERSTORFF, UNTIL JUSTICE AND PEACE EMBRACE (1983). Others have insisted, "no
power, no justice," see, e.g., JAMES CONE, BLACK THEOLOGY & BLACK POWER (1969);

REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY (1932). I believe both claims

are correct and seek only to demonstrate the extent to which the structures of institutional
power and legal agency maintained at the intersection of Title VII and the NLRA are based
on the assumption that there can be peace without justice and justice without power.
,4Some introductory remarks about the concept of "social construction" may be
helpful. I start with the proposition that the broadest group with which we all identify is
humanity. As individuals, we experience our own humanity and identify as humans in
response to that experience. The extent to which we identify with any subgroup is a direct
result of the extent to which the treatment we receive is based on some quality other than
our humanity. See Martha Mahoney, Law and Racial Geography:Public Housing and the
Economy in New Orleans, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1251, 1265 (1990) (quoting Peter Jackson, The
Idea of 'Race' and the Geography of Racism, in RACE AND RACISM: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL
GEOGRAPHY 6 (Peter Jackson ed., 1987)) ("We begin by recognizing that 'race' is fundamentally a social construction rather than a natural division of humankind.").
For example, women may identify with other women as women (rather than as human
beings) not because we are women but because, being women, we are treated in ways that
only women are, for the most part, treated. Physical and reproductive differences do not,
in and of themselves, determine an individual's "essential identity," for one could easily
imagine that in a world in which relations of power were organized around the physical
feature of height, individuals might be more likely to identify themselves as short or tall,
rather than as men or women. Thus group identity is developed as a result of and in
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cerned with the procedures for collective organization in labor
unions and the procedural structures available for enforcing Title
VII. I use the concept of structural violence to focus attention on
particular features of legal interpretation and on the practice of
case by case adjudication, and to assess these features in terms of
their impact both on the integrity of legal interpretation and on the
practical alternatives available for women of color to act effectively as agents of self-determination and social transformation.
The concept of structural violence suggests that the problem
in the relationship between law and the social reality of women of
color is not primarily the fact that judges preside over a social
structure in which their interpretative judgments are enforced
through the coercive power of the state,15 though this authority
does play an important role in constituting the structural violence
of law. Nor is the problem simply that the interpretative practices
of lawyers and judges suppress and render legally irrelevant the
perspectives, life experiences and values of the individuals whose
interests and claims they routinely decide, though this too plays a
6
significant role.'
The concept of structural violence locates the problem in the
relationship between the practices of legal interpretation, on the
one hand, and the organization of institutional power, the regulation of collective agency and the aspiration toward objective justice
on the other. If, as I argue, the structures erected through legal
interpretation organize our social, political and economic alternatives in ways that systematically exclude our transformative
agency from the realm of the lawful, then exploitation is institutionalized and violence is structural. Liberation depends on the
affirmative resistance to the practices that allocate resources and opportunities across rigid
socially constructed categories-categories by which individual consciousness is ascribed
an external identity and accorded a concrete position in society.
For women of color, whose individual self-consciousness is developed at the intersection of multiple practices of oppression and resistance, the difference between socially
constructed group identity and individual self-consciousness is palpable and often painfully
debilitating. Both the practices through which groups are constructed externally (namely,
the racist, sexist and capitalist practices of dominant social actors) and maintained internally
(namely, the practices through which internal elites suppress differences and maintain group
cohesiveness around their self-privileging agendas) fragment our consciousness of our
individual reality and assault our ability to act self-consciously in the world.
-' See Cover, supra note 1.
Fajer, supra note 8; Alfieri, supra note 7; Mai J. Matsuda, Looking to the
Bottom: CriticalLegal Studies and Reparations,22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987).
16 See
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assertion of unlawful agency, while social justice depends on the
17
reconstruction of legal agency.
At a superficial level, both the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) and Title VII appear to provide women of color with
viable avenues for obtaining recourse and effecting change in the
workplace. The empathetic interpretation of particular legal issues
in particular cases by particular judges also appears, at times, to
have produced progressive results for women of color. Nevertheless, these avenues of agency and recourse are more apparent than
real. Their limitations are often obscured precisely because legal
interpretation is practiced in and operates through a strategic fragmentation of doctrinal and institutional domains. This fragmentation is, to some degree, inherent in the practice of case by case
adjudication, but it has also been significantly exacerbated and
strategically manipulated by judicial decisions which intentionally
separate doctrinal and institutional domains in order to promote
specific interests and policies that have little to do with respecting
the self-determination or empowering the transformative agency
8
of women of color.'

17In claiming that interpretative practices at the boundaries of Title VII and the NLRA
operate to maintain a system of structural violence, I do not mean to say either that
resistance is impossible or that favorable judgments have never been rendered. Such a
claim would be absurd, for then court opinions favoring racial subgroups and, indeed, Title
VII itself would be impossible to explain. On the contrary, these interpretative practices
have erected a structure which systematically restricts the pace and direction of social
change by denying subordinated subgroups the legal authority to act as agents. While
resistance is possible, when truly effective, it is most often illegal; and while progress also
is possible through law, the progress obtained in one legal context is often undermined by
legal rules articulated in another context. As Steve J. Schnably suggests in Beyond Griswold: Foucauldianand RepublicanApproaches to Privacy, 23 CONt'.. L. REV. 861 (1991),
we need to rethink the dichotomy of power and powerlessness. The concept of powerlessness may simply hide the fact that law legitimates some exercises of power and delegitimates
and punishes others. Neither black workers, nor women workers (of any race) are powerless; we are simply prohibited from exercising our power and denied the protection of
law when we do. Nikki Giovanni has implored us to remember (and I do) that resistance
is always possible: "We've got to live in the real world. If we don't like the world we're
living in, change it. And if we can't change it, we change ourselves. We can do something."
NIKKI GIOVANNI, BLACK FEMINIsT THOUGHT 110 (1990). The questions I address in this

Article go directly to the problem of knowing when we should change ourselves and when
and how we should demand, instead, that the world change.
,8See, e.g., NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662 (1976) (FCC lacks
authority to promulgate rules prohibiting regulatees from engaging in employment practices
prohibited by Title VII); Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50 (1975) (Title VII is irrelevant to the Board's interpretation of rights and duties
established by the NLRA).

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

400

[Vol. 28

This politics of interpretative fragmentation results in and is
based on the absence of women of color as a compelling reference
point in the elaboration of boundaries and intersections between
the different legal regimes that converge upon the American workplace. The purpose of this Article is to foreground the woman of
color-just as liberation theology makes a normative commitment
in its preferential option for the poor-and to bring this reference
point to bear in a sustained critique of the cumulative and interactive impact which the politics of interpretative fragmentation
have had in regulating our agency and constructing our identities.
To define my project in this way is to invite assault on numerous fronts. Let me focus initially on the most immediate source
of potential misunderstanding, namely the implicit assertion that
women of color constitute a distinct political subject and represent
a meaningful perspective from which existing legal regimes may
be examined and judged.19 Admittedly, the woman of color is a
historically contingent, 20 culturally embedded and politically contested subjectivity. Nevertheless, women of color represent the
potential universality of a shared political identity, not because
they constitute a homogenous group, but because, as a political
construct, they represent a shared context of struggle based on
of multiple practices
their individual experiences at the intersection
21
of oppression and identity formation.
19Chandra Mohanty, Cartographiesof Struggle, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND
POLITICS OF FEMINISM

THE

5-7 (Chandra Mohanty et al. eds., 1991). As Professor Mohanty

observes:
[W]omen of color ... is a term which designates a political constituency, not a
biological or even sociological one. . . . What seems to constitute "women of
color" or "third world women" as a viable oppositional alliance is a common
context of struggle rather than color or racial identifications. Similarly, it is third
world women's oppositional political relation to sexist, racist, and imperialist
structures that constitutes our potential commonality. Thus, it is the common

context of struggles against specific exploitative structures and systems that determines our potential political alliances.
Id. at7.
20 As Chandra Mohanty notes, "few studies have focused on women workers as subjects-as agents who make choices, have a critical perspective on their own situations, and
think and organize collectively against their oppressors." Id. at 29.
21While I understand the importance of resisting "essentialism" in all its modalities,
see Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42

STAN.

L. REV.

581 (1990), the importance of affirming the potential universality of an individual woman
of color was recently made rather obvious to me. In an earlier draft of this Article, I wrote
in terms of "I" rather than in terms of the experience of "women of color." In doing so, I
intended and believed I could successfully project my stream of consciousness as an
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Women of color are entitled to demand legal agency within
the institutional arrangements established by law. Nevertheless
these institutions present a reality in which a woman of color finds
no home for herself as an integrated whole; to participate in the
22
community she must sacrifice some significant aspect of herself.

My purpose is to illustrate how this is done at the boundaries of
invitation for others to see themselves in me-as a universal at least in some locality. Upon
circulating the draft, I repeatedly received comments that I might not want to be "so
personal," the implication being that when I spoke of "I," it could only be me that I was
speaking of. I reject that implication. At the same time, I recognize that it may be a long
time before a woman of color can ever speak in terms of "I" without triggering the thought
of "she," rather than of we, and even less of you, for in speaking of "I," I was inviting you
to see yourself in me. We still have a long way to go.
" For example, a black woman joins the black liberation movement at the expense of
her interests as a woman. Deborah King, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black
Feminist Ideology, 1988 SIGNS 42 (1988). The women's liberation movement neglects her
interests as a black. Id. See also BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO
CENTER (1984); Harris, supra note 21. And the Labor Movement's struggle against exploitation in the workplace has often been affirmatively hostile to her interests as both. See
generallyDIANE BALSER, SISTERHOOD & SOLIDARITY: FEMINISM AND LABOR IN MODERN
TIMES (1987); WILLIAM B. GOULD, BLACK WORKERS IN WHITE UNIONS (1977); HERBERT
HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1985); Heidi I. Hartmann,
Capitalism, Patriarchyand Job Segregation by Sex, in CAPTIALIST PATRIARCHY AND THE
CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM (Zillah R. Eisenstein ed., 1979).
In a recent article, Professor Harris provides a valuable starting point for understanding
our situation as women of color. According to Harris:
[W]e are not born with a "self," but rather are composed of a welter of partial,
sometimes contradictory, even antithetical "selves." A unified identity, if such can
ever exist, is a product of will, not a common destiny or natural birthright. Thus,
consciousness is "never fixed, never attained once and for all"; it is not a final
outcome or a biological given, but a process, a constant contradictory state of
becoming, in which both social institutions and individual wills are deeply
implicated.
Harris, supra note 21, at 584 (footnotes omitted). Harris calls this self-experience "multiple
consciousness," and I affirm this account as an accurate depiction of my own self-consciousness. Nevertheless, even as I experience myself as fluid, fragmented and evolving,
I recognize that I am, for others, both fixed and formulated-a woman, a hispanic. Thus,
my fragmented self-consciousness is not simply a direct response to the overwhelming
abundance which constitutes the socio-phenomenal world in flux, but also a product of my
experiences as an individual who is constantly renegotiating my identity in a politically

segmented social reality which I desire both to understand and to transform. See infra part
III.B.2.
Being a woman of color in America situates my individuality in a political and economic
structure which renders my self-experience different from the self-experience of others
who are not so situated. The problem is that when I identify my situation, my selfexperience is considered less universal and more particular, as though my vulnerability to
sickness, self-deception and my ultimate mortality are more essential to my human consciousness than my vulnerability to male violence and racial prejudice. This is absurd and
simply reflects the disproportionate social and discursive power of those who do not
experience male violence and racial prejudice as part of their human condition. Thus, I
embrace my experience of multiple consciousness as a woman of color, and it is as a
woman of color that I explore and seek to transform its social and political dimensions.
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Title VII and the NLRA23 and, furthermore, to suggest how this
might be remedied by reconstructing the processes of collective
24
identity formation and the redistribution of institutional power.
The perspective of women of color provides a particularly
powerful vantage point for my critique. 25 Law is maintained as a
system of structural violence only because the fragmentation of
doctrinal and institutional regimes obscures the analytic inconsistencies and the cumulative and interactive impact which judicial
interpretation of Title VII and the NLRA has had on the allocation
of power in the institutional arrangements through which social
relations in the workplace are established and transformed. The
liberation of women of color, however, requires that we unify what
has been fragmented 26 and fragment what has been unified. 27 Thus,
2 1 focus on these two regimes because the essentialism which suppresses one aspect
or another of my self-consciousness is not simply a theoretical approach. It is also a
constitutive principle through which the institutional structures which organize my interactions with others have been constructed. Thus, while Professor Harris uses the woman
of color's experience of multiple consciousness to challenge the "gender essentialism" of
white feminist theory, Harris, supra note 21, at 585, my point is that the institutional
arrangements we inhabit are as much the product of essentialism as the theories through
and in response to which we attempt to make sense of our worlds.
Just as mainstream theory reflects the perspective of the speaker who purports to
speak for all, social structures (like the gender/color blind majoritarian collectivities into
which we have been channeled by interpretative practices at the intersection of Title VII
and the NLRA) are historical artifacts which reflect and embody the experience and
intentions of those who initially designed them and those whose decisional practices and
discourse reconstitute them on a daily basis. See Mahoney, supra note 14, at 1261 (invoking
the concept of a "built environment" to explain the economic subordination of urban
blacks).
24 See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MIcH. L. REV. 1077 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, The
Triumph of Tokenism]; Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for PoliticalEquality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991) [hereinafter Guinier, No Two Seats]; Eileen Silverstein,
Union Decisions on Collective Bargaining Goals: A Proposalfor Interest Group Participation, 77 MICH. L. REv. 1485 (1979); George Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123
U. PA. L. REV. 897 (1975).
2 See generally J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1991),
discussed infra notes 264-268 and accompanying text.
26 That is, the individual and collective identity of the woman of color as it is situated
within the network of legal regimes and doctrinal conceptions that regulate the workplace.
See, e.g., Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Cathy Scarborough, ConceptualizingBlack Women's
Employment Experiences, 98 YALE L.J. 1457 (1989); Elaine W. Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interactionof Race and Sex in Employment Discrimination,55 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 793 (1980).
2 That is, the legal rules and theoretical commitments through which women of color
have been submerged in broader collectivities. See HOOKS, supranote 22, at 43-65 (rejecting
feminist vision of sisterhood grounded on suppressing the challenges raised by women of
color against racism); Harris, supra note 21.
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while judicial practices may fragment the way we interpret Title
VII and the NLRA, adopting the perspective of women of color

brings these two regimes together as they operate interactively to
regulate the workplaces we inhabit and provides a perspective

from which their cumulative impact can be recognized as fundamentally unjust.
Without attempting to provide a definitive account of what a
woman of color "really" is, I examine the way that the institutional
arrangements constructed through the legal interpretation at the
boundaries of Title VII and the NLRA organize the formation of
collective political identity and the exercise of institutionalized
authority. I focus specifically on the impact these structures have
on the agency of the women of color who have little alternative
but to inhabit them. Part II of this Article illustrates the concept
of structural violence through an institutional critique of the duty
of fair representation of the NLRA. It provides an alternative way
of reading duty of fair representation cases and an alternative
perspective for understanding the practical significance of this duty
as the conceptual cement which holds together the institutionalization of white/male power in American workplaces. This practical
result is most apparent when considered in the context of what I
call "the politics of interpretative fragmentation," or the strategic
boundary setting between regimes. Part III explains this structure
of violence as an artifact of legal interpretation and grounds its
transformation in the jurisprudential and institutional unification
of Title VII and the NLRA. 28
2 Having said all this, I am somewhat amused, bemused and frankly amazed by the
number of times I have been asked to justify the fact that I am "forcing" women of color
into an analysis of legal doctrines, which, after all, are not "really" about women of color.
It seems to me that the question is not really a question, but rather an expression of a
pervasive commitment to preserving the interests which are currently privileged in the
conceptual and institutional structures established by law-the concern seems to be that if
"women of color" must count as such, then everyone must count and then what would
become of us? See, e.g., Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp.
142, 145 (E.D. Mo. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th
Cir. 1977) (denying black women independent standing as Title VII plaintiffs on the ground
that "[tihe prospect of the creation of new classes of protected minorities, governed only
by the mathematical principles of permutation and combination, clearly raises the prospect
of opening the hackneyed Pandora's box."). I admit that the prospect that one day the
practices and structures of subordination may be rendered accountable to everyone who
is thereby oppressed does not disturb me. On the contrary, I am encouraged by the extent
to which other political identities find my analysis relevant to their situations.
Nevertheless, I am somewhat perplexed by comments to the effect that my analysis
is as applicable to "people of color" as to women of color, the implication being that
because most of the doctrines are articulated in the context of race-based discrimination
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II. The Duty of Fair Representation at the Intersection of
Title VII and the NLRA
A. Defining the Context: Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.
The duty of fair representation ("DFR") was first imposed on
labor unions in the case of Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. 29 In
Steele, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen
was party to a collective bargaining agreement with twenty-one
railroads operating in the southeastern United States. A majority
of the firemen employed by these railroads were white and only
they were members of the Brotherhood. Although purporting to
act "as representative of the entire craft of firemen," the Brotherhood amended the collective bargaining agreement to exclude
all black firemen from employment with the railroads. The black
firemen brought suit seeking an injunction prohibiting the union
from representing blacks so long as it continued to exclude racial
minorities. The Supreme Court held that unions had a statutory
duty to represent fairly the interests of all workers in any appropriate bargaining unit they purported to represent.3 0
The black workers in Steele were not and could not become
members of the Brotherhood because the union discriminated
against blacks. Consequently, the union's representational authority was based not on the black workers' "action or consent, but
[derived] wholly from the command of the [Railway Labor] Act"
which authorized the union to represent the black workers because

that my critique is not "really" about women. One obvious response is that if these cases
are not "about women" it is only because gender discrimination was so pervasive and
effective in shutting women out of the workplaces these cases examine. A more compelling
and perhaps more radical response is that women of color are people of color and that,
consequently, structures of racial subordination matter to us as women. Thus, from ily
perspective, these comments are simply efforts, whether intentional or inadvertent, to
reconstitute the categories of political identity I am challenging.
323 U.S. 192 (1944). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953)
(applying the DFR under the NLRA).
30 In an effort to circumvent potential constitutional objections that would otherwise
arise under the statute, the Court implied the DFR as judicial gloss on the Congressional
intent underlying the Railway Labor Act. Under the Act, unions are vested with "legislative" authority to determine the terms and conditions of the workplace. Just as a legislature
is subject to constitutional limitations on its power "to deny, restrict, destroy or discriminate
against the rights of those for whom it legislates" and has an "affirmative constitutional
duty equally to protect those rights," so too the union's power must also be limitedotherwise the statute purporting to create such unlimited power would be constitutionally
suspect. Steele, 323 U.S. at 198-99. That limitation is the DFR.
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a majority of their craft had chosen the Brotherhood as their
bargaining representative. 3' The black workers were thus represented by an organization that, by excluding them from membership, excluded them from participation in the internal political
processes through which the organization's distributional priorities
were established.
Excluded from membership in a union chosen by the white
majority of their craft, the black workers were, at the same time,
prohibited from attempting to represent themselves individually,
collectively or through the intervention of another union. 32 The
Court found this result unacceptable in light of the purposes of the
3
Act.
Thus, the DFR first appeared as an obligation imposed upon
unions in exchange for the power to determine the working conditions of minority workers who were excluded from membership
and who were legally prohibited from establishing their own competing organizations. The purpose of imposing the duty was to
avoid the constitutional and practical problems that might be generated by permitting the union to discriminate against a group it
purported to represent. Since Steele, the DFR has been the subject
34
of extensive judicial elaboration and legal scholarship.
11Id. at 199.
32 The Act required employers to bargain exclusively with the union elected by the
majority of any craft constituting an appropriate bargaining unit. It had already been decided
that "a craft or class of employees may not be divided into two or more on the basis of
race or color for the purpose of choosing representatives." Id. at 206.
3 These purposes were declared in Section 2, which seeks to avoid "any interruption
to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged therein," through "the prompt and
orderly settlement of all disputes concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions."
Id. at 199. These purposes were at risk

if a substantial minority of the craft were denied the right to have their interests
considered at the conference table and if the final result of the bargaining process
were to be the sacrifice of the interests of the minority by the action of a representative chosen by the majority. The only recourse of the minority would be to
strike, with the attendant interruption of commerce, which the Act seeks to avoid.
Id. at 200.
34 See, e.g., Ross E. Cheit, Competing Models ofFairRepresentation:The Perfunctory
Processing Cases, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1982); Matthew W. Finkin, The Limits of Majority
Rule in Collective Bargaining,64 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1980); Mayer G. Freed et al., Unions,
Fairness,and the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 461 (1983); Michael
Harper & Ira Lupu, Fair Representation as Equal Protection, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1211
(1985); Alan Hyde, Can Judges Identify FairBargaining Procedures?:A Comment on
Freed,Polsby & Spitzer, Unions, Fairness, and the Conundrums of Collective Choice, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 415 (1984); Fredric C. Leffler, Piercingthe Duty of FairRepresentation:
The Dichotomy Between Negotiationsand Grievance Handling, 1979 U. ILL. L. F. 35 (No.

406

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 28

Rather than examining the network of restrictions and disabilities which adoption of the DFR purportedly legitimated, legal
scholarship on the DFR has, for the most part, focused on establishing the standards for determining when the DFR has been
violated, an issue the Court left open in Steele. 35 But the significance of Steele is not exhausted by the debate over the substantive
standards that control judicial application of the DFR. My purpose
is to illustrate an alternative approach to the DFR cases, one that
seeks to understand the significance of this duty by examining the
way the DFR operates across institutional and doctrinal domains
to expand the network of restrictions which suppress the agency
and withhold institutional authority from racial minorities in general and women of color in particular-the very sorts of restrictions
the Steele decision was intended to legitimate.
Thus, rather than focusing initially on the legal standards that
govern judicial review of majoritarian decisions under the DFR, I
look at the institutional structures that have been created through
the invocation of the DFR in the three different doctrinal contexts
where Title VII and the NLRA intersect. First, I focus on a series
of decisions which ordered the integration of segregated union
locals and established the conditions under which minority workers who oppose the discriminatory employment practices of their
employers will be protected from retaliation. Second, I examine
the reasoning through which the Board rationalized its decision to
permit the certification of discriminatory unions as exclusive bargaining representatives and decided the conditions for defining an
appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Third, I examine the role of the DFR in courts' determinations of
the legality of race-conscious allocation of union offices.
In each of these contexts, the cases were decided by establishing boundaries between Title VII and the NLRA and invoking
the fact of the DFR-that is, invoking its existence as an alterna1) (1979); Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court and the Duty of FairRepresentation, 27
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 127 (1992); Lea S. VanderVelde, A FairProcessModel for the
Union's FairRepresentation Duty, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1079 (1983); Kenneth Kleinman,
Comment, Seniority Systems and the Duty of FairRepresentation: Union Liability in the

Teamsters Context, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 711 (1979); Keith Livesay, Comment,

Affirmative Action Programs:A Violation of a Union's Duty of FairRepresentation?, 36
BAYLOR L. REV. 155 (1984).

31For a notable exception, see Karl E. Klare, The Quest for Industrial Democracy
and the Struggle Against Racism: Perspectivesfrom Labor Law and Civil Rights Law, 61

OR. L. REV. 157 (1982).
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tive avenue of recourse. Crossing these domains is an important
first step towards understanding the significance of this duty for
women of color. The institutional arrangements maintained
through the invocation of the DFR offer women of color such
impoverished and ineffective avenues for agency or remedial recourse that whatever gains might be made by the successful assertion of a DFR violation in a particular case are more than offset
by the systemic powerlessness it simultaneously legitimates and
obscures. 36 The way the courts invoke the DFR and negotiate the
boundaries of Title VII and the NLRA in these cases establishes
fundamental restrictions on the formation of institutionally effective collective alliances, restricts the opportunities for exercising
agency, and ultimately ensures that our inclusion constitutes our
submergence.
B. ChannelingAgency and Allocating InstitutionalPower:
Toward a First Understandingof Structural Violence
This section explores two series of cases: one that ordered
the integration of racially segregated unions and another that established the conditions under which minority workers will be
legally protected from retaliation for opposing race discrimination
in the workplace. The purpose of my analysis is to illustrate the
cumulative impact of these decisions in constructing, or more
precisely in deconstructing, the opportunities for collective alliance among and the exercise of transformative agency by women
of color who inhabit the institutional arrangements that are constructed through these decisions. 37
36 Not to mention that the DFR has seriously failed us in numerous instances. See,
e.g., NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers Association, 821 F.2d 328 (6th Cir. 1987); Barcume

v. The City of Flint, No. 84-CV-8066-FL (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 1986); Seep v. Commercial

Motor Freight, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
3To be sure, legal rules do not determine political identity or collective alliances. If

the social practices to which we are subjected are important enough to inspire a sense of
shared experience with others who are similarly affected, a court's failure or refusal to
recognize or confer legal authority on that collective identity does not settle the matter. It
may simply lead to "extra-legal" forms of collective action. See, e.g., CONE, supra note
13, at 28-29 ("Black people now know that freedom is not a gift from white society, but

is, rather, the self-affirmation of one's existence as a person, a person with certain innate
rights to say No and Yes, despite the consequences."). Indeed, as Professor Abraham has
noted, the NLRA may have recognized the collective identity of workers as a class simply

because, at the time, workers were acting as a class. David Abraham, IndividualAutonomy
and Collective Empowerment in Labor Law: Union Membership Resignationsand Strikebreaking in the New Economy, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1268, 1279 (1988). Through this legal
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In the cases which follow, the courts (or the Board) were
concerned with allocating institutional power and representational
authority and with determining the legal parameters of collective
identity formation. These cases maintain an institutional arrangement in which collective identity is externally defined, institutionalized and superimposed upon women of color through a network
of rules that channel our alliances, restrict our authority and sanction our resistance.
This external identity is formally colorblind and gender neutral. It purportedly represents the common situation and collective
interests of the "universalized worker" in a capitalist economy.
Nevertheless, the collective alliances and institutional arrangements that are organized around this universalized working class
identity offer women of color few avenues of effective agency in
the workplace.
Equally important, these institutional arrangements are constructed piece by piece through the process of adjudication. As a
result, the relationship between these cases is not immediately
obvious; they appear to be situated in different discursive domains.
This apparent lack of relationship is misleading, for these cases
operate interactively to construct the terms and conditions of
transformation by determining who will NOT be agents of transformation. Cumulatively, they construct the institutional arrangements that constitute our social reality at the workplace.
1. The Duty of FairRepresentation in the Integration of
Segregated Union Locals
Almost thirty years ago, federal courts throughout the South
invoked Title VII to compel the integration of racially segregated
unions in the longshoring industry. The court-ordered mergers
occurred during the 1960s and 1970s. Some of the lawsuits were
filed by the United States government. 3 Others were brought by
recognition, the NLRA participated in the consolidation of that identity, but it did not
create it. See id. While legal rules do not determine the political identity we will assume,
nor the types of alliances we will form, they do construct the institutional arrangements in
which we must locate ourselves and each other.
33 See, e.g., EEOC v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 623 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 460 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1972) [hereinafter ILA
Baltimore]. Both lawsuits were originally brought by the Attorney General under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-6(a) (1988). However, effective March 1974, jurisdiction was transferred to the
EEOC by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1988); hence the EEOC became a substituted party in
the first case.
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individual black plaintiffs on their own behalf and that of similarly
situated longshoremen. 39 Both the DFR and the courts' perception
of the relationship between Title VII and the NLRA played an
important role in these decisions to merge the locals. In all of the
cases, the mergers were vehemently opposed, not only by white,
but also by black and latino union officials, and by a majority of
40
the black and latino workers these officials represented.
41
ILA Baltimore was one of the earliest union integration cases
to invoke the DFR. In that case, black union representatives
sought to limit the district court's decree abolishing dual hiring
halls and other reforms of the race-based practices prevailing at
the Port. The court rejected their position, reasoning that:
Apart from further litigation, [ending] discrimination
against black workers who aspire to non-gang jobs, such
as gearmen, mechanics and foremen, can only be accomplished by bargaining with the stevedores. But the officers
of the white local owe no duty to the members of the.
black local, and it is unrealistic to expect them to participate in hard bargaining on behalf of black longshoremen.
The president of the white local, while conceding that he
knew members of his local worked 300,000 hours more
than members of the black local in 1968, admitted he had
done nothing to correct this disparity because it was "not
within my power." At best the union's committee approaches the bargaining table with divided legal responsibilities and loyalties. However, merger of the locals will
place on all bargaining representatives, the statutory duty
42
to eliminate racial discrimination throughout the Port.
The court's reasoning was invoked again and again throughout
the series of cases ordering integration of the segregated longshoring unions of the South. In EEOC v. Int'l Longshoremen's

19See, e.g., Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc., 528 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1976) (class

action brought by black plaintiffs); Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 466 F. Supp. 662
(E.D. La. 1979) (same).
40 See United States v. Longshoremen's Ass'n, 334 F. Supp. 976, 978 (S.D. Tex. 1971);
Bailey, 528 F.2d at 551; Williams, 466 F. Supp. at 680.

4' 460 F.2d 497 (4th Cir. 1972).
42 Id. at 501.
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Ass'n, 43 black union representatives were particularly explicit
about the impact the merger would have on the interests of black
longshoremen and the black community in general. Testifying before the trial court, they asserted that:
[T]he Negroes, by having their own unions and their own
union officials, have been able to better themselves by
being able to hold high positions in their locals, and have
been recognized in the community as a separate, powerful
voice for the Negro communities, and has attained for
them and the Negro people of the community, a standing
which they could not have otherwise attained."
The court dismissed their objections. Quoting at length from
the Fourth Circuit's opinion in ILA Baltimore, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that "[race] discrimination is more likely to be overcome
when all of labor's negotiators have the statutory duty to oppose
discrimination as compared to the case when only some will oppose it and others will be willing, at least, to 4tolerate the discrimination in return for other types of benefits.
Merger was thus ordered, in part, on the theory that the black
workers were unlikely to make substantial progress at the bargaining table without it. The minorities who opposed the merger argued, however, that they did not need every representative at the
bargaining table representing their interests because they were
adequately represented by their separate representatives 46 and
could, in any event, sue both the employers and the unions under
Title VII if their defeats at the bargaining table were, in fact,
43511 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter EEOC v. ILA], aff'g United States v. Int'l
Longshoremen's Ass'n, 334 F. Supp. 976 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
4

United States v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 334 F. Supp. at 978.

45EEOC v. ILA, 511 F.2d at 279. See also Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 466
F. Supp. 662, 681 (E.D. La. 1979), concluding that:

representatives of separate unions charged with only serving that union cannot be
realistically expected to act strongly on behalf of the other union and, conseagreements between labor and management emerging from bargaining
quently ....
by one union on behalf of all longshoremen rather than one charged with serving
white employees and the other with serving black employees will better the
employment status of all employees.
46The benefits black longshoremen and the black community in general had achieved
through the institutionalization of separate representation was noted by numerous courts.
See, e.g., EEOC v. ILA, 511 F.2d 273; Williams, 466 F. Supp. 662.
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racially motivated. 47 Rather than merging the locals, the court
might have focused on developing legal doctrines that would make
Title VII a more effective remedy against discrimination both at
the bargaining table and in the employment decisions that were
not then being channeled through the collective bargaining process. The court opinions dismiss this possibility by minimizing,
without justification or argument, the existence of Title VII litigation as an important factor in assessing the necessity of merging
the locals.
The DFR and its purported impact at the bargaining table is,
therefore, crucial to the apparent "rightness" of these cases. If this
assumed impact is incorrect, then the dissolution of black and
latino organizations and their merger into the majority dominated
union is an empty formality which has little to do with eliminating
the conditions of subordination that racism entails. Worse than a
formality, these mergers would constitute an affirmative disempowerment of minorities as a group. Instead of preserving for
minorities the power of self-representation, these cases integrated
blacks and latinos as a numerical minority in a majoritarian organization whose representatives are, by implication, accountable to
them only through the DFR or Title VII litigation, the efficacy of
48
which the courts have minimized.
The relationship between Title VII and the NLRA is not an
explicit consideration in the union integration cases. Nevertheless,
these cases articulate a particular vision of how these two regimes
operate. To some extent these cases appear to want to channel
the elimination of race discrimination through the collective bargaining system established by the NLRA, rather than through the
courts, based on the theory that collective bargaining on behalf of

47 See Black Grievance Committee v. NLRB, 749 F.2d 1072 (3d Cir. 1984) (where more

than one employee organization is functioning in the workplace and none is established as
exclusive representative, an employer may not discriminate among the organizations on
the basis of race).
48Indeed, suspicions that the union integration cases may have been an empty formality
are further supported by the facts that (1) the mergers were ordered despite clear evidence

that integration would actually prejudice the employment opportunities of black and latino
longshoremen, EEOC v. Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 623 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1980) (irrelevant that employment opportunities of members of Mexican-American local would be

prejudiced by integration with white and black longshore locals); and (2) the Title VII
mandate which was deemed compelling enough to warrant merger of the locals was not
sufficiently compelling to warrant an immediate dissolution of segregated work gangs, ILA
Baltimore, 460 F.2d at 502-06 (applying business necessity defense).
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minorities is likely to end race discrimination more quickly than
further litigation under Title VII.
While the union integration cases invoke the DFR and an
implicit assessment of the relative relationship between Title VII
and the NLRA, these cases were argued and are generally thought
of in terms of the conflict between the Title VII right of an individual to be free of race discrimination and the First Amendment
rights of association of the workers who resisted integration. The
courts concluded that the right to associate did not include the
right to exclude groups in the formation of an association even if
the forced integration was resisted by and ultimately prejudicial to
the interests of the groups which Title VII sought to protect
(namely blacks and women).
Thus, in EEOC v. ILA, 49 the Fifth Circuit gave short shrift to

the fact that minority workers were opposing the mergers. According to the Court, the burden imposed by Title VII on the
officials seeking to maintain the segregated unions is "heavy" and
requires them to show that "this organizational structure would
not tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunitiesor
affect his status as an employee. ' 50 Not surprisingly, the court
concluded that this heavy burden was not met. "[E]ven granting
that present longshoremen, whether black or white, are paid the
same wages, have equal numbers of representatives on the contract negotiating committee, and, under a common seniority and
hiring hall, could be assured of an equal chance of obtaining longshore work," the segregated unions would still violate Title VII
because black workers who might otherwise pursue employment
as longshoremen might be dissuaded from seeking these opportunities because of the "stigma" associated with working in an all
black organization. 51 Consequently, the court concluded,
[i]t does not matter that many of the blacks currently in
the segregated local have come to regard it as a voice of
the black community. The effect of such segregation is
likely to be viewed as a negative one by many blacks
so
considering potential jobs and so long as one black
52
views it, the result of the practice is discrimination.
49511 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975).

55 1 Id. at 277 (emphasis in original).
Id.at 278.
52 Id.

(emphasis added).
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The courts' emphasis on the rights of minority individuals is
echoed throughout the reporters. One court after another has rejected the claims asserted by the majority of black and latino union
members who, in every instance, opposed the integration of their
locals with the white majority. For example, in Williams v. New
Orleans, the court invoked ILA Baltimore to reject the black
union's plea that:
[o]ver the years, Local 1419 has regarded itself, and has
been regarded by others, as a special spokesman and
leader of the black community . . . . It has used its
resources and the energies of its officers and members to
promote a wide variety of black educational, social and
political programs in an effort to improve the lot of the
black community. Local 1419 is a potent force on behalf
53
of blacks in New Orleans and Louisiana.
In response, the court simply noted that while the union's
work might be "a noble endeavor," there was some "doubt that it
is one which ought to be pursued under the direct auspices of a
'54
labor union.
Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co. 55 is perhaps the most compelling example of the courts' tendency to individualize the antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII. The case was a class action
filed by Alton Bailey, a black longshoreman, charging five stevedoring companies and two locals with various discriminatory employment practices in violation of Title VII. In response to the
lawsuit, 204 of approximately 230 members of Local 1830 filed a
petition with the district court, asserting in pertinent part:
We understand Boudreaux, Wells and Bailey claim
to represent all black persons employed as longshoremen
53Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 466 F. Supp. 662, 680 (E.D. La. 1979).
14 Id. See also ROBERT L. ALLEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA (1990)

(discussing importance of community institutions to combat the incoherence of ghetto life).
55528 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that the district court had erred in refusing to
grant a permanent injunction against the continuing operation of segregated locals), reh'g
denied, 533 F.2d 976 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977), on remand, 443 F.
Supp. 899 (M.D. La. 1978) (mandate ignored on the strength of East Texas Motor Freight
v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977)), rev'd on second appeal, 613 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1980)
(original mandate to issue injunction reinstated), reh'g denied, 618 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1980),

cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964 (1981).
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on the Port Allen docks since 1965 and all black persons
who are members of Local 1830.
We understand that they are seeking to join our black
Local 1830 and the white Local together.
We state Boudreaux, Wells and Bailey do not represent us as a class in their effort to integrate the unions.
If the unions are integrated, we will lose (1) our right to
equal jobs with the whites, (2) our right to elect our own
officers and grievance committees, and (3) our rights to
our own meetings and a chance to hold office and act for
the black longshoremen to protect their interest.
By maintaining our separate strength and not having
it diluted by joining with the white Local we have been
able to obtain the same wages, the same number of jobs
and equal working conditions, including foremen and
other jobs in the Port. If our Locals are put together a
few dissatisfied black men can join with the white men
and deprive the vast majority of black workers of their
jobs and working conditions.
We do not want these three men, Boudreaux, Wells
and Bailey to act for us as a class in this suit and we do
not want our Local Union destroyed. We understand that
white
if any of us want to we have the right to join the
56
now.
union
black
the
of
member
a
stay
or
union
In denying certification of the proposed class action, the trial
court concluded that "[t]he facts of this case clearly establish that
the claims of [Bailey] are individual in nature and the issues raised
by him are not issues common to any identifiable class too numerous to sue individually . .

. " It viewed the suit instead as

an individual action by Bailey "for no one's benefit but his own"
and, after finding no evidence of race discrimination either in the
volume or the nature of the work assignments, dismissed the
58
complaint.
The Fifth Circuit reversed. Relying on EEOC v. ILA, the court
noted that Title VII proscribed any organizational structure that
would tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities

- Bailey, 528 F.2d at 553.
7Id. at 553.
s8 Id.
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on account of race. 59 Accordingly, the court concluded that a union
could appropriately be dissolved over majority objection at the
instance of one single Title VII plaintiff. 60
The benefits minority workers and their communities had
achieved through their separate union locals were implicit in the
black workers' opposition to integration and explicit in their testimony before the courts. Judicial opinions, however, never articulated a principled, normatively defensible rationale for preserving
the separate locals, nor did the courts ever elaborate any perspective from which the separate unions might be understood as instrumental in effectuating the anti-discrimination policies of Title
VII. This was partly because the courts focused on individual
employment opportunites and conceptualized them as separate and
distinct from the community's status and power. In addition, the
courts operated within a colorblind vision of Title VII's anti-discrimination mandate-a vision that fails to consider how the allocation of institutional power across racial groups affects the prospects of racial equality and the role that unequal power plays in
maintaining race-based subordination.
For racial minority workers, the practical impact of these
decisions is discouraging; these cases establish substantial obstacles for the organization of collective action as well as for the
development of a common political identity. Efforts to institutionalize a collective identity in order to promote collective interests
are thwarted, from the start, by an apparent commitment to advance or preserve the employment opportunities of individual employees, whether actual 61 or imagined, 62 who may not want to work
through racially segregated locals.
2. The Duty of FairRepresentation and Section 7 Rights of
Concerted Activity
Like the integration cases, Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western
Addition Community Organization63 was concerned both with the
59
6 0 Id.

at 556.

Id. at 557.

Id.; Williams, 466 F. Supp. at 662.
ILA, 511 F.2d at 278 (discussing the hypothetical black worker who might
be dissuaded from entering the longshoring industry because of added "psychic discomfort"
of working through racially segregated locals). Of course, the "psychic" discomfort of
61

62 EEOC v.

working through the segregated locals may be preferrable to the "material" discomfort of
having no work at all because of the racist/sexist practices of employers and unions.
63 420

U.S. 50 (1975).
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appropriate relationship between Title VII litigation and the collective processes and institutions of the NLRA and with the relative priority of individual and collective rights. Somewhat surpris-

ingly, however, the only similarity in the resolution of these cases
was the way the DFR was invoked to legitimate the submergence

and demobilization of minorities within a broader collectivity controlled by a white majority.
Doctrinally, Emporium Capwell turned on resolving the relationship between a union's status as exclusive bargaining repre-

sentative under Section 9(a) of the NLRA64 and the employees'
right to engage in concerted activity under the protection of Section 7.65 The case arose as a result of the employer's retaliatory
discharge of two black workers who were involved in organizing
a picket and a community boycott to protest the employer's racially discriminatory employment practices. 66 When the workers

'A

Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides in part:

Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be
the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
6 Section 7 of the NLRA provides that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain
from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this Title.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
66Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 53-56. Initially, I should note that Emporium Capwell was decided by the Court and has since been interpreted as a separate bargaining case,
that is, as a case in which a subgroup of employees attempted to circumvent the union and
engage in separate collective bargaining with the employer. See, e.g., Abraham, supra note
37. The decision is problematic even at this initial level. First, the black workers vigorously
argued, and the lower court agreed, that they were not attempting to bargain, but were
instead "attempting only to present a grievance to their employer within the meaning of
the first proviso to section 9(a)." Id. at 61. That proviso states
[t]hat any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment
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were discharged, a community civil rights organization brought

suit against the employer under Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 67
Because Emporium Capwell plays a central role in the argu-

ment I am developing, a further statement of the facts will be
helpful. The union's efforts to address complaints of employment
discrimination began in April, 1968 when the union wrote a letter
taking an official position that the Emporium was discriminating
against workers on the basis of race. Shortly afterwards, the union
held a series of meetings attended by a number of black employees,
68
including the two employees who were later discharged.
After receiving no response to the first letter, the union sent
another letter, this time requesting that the Adjustment Board
convene to hear the charges of discrimination. When the Board

is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement
then in effect ....
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
The Court rejected this argument, holding that the proviso was not intended to give
individuals the right to present grievances to the employer, but rather to afford the employer
the discretion to "entertain such grievances without... [risking] liability for dealing directly
with employees in derogation of the ... [employer's] duty to bargain only with exclusive
bargaining representative ......Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 61. This response,
however, only assumes the issue in dispute: whether the employer would have lbeen
bargaining in violation of the union's status as exclusive representative or simply adjusting
a group grievance pursuant to an existing anti-discrimination clause in the collective bargaining agreement. See generally Edmond T. Fitzgerald, DissidentActivity and the Exclusivity Principle Under the NationalLabor Relations Act: NLRB v. Chelsea Laboratories,
Inc., 55 BROOK. L. REv. 721 (1989) (Section 7 protection of concerted actions by rank and
file union members traditionally turned on whether the workers' agenda was consistent
with the union's purposes, policies or procedures, not on whether it was authorized by the
union; nevertheless the Board's interpretation has been less than consistent).
Moreover, since concerted action opposing race discrimination had previously been
protected by Section 7, see, e.g, Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd., 148 N.L.R.B. 1402, 1403-04,
aff'd after remand, 166 N.L.R.B. 551, enforced, 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969), Emporium
Capvell is a separate bargaining case only if all it means is that protesting workers must
refrain from demanding to meet with the employer. Under the Court's reasoning, however,
the case cannot reasonably be construed so narrowly. Thus, Emporium Capwell is best
read as a drastic contraction of the circumstances under which collective self-help by racial
subgroups will have Section 7 protection. Nevertheless, I treat it as a separate bargaining
case.
67 Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA states that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 157 of this Title ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988).
63 The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 180 (1971). At least one of these meetings was
attended by representatives of the Fair Employment Practices Committee and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. Id.

418

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 28

convened, four black employees (who had been attending the
union's meetings) stated that
they would not participate [in the grievance proceedings]
as individuals but only as a group; that they objected to
prosecuting grievances on an individual basis and wanted
the matter of racial discrimination presented as an issue
affecting all employees belonging to minority races; that
they insisted on meeting with the [Emporium's] President
and they would not go ahead with the Adjustment Board
hearing.

69

The four employees walked out of the hearing.
Later, after unsuccessful efforts to meet with the Emporium's
President, several of the workers held a press conference. Their
statements were substantially similar to the message in the pamphlet which they later distributed while peacefully picketing on
their own time on a Saturday. 70 The next Thursday, the Emporium's manager of labor relations gave the workers notice that they
would be fired if they repeated their activities. 7' Despite the warning, the workers picketed again on the following Saturday and two
72
of them were discharged on Monday.
69 Id. at 181 (footnote omitted). Among the demands was that "selling personnel of the
following Racial groups.., be infiltrated into the following high commission selling areas.
Black, Mexicans, Chinese, Filipinos, etc." Emporium Capivell, 420 U.S. at 68 n.21.
70 The pamphlets distributed by the dissenters read as follows:

BEWARE EMPORIUM SHOPPERS BOYCOTT IS ON !!!
For years at the Emporium black, brown, yellow and red people have worked
at the lowest jobs, at the lowest levels. Time and time again we have seen
intelligent hard working brothers and sisters denied promotions and basic respect.
The Emporium is a 20th century colonial plantation. The brothers and sisters
are being treated the same way as our brothers are being treated in the slave mines
of Africa.
Whenever the racist pig at the Emporium injures or harms a black sister or
brother, they injure and insult all black people. THE EMPORIUM MUST PAY
FOR THESE INSULTS. Therefore, we encourage all of our people to take their
money out of this racist store, until black people have full employment and are
promoted justly throughout the Emporium.
We welcome the support of our brothers and sisters from the churches, unions,
sororities, fraternities, social clubs, Afro-American Institute, Black Panther Party,
W.A.C.O. and the Poor People's Institute.
Emporium Capivell, 420 U.S. at 55-56 n.2.
71 The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. at 182.
72 The Trial Examiner's recitation of the facts does not indicate whether the two
claimants were the only employees picketing on November 9; however, they were, in all
prior incidents, accompanied by at least two other employees. Id.
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Adopting the findings and conclusions of the Trial Examiner,
the Board concluded that the employees' protest activities, though
concerted, were not protected by Section 7 because they amounted
to "nothing short of a demand that the [Company] bargain with
the picketing employees for the entire group of minority employees." 73 According to the Board, a demand for separate bargaining
undermined the union's status as exclusive representative under
Section 9(a). Affording Section 7 protection to this kind of activity
would undermine the statutory system of bargaining
through an exclusive, elected representative, impede
elected unions' efforts at bettering the working conditions
of minority employees, "and place on the Employer an
unreasonable burden of attempting to placate self designated representatives of minority groups while abiding by
the terms of a valid bargaining agreement and attempting
in good faith to meet whatever demands the bargaining
representative put forth under the agreement." 74
a. The Appeals Court Decision:A Unified Labor Policy
The D.C. Circuit acknowledged on appeal that the principle
of exclusive representation established by Section 9(a) might, in
some cases, require denial of Section 7 protection to concerted
activity by dissident individuals and groups. 75 Nevertheless, while
the structure of governance established by the NLRA affords
unions broad discretion to prioritize among the competing interests
of individual members, the right to be free from racial discrimination was, according to the court, an individual right secured by
federal law, not by the collective bargaining process. 76 Conse73Id. at 185.
74 Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 58 (quoting The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. at 186).

7- Western Addition Community Org. v. NLRB, 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973). According to the court,
the exclusivity principle ... was premised on the concept of majority rule. This
concept-that what was best for the union was best for the individual-recognized
that collective bargaining could not proceed where various factions within the
bargaining unit were free to present conflicting or unequal demands to the employer. Subjection of the will of the individual to the will of the majority was the
method Congress chose to preserve industrial peace and stability over matters in
which individuals would most likely disagree ....
76 Id. at 927.
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quently, even as exclusive bargaining representatives, unions had
no authority to compromise, waive or in anyway dilute an individual's enjoyment of Title VII rights to be free from discrimination.
While a union might in other cases subordinate the interests of
particular individuals in order to further the interests of the majority, "on the issue of whether to tolerate racial discrimination in
employment the individuals in a union cannot legally disagree.""
Thus, in denying the black employees Section 7 protection, the
Board not only failed to recognize a fundamental limitation on the
bargaining representative's authority, but also failed to give appropriate weight to the independent statutory foundation which supported the rights asserted by the black workers 78 and protected
the very activities for which they were discharged. 79
The D.C. Circuit's opinion is significant because the court
articulated a specific vision of the relationship between Title VII
and the NLRA and of the Board's role with respect to that relationship. According to the court, the NLRA is to be interpreted
in light of the anti-discrimination policies of Title VII because both
statutes embody and attempt to effectuate a unified national labor
policy. To interpret either statute in isolation would have unintended consequences, as for example, converting the NLRA's
principle of exclusive representation into broad authority for
unions "to control the scope, direction, pace and degree of racial

77The court continued:

The law does not give the union an option to tolerate some racial discrimination,
but declares that all racial discrimination in employment is illegal .... Therefore,
the underlying premise of section 9(a) that the will of the individual must be
subjected to the will of the majority does not authorize the approval of racially
discriminatory employment practices, because the purposes of the minority group
and the union in desiring to eradicate the racial discrimination in employment
cannot be at odds.

Id. at 928-29.
78Id. at 927.

79 According to the court, the employees' protest activities were protected under
Section 704(a) of Title VII, which provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees or applicants for employment ... or for a labor organization
to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership, because
he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1988).
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discrimination." 80 Thus, while the Board's primary responsibility
is to interpret the NLRA and to effectuate its policies, the Board,
as a federal agency, must also act so that its interpretations of the
NLRA are not inconsistent with the policies underlying other major federal legislation, specifically Title VII. As the court noted,
"the Board has an obligation in construing the acts which it administers to recognize, and sometimes reconcile, coexisting and
s
perhaps inconsistent policies embodied in other legislation."'
The court's opinion also reflects a value judgment about which
policies must prevail in the event of a conflict at the intersection.
For the D.C. Circuit, the national policy of eliminating race discrimination took precedence over the NLRA's policy of promoting
"orderly collective bargaining. 82 While concerted activity by racial subgroups might undermine the stability associated with exclusive representation, the court considered the "disruptive effect
• . . to be outweighed where protection of minority activity is
necessary to full and immediate realization of the policy against
discrimination."8 3 Accordingly, the court carved out a narrow area
of protection for racial subgroups protesting race discrimination in
cases where the union's efforts fall short of a standard requiring
the union to be "actually remedying" the discrimination "to the
fullest extent possible, by the most expedient and efficacious
means." 8 4 Since the black workers in Emporium Capwell could
reasonably believe that the union could fight race discrimination
more effectively by entering into collective bargaining negotiations
than by processing individual grievances, their concerted protests
could not be denied Section 7 protection.8 5
b. The Supreme Court's Decision: The Fragmentationof
DoctrinalDomains
The Supreme Court purportedly agreed with the D.C. Circuit
that the NLRA and Title VII should be interpreted as elements of

90Western Addition, 485 F.2d at 931 (quoting The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 176
(1971) (Member Jenkins dissenting)).
81 Id. at 928 (quoting Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)). See
also Shultz v. Local 1291, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 338 F. Supp. 1204, 1208 (E.D. Pa.

1972) (a court may not consider an employment practice "reasonable" for purposes of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act if the practice would be unlawful under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
"I Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 59.
83Id. (emphasis added).
84 Western Addition, 485 F.2d at 931.
85Id.
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a unified national labor policy, and that eliminating racial discrimination is a highest priority of that "unified" policy.8 6 The Court
also recognized that Section 7 protection would give the black
workers access to the enforcement procedures of the NLRB,
which the Court reluctantly acknowledged might be instrumentally87
superior to the procedures established for enforcing Title VII.
Nevertheless, the Court refused to afford Section 7 protection to
racial subgroups engaged in concerted activities in support of their
demands for non-discriminatory employment policies.
Analytically, the Court's first and perhaps most significant
move was to separate Title VII and the NLRA, or more precisely,
to fragment the national labor policy across two doctrinal domains.
In rejecting the D.C. Circuit's argument that the mandate of Title
VII compelled both the employer and the union to bargain with
black workers demanding non-discriminatory employment policies, the Supreme Court distinguished the substantive rights established by Title VII from those established by the NLRA, most
specifically, the right to engage in collective action to apply economic pressure in support of collective demands.8 8 The Court later
elaborated this distinction in addressing the workers' more specific
claim that failure to afford their protest activities the protection of
Section 7 would undermine the Congressional policy to protect
employees engaged in conduct opposing unlawful discriminationa policy expressly manifested in Section 704(a) of Title VII.
According to the Court, the fact that a particular conduct (like
employee opposition to race discriminatory practices) might be
protected under Title VII does not mean that it should be protected
under the NLRA. 89 Instead, the issue whether employee conduct
is protected under Section 7 must be determined exclusively by
reference to NLRA precedents, which define the sorts of activities
protected by the statute in light of the NLRA's own distinct policies and purposes. If an authoritative interpretation indicates that
protecting the conduct at issue would be inconsistent with those
policies or purposes, then Section 7 protection must be denied
regardless of how the conduct would be treated under Title VII.
The conduct may still be protected, but only under Title VII. 90

86 Emporium

Capwell, 420 U.S. at 66.

7 Id. at 72-73.

MId. at 69.
89Id. at 71.
90 Id. at 71-72.
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The Court's decision did not simply distinguish the substantive rights established under Title VII and the NLRA. It also held
that the substantive rights created under one legal regime would
not be enforced through the procedural mechanisms of the other
(or at least, that Title VII substantive rights would not be enforced
through NLRA procedures, which includes the protection of concerted action). The black workers objected to this result on the
grounds that Title VII procedures were "inadequate to effectively
secure the rights conferred by Title VII." 91 For lack of an adequately developed record, the Court withheld judgment on the
merits of this argument. 92 Nevertheless, the Court asserted that
even if true, the argument would not alter its decision. The argument was more appropriately addressed to Congress, which, according to the Court, had intentionally established the procedural
distinctions between the two regimes. 93 To interpret Title VII and
the NLRA in a way that permitted the substantive norms of one
regime to be enforced through the procedures of the other would
be "to override a host of consciously made decisions well within
the exclusive competence of the Legislature." 94
c. Modeling the Regimes, Considering the Consequences
The D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court used different models
of the relationship between Title VII and the NLRA. 95 In the D.C.
Circuit's model, Title VII operates not only as a substantive limit
on the types of decisions that will be permitted to emerge from
the procedural structures established by the NLRA, but also provides necessary background for interpreting the institutions and
processes established under the NLRA. In the Supreme Court's
model, Title VII is essentially an external regime. Thus, while
actions governed by the NLRA may also be challenged under Title
91Id. at 72.
92 The Court's opinion suggests that its holding would have been the same even if the
inadequacy of Title VII were established. Id. at 65 n.16.
91Id. at 73.
94The Court acknowledged that the legislative intent on this issue was hardly unequivocal, particularly in light of the fact that Congress affirmatively rejected an express proposal
to make Title VII's remedial process an exclusive remedy. Thus the Court refused to
foreclose the possibilty that "in some [undetermined] circumstances rights created by the
NLRA and related laws affecting the employment relationship must be broadened to
accommodate the policies of Title VII." Id. at 73-74 n.26.
9SI am indebted to Patrick Gudridge for helping me conceptualize these two alternative
models. See Patrick Gudridge, Arbitration and Statutory Prominence (1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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VII, the NLRA creates a separate substantive domain, whose
contours are interpreted and whose procedural mechanisms are
triggered independent of the doctrines and policies of Title VII.
The D.C. Circuit would make Title VII policies and doctrines
an operative factor in the evolution of NLRA precedents. The
Supreme Court, on the other hand, would render Title VII's nondiscrimination principle an issue warranting "sensitivity. ' 96 Consequently, the Court's decision in Emporium Capwell ensured that
the policy promoting the resolution of industrial conflict would be
articulated and enforced in one procedural framework and doctrinal domain, while the policy prohibitting race and gender-based
discrimination would be articulated and enforced in a very different
framework/domain.
Understanding the way this fragmentation of Title VII and the
NLRA operates through different legal contexts is one of the first
steps toward understanding the concept of law as structural violence. The argument can be made at multiple levels. At one level,
the argument is that by fragmenting Title VII and the NLRA into
separate doctrinal domains, Emporium Capwell did much more
than simply limit the extent to which the whole power of the state
could be used to eliminate race and gender subordination in the
workplace. 97 In fact, the fragmentation of these regimes created
an interpretative context in which the inconsistent and biased
treatment of crucial conceptual structures, like the relationship
between individual and collective rights or the relationship between group membership and fair representation, would remain
hidden. From this perspective, legal interpretation produces structural violence against women of color because the fragmentation
of these regimes hides from us, and often from judges, the extent
to which the same interests and identities that are negated in the
interpretation of one regime are also negated in the interpretation
of the other.
A comparison of Emporium Capwell and the union integration
cases provides an initial example. In the union integration cases,
black and latino workers were denied the authority to maintain an
independent collective identity as a result of the courts' judgment
that collective rights and majority interests must give way to the
96Emporium Capivell, 420 U.S. at 72 n.25.
97See generally Herbert Hill, The National Labor Relations Act and the Emergence

of Civil Rights Law: A New Priorityin FederalLabor Policy, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.

299 (1976).
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individual's Title VII rights. The segregated locals were merged
on the theory that the separate locals violated Title VII if only one
individual could show that the arrangement tended to deprive him
of equal employment opportunities. The merger caused black and
latino workers to lose an important institution through which they
had been able to advance their collective interests, both in the
workplace and in the local community. 98
Like the integration cases, Emporium Capwell also denied
minorities an independent collective identity. After fragmenting
Title VII and the NLRA into separate regimes, the Court reviewed
the policies and precedents established under the NLRA and concluded that the black workers were not entitled to Section 7 protection. This time, however, the suppression of minority collective
agency was effected on the theory that the Title VII rights the
black workers were attempting to enforce through their collective
action were individual rights that must give way to the majority's
collective rights.
In denying the black workers' claim under the NLRA, the
Court acknowledged that Section 7 guarantees employees the right
of "industrial self-determination"; nevertheless, the Court characterized these rights as being "for the most part, collective rights
to act in concert with one's fellow employees; they are protected
not for their own sake but as an instrument of the national labor
policy of minimizing industrial strife 'by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining.' 99
According to the Court, a central feature of this collective
bargaining process is a commitment to majority rule. Under the
industrial relations system established by the NLRA, the majority
in any appropriate bargaining unit determines whether the unit will
be unionized and who shall represent it. It is the majority's interest
which the union is bound to represent and must attempt to further. 100 Accordingly, a system of majority rule implies that minority
interests will give way to majority preferences. 10'
91Compare Williams v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n, 466 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. La. 1979)

(questioning whether this was an appropriate purpose for a labor union) with CONE, supra
note 13 (discussing the decomposition of the ghetto for want of community creating
institutions).
99Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 62 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 151) (July 23, 1947)).

100
Seep v. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(rejecting DFR claim against union on grounds that union's refusal to support demands of
female clerical workers justified by a judgment that it should protect interests of numerical
majority, namely male workers).
10,
See Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 62.
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Because the NLRA was designed to establish conditions under which collective bargaining would be an effective vehicle for
promoting the collective interests of workers as a group, efforts
to bargain separately are viewed with suspicion, whether they are
initiated by an employer or an individual worker. 10 2 On the one
hand, separate bargaining is a strategy employers routinely use to
make appeals that divide workers and throw individuals into such
competition that, ultimately, every individual is worse off than she
would have been had she subordinated her individual interests and
held out with her co-workers for the collective good. On the other
hand, even if some individuals do manage to extract superior terms
or conditions in separate bargains than they would have obtained
as group members through the collective bargain, the presumption
is that these advantages are obtained at the expense of other group
members.
Emporium Capwell seeks to maintain an industrial relations
system in which the majority's interest is furthered by denying
individuals the power of self-determination and requiring them to
submit their individual interests to a collective decision-making
process. The normative justification for this system construes collectivization as a reflection of worker solidarity-a commitment to
promote the common or collective good over individual self-interests. 103 The instrumental justification promotes collectivization as
a means of developing institutional arrangements in which workers
can confront employers on an "equal" basis. Only the power of a
union can successfully confront and counteract the power of management. 104 Accordingly, collectivization is viewed as the worker's
best hope for securing his interests, even if the cost is the centralization of authority and the suppression of individual selfdetermination.
These two accounts of collectivization converge in Emporium
Capwell and provide the Court's basis for withholding Section 7
protection from the black workers who were discharged as a result
of their collective protest activities. 0 5 Drawing on these images,
,02See, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1943).
103See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 37, at 1294.
0 This version of collectivization is based on an adversarial model of industrial relations which has its intellectual orgins in the Marxist idea of class struggle. See, e.g., Harper
& Lupu, supra note 34.
105 Although the Court construed the workers' activities as an effort to bargain separately, it is clear that they were discharged not because they insisted on meeting with the
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the Court construed the black workers' Section 7 claim as a request
for "special treatment," that is, as a request that the Court carve
out an exception to the principle of exclusive representation "peculiarly affecting" racial minorities.10 6 The black workers' protest
activities were construed as a breach of solidarity because they
constituted efforts to promote the special interests of some individuals at the expense of the collective interests of the whole.
The important point is that the Court's reasoning in Emporium
Capwell raises significant questions about the "rightness" of the
integration decisions, even as the integration cases raise significant
questions about the "rightness" of Emporium Capwell. If individual Title VII rights prevail over majority rights in the union integration cases, then why do they not also prevail in Emporium
Capwell? Alternatively, if majority rights (based on the majority's
interest in maintaining the power of its collective representative)
prevail over individual Title VII rights in Emporium Capwell, then
why doesn't the majority's interest also prevail over those same
rights in the union integration cases? Collective action and the
legal recognition of collective identity are surely as crucial to the
advancement of black and latina workers as they are to the advancement of the white majority.
Both Emporium Capwell and the union integration cases mediate the individual/collective rights conflict through a vision of
group identity that is formally colorblind and gender neutral. The
practical consequence of this approach is to imprison minorities
in institutional arrangements in which they can hold no effective
power. The structure of institutional power that is maintained, at
one end, by Emporium Capwell and, at the other, by the union
integration cases constitutes racial minorities as a demobilized
subset submerged in the majoritarian institutions it constructs and
consolidates.
For women of color, the practical disempowerment effected
by this structure is exponentially multiplied. Situated at the intersection of multiple socially constructed categories, women of color
are constituted as members of various groups, whose most common characteristic, from our perspective, is that we are most often
Emporium's President, nor even because they refused to participate in the joint grievance
procedures. The workers were discharged on account of their press releases, their picketing
activities and their efforts to organize a community boycott.
106

Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 65.
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numerical minorities. 0 7 Equally important, ostensibly gender/color
blind collectives operate to deconstruct women of color, both as
individuals and as a collective political identity. The move toward
deconstruction is explicit in the priority given individual rights in
the union integration cases and implicit in Emporium Capwell's
refusal to recognize the collective nature of the black workers'
claims and protests.
Framing the issue in Emporium Capwell as a conflict between
individual and collective rights was positively ironic, since it was
precisely the union's individualized case by case approach to racial
grievances to which the black workers objected and against which
they mobilized. The dissidents were not acting to further their own
individual self-interests, but rather to promote the collective interests of subordinated racial groups within an institutional arrangement dominated by another racial subgroup, namely white male
workers and their representatives. As Justice Douglas noted in
dissent, "it]he employees were engaged in a traditional form of
are unquestionably a
labor protest, directed at matters which
08
proper subject of employee concern.'
Recognizing the irony is not enough. The problem is the
Court's vision of collective identity. Like the union integration
cases, Emporium Capwell ignores the impact of race/gender discrimination on an individual's political self-identity and group allegiances. It presupposes that every worker (regardless of race or
gender) is similarly situated insofar as she is torn between her
individual self-interests and a common interest in the "collective
good" pursued by the majority's exclusive representative. By presupposing a simple one dimensional conflict between individual

Thus, if race is an impermissible basis for self-determination and collective action,
107
then as racial minorities we are bound to be constituted as demobilized and disaggregated
individuals in organizations dominated by white majorities (whether male or female). Likewise, if gender is an inappropriate category for collective action and self-determination,
then given the current demographics of the workplace, we can again expect to find ourselves
constituted as minorities without effective institutional power in organizations dominated
by male majorities (whether white or nonwhite). Given these institutional arrangements,
our only recourse is the substantive limits imposed upon majoritarian decisions by the DFR
or Title VII, or, alternatively, to engage in unlawful mobilization and suffer the
consequences.

10s
Emporium Capvell, 420 U.S. at 75 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Court's insistence
on construing the black workers' concerted activity as separate bargaining is normatively
loaded. The Court characterized their activity as the pursuit of self-interest (which the
labor laws abhor) rather than an expression of solidarity and mutual interdependence. See
supra note 66.
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self-interest and the collective good, the Court ignored the existence of subordinated communities, whose collective interests may
claim the allegience of individual members even as those interests
differ from both the interests of the majority group and the personal
"self" interests of individual group members. Indeed, by invoking
the readily available rhetoric of "factions" and "special interests,"
the Court was able to delegitimize the black workers' efforts at
collective self-help and to avoid any consideration of the way in
which the allocation of institutional power among different groups
of workers determines which interests will be deemed "special"
and which will be deemed "collective" or in the "common good."
The Emporium Capwell opinion operates on other levels as
well. Like the union integration cases, Emporium Capwell invokes
the DFR and contemplates a potential Title VII action against the
employer or the union. In doing so, the Court creates an impression that while minority workers may be unable to influence the
processes through which the majority decides how to handle race
discrimination complaints, they are not without recourse. Since
black workers have alternatives other than disruptive protesting
or separate bargaining, the Court could focus entirely on the costs
of separate bargaining by racial minorities.
For the Court, the costs of separate bargaining and collective
action were evident and substantial and outweighed the benefits.
Given a limited number of positions, "an employer confronted
with bargaining demands from each of the several minority groups
would not necessarily be able to agree to remedial steps satisfactory to all at once." 10 9 According to the Court,
Competing claims on the employer's ability to accommodate each group's demands, e.g., for reassignments
and promotions to a limited number of positions, could
only set one group against the other even if it is not the
employer's intention to divide and overcome them. Having divided themselves, the minority employees will not
be in position to advance their cause unless it be by
recourse seriatim to economic coercion, which can only
have the effect of further dividing them along racial or
other lines.110
109Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 67.
110Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Moreover, "[w]ith each group able to enforce its conflicting demands-the incumbent employees by resort to the contractual
processes and the minority employees by economic coercion-the
probability of strife and deadlock is high; the likelihood of making
headway against discriminatory practices would be minimal."'11
The problem with this reasoning is that it suggests that withholding
from minority workers the authority to assert their separate interests will somehow resolve "the conflicting demands" and unify the
workers. This suggestion is a lie. Denying self-identified racial
subgroups the power of self-representation on issues of race discrimination on the ground that separate bargaining will splinter
workers into competing subgroups ignores the fact that these
groups have already been constituted and individual interests have
already been fragmented across the divisions which discrimination
has created. In a workforce divided by race and gender discrimination, withholding Section 7 protection accomplishes very little
toward resolving those divisions. The number of positions is still
limited, the workers' interests are still divided across race and
gender lines and their competing claims remain unresolved. The
only thing accomplished is to concentrate institutional power in
the white-dominated union officers and restrict the number of
demands the employer must confront and resolve, both achieved
by submerging minority interests and demobilizing minority
agency.
The way the courts negotiate the relationship between Title
VII and the NLRA produces structural violence. By fragmentating
these two regimes, the courts maintain an interpretative context
which accords inconsistent priority to individual and collective
rights and hides the practical consequences from view. However,
the fragmentation of Title VII and the NLRA does more than
simply provide a context in which individual and collective rights
can be blindly manipulated. These fragmented domains are also
11Id. at 68-69 (citation omitted). Again, like the union integration cases, the assumption here is that the redistribution of power across racial groups will promote further racial
fragmentation. See, e.g., EEOC v. ILA, 511 F.2d at 279. The idea that racial harmony can
be grounded on the institutional disempowerment of minority groups is simply wrong.
Consider that racial fragmentation is a function of racial subordination, which is effected
through the concentration of institutional and interpretative power in members of the
dominant racial group. Redistributing power across racial groups is the first step towards
ending the conditions of racial subordination; ending racial subordination is the only legitimate way to stop human beings from "further dividing them[selves] along racial or other
lines." See also supra note 13 (no power, no justice; no justice, no peace).
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the context in which the relationship between these two regimes

is interpretatively manipulated to produce a legal structure in
which our political identities and collective agency are systemati11 3
cally negated.112 Consider King v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.
In King, the relationship between Title VII and the NLRA
was once again examined, this time in the context of a Section
704(a) claim.114 The plaintiff, William King was a draftsman at the
Illinois Telephone Company. About a year after he was hired, a

group of black employees presented the Company's representatives with a list of grievances alleging numerous instances of race
discrimination and communicated their refusal to work until the
grievances were resolved. When they were suspended from work,
l1 It might be argued, for example, that the reversed priority given to individual and
collective rights in the union integration cases and Emporium Capwell is not inconsistent
at all. Recall that in Emporium Capivell the Supreme Court rejected the claim that Section
7 of the NLRA should be interpreted to further the national policy against race discrimination as reflected generally by the passage of Title VII and, more particularly, by the
protection Section 704(a) affords individuals engaged in oppositional conduct protesting
violations of Title VII. Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 70-72. The Court rejected an
interpretative approach that would have required the policies of Title VII and the NLRA
to inform the interpretation of the other, and instead invoked a model of disconnected legal
regimes with distinct substantive rights and procedural structures.
From one perspective, the union integration cases reaffirm and vindicate the legitimacy
of this disconnected model. If we ignore the impact of this model on minority collective
agency, one might argue that the union integration cases demonstrate the lengths to which
courts will go in affirming individual workers' Title VII rights once they are asserted in the
appropriate forum. Id. at 70. Minority workers have only to invoke Title VII properly, and
their Title VII rights will take precedence not only over the majority will, which the NLRA
is designed to further, but even over the majority's very existence as a legal entity.
My position is that we cannot ignore the way minority agency is suppressed and
submerged as a result of these decisions. If there are limits on the extent to which courts
are willing to embrace doctrinal interpretations that fundamentally alter the status quo of
race and gender subordination, see infra Part II.D.2., then forcing individuals to assert
their fundamental rights through the courts (as opposed to redesigning the structures of
institutional power and and representational authority so that they themselves may protect
their interests) is at least as debilitating as withholding these rights in the first place. See
Schnably, supra note 17.
Nevertheless, if this attempted reconciliation can withstand criticisms stemming from
its suppression of minority agency, it cannot withstand the impact of King v. Illinois Bell
Telephone Co., 476 F. Supp. 495, 501 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (defining the relationship between
Title VII and the NLRA in construing the scope of Title VII's section 704(a)).
13476 F. Supp. 495 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
"4 Id. at 501. The Supreme Court has not returned to examine whether Section 704(a)
protects "opposition conduct" that would constitute unprotected concerted activity under
the NLRA since the issue was left undecided in Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. at 71 n.25.
Moreover, there are very few lower court cases on point: King, 476 F. Supp. 495; Mozee
v. Jeffboat, 746 F.2d 365, 374 (7th Cir. 1984) (case remanded but issue not decided); Mosley
v. General Motors Corp., 497 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mo. 1980). For the text of Section 704(a),
see supra note 79. For a helpful overview of how Section 704(a) has been applied generally,
see Edward Walterscheid, A Question of Retaliation: Opposition Conduct as Protected
Expression under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 B.C. L. REv. 391 (1988).
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they formed a picket line outside the Company's corporate headquarters in Chicago during working hours. Although King was not
involved in these initial activities, he and other employees, both
black and white, joined the picket line later.
Two days after he joined the demonstrators, King was the
group's spokesperson in a meeting with company officers. They
warned King that the demonstrators would be fired if they did not
return to work; a few days later King and the other demonstrators
were discharged. About a month later, a number of the employees
were asked to return and be considered for re-employment. Eight
of the fifteen employees who returned were re-hired. King was
not.
While the Company claimed that King was a poor worker with
a poor attitude, King claimed that the Company's refusal to rehire
him was both racially motivated and retaliatory. King claimed
participation in the work stoppage and picketing activities was
protected by Section 704(a). The Company, on the other hand,
argued that the strikes were not protected under Section 704(a)
because they were conducted by union members during working
hours in violation of a no-strike clause contained in the union's
collective bargaining agreement with the Company. In resolving
the dispute, the court found it necessary to construe not only Title
VII, but also to examine the policies embodied in the NLRA since
"strikes are an integral part of our labor laws." t 5 Reviewing the
Supreme Court's decision in Emporium Capwell, the King court
noted that Emporium Capwell had expressly declined to decide
whether the discharged employees were protected by the opposition conduct clause of section 704(a) of Title VII. Nevertheless,
after quoting the Court for the proposition that Title VII rights
"cannot be pursued at the expense of the orderly collective-bargaining process contemplated by the NLRA... [whether they are
thought to depend upon Title VII or have an independent source
in NLRA]," the King court concluded that it was "reasonable to
infer that the Court would reject the argument that an employee's
Section 704(a) right to oppose employment discrimination encomprohibited by the
passes the use of work stoppages which are
' 16
terms of a collective bargaining agreement."
"5

King, 476 F. Supp. at 500.

501. The Court continued: "If an employer cannot obtain a binding no-strike
clause, then his incentive to bargain is decreased [so that, the employer has a legal obligation
116Id. at
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The evolution of doctrine from Emporium Capwell to King is
as significant as it was predictable. 117 If King represents the ultimate resolution of the issue left undecided in Emporium Capwell,
namely, the degree to which Section 704(a) protects concerted
activity that is unprotected under the NLRA, then the relationship
between Title VII and the NLRA is not, after all, distinct and
discontinuous. While Emporium Capwell ensures that the rights
and privileges established by the NLRA will not be expanded to
accommodate the anti-discrimination policies of Title VII, King
means that the rights established under Title VII will be contracted
to accommodate the policies and objectives of the NLRA. As a
result, the anti-discrimination mandate of Title VII is subordinated
to the policies of the NLRA in both regimes.
Consider the impact of this structure on a woman of color
who inhabits a workplace regulated by these intersecting regimes. 1 8 She is at the intersection of a network of instititutional
arrangements that fragment her individual identity and diffuse her
political identity. Each regime offers an alternative set of incentives and opportunites that conflict with each other but converge
upon her in a manner that ignores the integrity of her reality as an
individual situated at the intersection of the multiple practices of
race/gender/class based oppression.
Collective action through unions is the recognized vehicle
through which working people protect and promote their interests.
Yet, given the union integration cases, the woman of color cannot
realistically hope to establish a union in which she would be majority member. 119 Supporting unionization as a minority/woman
may further her class interests, but perhaps at the expense of her
race/gender interests. 20 If the workplace is unionized, the woman
to bargain regardless of incentives]. He will be less willing to make concessions during the

bargaining process. The end result is that the collective bargaining process would be
weakened in its ability to resolve disputes." Id.
117 For an early prediction of the perverse impact of Emporium Capwell, see Note,
Title VII and NLRA: Protectionof Extra-Union Oppositionto Employment Discrimination,

72 MICH. L. REv. 313, 325 (1973) (protection under Section 704(a) for employees in
unionized workplaces may be restricted after The Emporium).
1,8
Clearly, not only women of color may find themselves suppressed and demobilized
by this structure. Rather than undermining my analysis, this fact provides all the more
reason for changing this structure along the lines I advocate below. See infra parts III.A.2.

&B.
119
But see Allegheny General Hospital v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979), discussed
infra notes 139-157 and accompanying text.
120See, e.g., Rhonda M. Williams & Peggie R. Smith, What "Else" Do Unions Do?:
Race and Gender in Local 35, REv. BLACK POL. ECON., Winter 1990, at 59.
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of color may lose the legal protection her oppositional agency
might otherwise receive under Title VII.121 On the other hand,
resisting unionization may further her race/gender interests, but
perhaps at the expense of her class interests. 22 That Title VII and
the NLRA were not created for her is best evidenced by the fact
that she neither exists for them except as a fragment of who she
is, nor can she, through them, affirm her interests as an integrated
whole.

123

C. The Structures of Inclusion and Exclusion: Towvard a Second
Understandingof Structural Violence
In this section, I situate women of color in the network of
legal rules that establish the parameters of the bargaining unit.
Both the DFR and the fragmentation of Title VII and the NLRA
play significant roles in rationalizing decisions that create an institutional arrangement in which women of color find themselves
without effective means either for resisting their compulsory inclusion or for preventing their exclusion from a bargaining unit
sought by the majority.
1. Board Certificationsof DiscriminatoryUnions:
Compulsory Inclusion

In Handy Andy, Inc.124 the DFR was invoked to rationalize
the NLRB's refusal to consider charges of discrimination against
a union seeking certification.12 5 As in Emporium Capwell and the

121See,
122See,

e.g., Note, supra note 117, at 325.
e.g., Union Labor Report Weekly Newsletter (BNA), Apr. 2, 1992, at 100-02.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, union members received higher pay than nonunion workers both in 1990 (when median weekly pay was $509 and $390, respectively)
and in 1991 (when median weekly pay was $526 and $404, respectively). Unionized men
received median weekly earnings of $568 compared to unionized women, who received
$467. Non-union men and women received median weekly pay of $473 and $348, respectively. Black union members received $461 median weekly pay. There was no breakdown
by sex.
123See supra note 22.
124228 N.L.R.B. 447 (1977).
125Board certification establishes a union as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit. After certification, minority employees who may have voted
against the union are prohibited from seeking separate representation; the employer is
required to bargain with the union; the union's status as exclusive bargaining representative
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union integration cases, the substantive content of the DFR was
not directly considered. Instead, the question was whether the

Board was constitutionally required to hold pre-certification hearings on allegations of race discrimination. The Board had previously determined in Bekins Moving & Storage Co. 126 that it could
not constitutionally bestow its certification upon a union which
127
engages in race based discrimination.
In Handy Andy, however, the Board overruled Bekins, holding
that pre-certification hearings were not required either by the Constitution or by the NLRA. Indeed, such hearings would be "destructive of the policies embodied in Section 9(c) of the Act" and
exceeded the authority of the Board. 28 The Board concluded that
claims of union discrimination should be considered in unfair labor
practice proceedings, rather than in pre-certification proceedings.
To support this conclusion, the Board had to reject its prior determination in Bekins that Board certification of a racially discriminatory union constituted sufficient state involvement in private
discrimination to render the certification a constitutional violation.
cannot be challenged for a year; and there is a presumption that its status as exclusive
bargaining representative continues after a year. Id. at 458 (Member Jenkins dissenting).
In Handy Andy, the Employer objected to certification of the union as the exclusive
bargaining representative on the grounds that the union had practiced discrimination against
individuals on the basis of race, alienage and national origin by excluding such persons
from membership and by failing to represent such persons fairly. Id. at 447. As evidence,
the Employer noted that the union had been found liable, on three different occasions, for
negotiating collective bargaining agreements whose seniority provisions perpetuated the
effects of past discrimination against minorities. Id. at 448 n.3.
126 211 N.L.R.B. 138 (1974).
£27The

Board explained:

Were the Board, as a Federal agency, to confer the benefits of certification on a
labor organization which practices unlawful discrimination, "the power of the
Federal Government would surely appear to be sanctioning, and indeed furthering,
the continued practice of such discrimination, thereby running afoul of the due
process clause of the fifth amendment."
Handy Andy, 228 N.L.R.B. at 448 (quoting Bekins, 211 N.L.R.B. at 139).
£28Id. at 449. According to the Board,
the [Bekins] majority members in effect arrogated to this Board the power to
determine the constitutionality of mandatory language in the Act we administer,
a power that the Supreme Court has indicated we do not have ....

Issuance of

a certification to a union which has won a fairly conducted valid election is
mandated by the Act ....
Absent unfairness in the election itself, the section
[9(c)(1)] commands the Board to issue a certification of representative to the
winning labor organization ......
Id. at 456 (quoting the Bekins dissent, 211 N.L.R.B. at 147).
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The Board reasoned that "while use of the Board processes
and the Board's certification may have helped a union gain the
powers of bargaining representative established by the Act," certification should not be construed as "state action" for purposes
of the Fifth Amendment. 129 Board certification may affirmatively
empower unions, but it does not authorize them to discriminate.
On the contrary, "the duty of fair representation in its various
forms specifically prohibits a union from practicing unlawful discrimination under the authority of the Act. 1 30 By enacting Title
VII, "Congress has also taken steps to eliminate such discrimination based on race, etc. .

.

. [Title VII] performs the very func-

tion-using the same test for discrimination, which the Eighth
Circuit . . . would require of the Board.' ' 31 Thus, the Board

concluded that to require the NLRB to hold pre-certification hearings on charges of discrimination would not be to require "the
Government merely to meet the constitutional requirements, but
[rather] to meet them in a particular way which the court [or the
' 32
Bekins majority] preferred to the methods Congress has chosen.'
The Board's constitutional analysis in Handy Andy was
grounded on its interpretation of the relationship between Title
VII and the NLRA. However, the Board's interpretation is different from the relationship advocated by the black workers in Emporium Capwell and different even from the relationship established by the Supreme Court's decision in that case. Rather than
expanding the Board's responsibility to interpret the NLRA in a
manner consistent with furthering the anti-discrimination policies
of Title VII, the Board in Handy Andy construed the mandate of
Title VII as a basis for contracting the Board's obligation to combat race discrimination through its interpretation of the NLRA.
Thus, while the Supreme Court's decision in Emporium Capwell might suggest that Title VII is irrelevant to the Board's interpretation of the NLRA, the Board's Handy Andy analysis suggests
that Title VII eliminates any constitutionalresponsibility the Board
has to address the problem of race discrimination under the
NLRA. The Board reasoned that by enacting Title VII, the state
29Id. at 448.
130
Id. at 450. For a pertinent and incisive critique of "the empty state" in legal
discourse, see Kenneth Casebeer, Running on Empty: Justice Brennan'sPlea, the Empty
State, the City of Richmond, and the Profession, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 989 (1989).
131Id. at 451.
132Id.
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established procedures for challenging a union's discrimination and
is, therefore, not implicated in the union's discrimination. Since

nothing in the Constitution prevents "Congress from eliminating
duplicative remedies by providing that a single agency should have

exclusive jurisdiction over claims of racial discrimination by employers and unions,"' 33 the question of Board certification becomes
an issue simply of the Board fulfilling its function to determine
and promote the policies and purposes of the NLRA-that is, to
ensure that the majority's will and the processes of collective
bargaining are not frustrated by the strategic presentation of col134
lateral claims.
The DFR plays a similar though slightly different role in the
Board's analysis in Handy Andy. Like the existence of alternative
remedial procedures under Title VII, the existence of a potential

post-certification action for breach of the DFR supports the
Board's conclusion that a pre-certification hearing is neither constitutionally required nor good policy. According to the Board,
even a union which practices some unlawful discrimination may be the best one available in the opinion of the
workers in the unit, who are given the right to decide for
themselves by the Act. Even if minority members of the
unit are convinced that the union will fairly represent
them, and vote for the union under the Bekins approach,
a bargaining order may still have to be denied. 135 Yet, the
" Bernard D. Meltzer, The National Labor Relations Act & Racial Discrimination:
The More Remedies the Better?, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1974).
'1 Handy Andy, 228 N.L.R.B. at 452-53. The Board concluded that:

[T]he Bekins doctrine will significantly impair the national labor policy of facilitating collective bargaining, the enforcement of which is our primary function.
[E]mployers faced with the prospect of unionization will be provided.., with an
incentive to inject charges of union racial discrimination into Board certification
and bargaining order proceedings as a delaying tactic in order to avoid collective
bargaining altogether rather than to attack racial discrimination.
Id. But see id. at 460 (Member Jenkins dissenting) (no evidence that employers have used
Bekins merely to delay bargaining or that the Board cannot distinguish compelling evidence
of discrimination from frivolous allegations).
'35
In Handy Andy, the Board makes much of "the fact" that the margin of victory
indicated that minority votes were instrumental in the union's election. According to the
Board,
the Employer concedes that, in a bargaining unit comprised of 211 employees, 58
are black and 114 are Spanish-surnamed Americans. Inasmuch as the Union won
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minority workers might not be helped by keeping the
union out, since they will then be at the mercy of their
employer who has no duty offair representationto fulfill
who may act to the detriment of all workers and who
may also discriminate against minorities. In short, a union
that has discriminated actively in the past and still has a
racial imbalance may be preferable for minority workers
13 6
to no union at all.
The Board's use of the DFR in Handy Andy is similar to the
use of the DFR in the integration cases and Emporium Capwell.
The fact that women of color may become a submerged minority
in an institutional structure dominated by a white/male majority
that discriminates against them is not problematic because the
DFR provides an alternative avenue of recourse. Only the union
has a DFR-a duty which requires the union to refrain from and
affirmatively combat discrimination; thus, women of color are better off submerged in a union that discriminates against them than
in no union or, as determined by the integration cases, in a separate
union.
The problem, as Member Jenkins noted in his dissent, is that
the prosecution of a DFR action is left up to the Board's General
Counsel rather than the worker's prerogative. 37 The Board's approach also assumes that the actions prohibited and the obligations
imposed on unions by the DFR would adequately protect women
of color from the consequences of allowing the concentration of
the decertification election by a vote of 108 to 66, simple arithmetic establishes
that a substantial percentage of the minority employees voted in favor of continued
representation by the Union.
Id. at 453. Consider, however, that all 58 black workers might have voted against the union
and the union would still have been elected. For this point, I am indebted to Mary Catherine
Rachu, a University of Miami law student, who pointed this out in my Equality in the
Workplace seminar.
136Id. at 452-53 (emphasis added). Compare id. at 460 (Member Jenkins dissenting):
[Als to a discriminating union's being preferable to none at all, it might just as
readily be claimed that segregated school systems should have been upheld because they were better than none at all and a state might refuse to support a
desegregated system. The effect of my colleagues' position is that the Board can
properly assist in the perpetuation of discriminatory representation because such
representation might be preferred to no representation. No authority is cited for
this bizarre suggestion.
17

Id. at 459 (Member Jenkins dissenting).

19931

Structures of Subordination

institutional power in a representative that discriminates against
them. The more discretion unions are allowed under the substantive standards of the DFR, the more problematic this assumption
138
becomes.
2. Appropriate Bargaining Unit Determinations:
Permissible Exclusion
The DFR appears again in Allegheny General Hospital,139 a
case in which a hospital employer invoked the policies of Title VII
to resist the certification of the maintenance department as an
appropriate bargaining unit. The hospital objected to the proposed
unit on the grounds that it would perpetuate race and gender based
segmentation among the hospital workers because, as defined by
the union, the proposed unit was made up almost entirely of job
classifications occupied by white male workers. It excluded job
classifications in the housekeeping departments, in which racial
minorities were employed and clerical jobs, in which women predominated.t 40 According to the hospital, the only appropriate unit
included both the maintenance and the housekeeping departments.
The Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB) rejected the
hospital's arguments and certified the maintenance department as
an appropriate bargaining unit. Nevertheless, the hospital refused
to bargain with the union. In response, the union filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the Board pursuant to Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the NLRA. 141 At the unfair labor practice hearing, the
hospital again alleged that the unit certified by the PLRB was
inappropriate and offered to prove that the certified unit conflicted
with Title VII, the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments, and state
laws requiring equal opportunity in employment.
The hospital offered proof that the disproportionate number
of minority and female employees holding jobs not included in the
twenty-six bargaining unit classifications was an inherited conse,38See infra part III.B. 1.
,39230 N.L.R.B. 954 (1977), enforcement denied, 608 F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1979).
140Id. at 957 n.13.
,4, Jurisdiction passed from the PLRB to the NLRB by virtue of the health care
amendments that became effective on August 25, 1974. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 158, 169 (July
26, 1974). The hospital moved that the PLRB vacate its order on the grounds that the
amendments pre-empted the PLRB's jurisdiction. The PLRB returned the motion, noting
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had closed all proceedings and that PLRB's jurisdiction had been pre-empted. Allegheny GeneralHospital, 230 N.L.R.B. at 954.
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quence of pre-Title VII discrimination against these groups. According to the hospital, union leaders had opposed the hospital's
efforts to change the race and gender composition of the workforce
and the advances that had been made in minority representation
in some classifications would not have been possible if the hospital
had been required to bargain with the union.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) rejected the hospital's
offers of proof. Nevertheless, he found that if the unit certified by
the PLRB was before the Board on a representation petition, the
143
Board would find the unit inappropriate. 142 The Board reversed.
According to the Board, the PLRB had considered the right factors
in concluding that the proposed unit was appropriate. Focusing on
the "commonality of functions and skills of the maintenance department employees,"' 44 the PLRB had noted that a majority of
the maintenance department employees were skilled craftsmen
who performed repair and maintenance work or operated complex
machinery. Other non-craft classifications included in the bargaining unit required either the performance of maintenance and repair
work or the operation of equipment. Still others who, like the wall
washers and storeroom attendants, did neither maintenance work
nor operated equipment, were nevertheless employed in tasks that
"were to a significant extent integrated with those of the craftsmen
' 45
and other maintenance employees.'
The excluded classifications in the housekeeping department,
on the other hand, were low-skill cleaning jobs. The departments
were appropriately separated because the workers had no significant interactions and worked under different terms and conditions:

142The AL noted that his decision was governed by the principles of comity afforded
to unit determinations made by state agencies, but concluded that comity should not be
granted because the unit certified by the PLRB conflicted with the unit standards devised
by the Board in the health care industry. Id. at 955.
141While state proceedings must meet requirements of a four factor test to warrant
deference under the principles of comity, the state agency's determinations need not follow
Board precedent. Under these four factors, the state proceedings must (1) reflect the true
desires of the affected employees; (2) exhibit no election irregularities; (3) meet the basic
requirements of due process; and (4) ensure that the unit certified not be repugnant to the
Act. Id. at 955. Thus, according to the Board, the ALJ could not refuse comity to the
certification decision on the ground that the unit found appropriate by the PLRB was
inconsistent with prior Board decisions. The Board took the position that even if comity
were unwarranted, "a de novo hearing before the Board would [not] lead to a unit determination different from that reached by the PLRB." Id. at 956.
144Id. at 956.
'4- Id. at 956.
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different pay scales, different hours, separate supervision and separate locker room and shower facilities.
The most significant aspects of the Board's decision in Allegheny General Hospital were its disposal of the hospital's claim
that bargaining with the PLRB-certified unit would result in Title
VII violations 146 and its treatment of the DFR. A union's DFR
runs only to workers in an appropriate bargaining unit represented
by the union. Because women and racial minorities were excluded
by the union's decision to restrict its proposed unit to job classifications in the maintenance department, the union's bargaining
position would necessarily focus exclusively on furthering the interests of the predominantly white male segment of the workforce
at the expense of women and minorities. Accordingly, the hospital
argued that the Board's unit determinations should take the race
and gender composition of the proposed unit into account and that
proposals to obtain certification for units which exclude job classifications occupied predominantly by women and minorities
should be found inappropriate.
The Board rejected this argument. The Board concluded that
unit determinations based on "a community of interest," rather
than the sex or race of the employees were reasonable and consistent with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VII.1 47 According to the Board:
Without a community of interest, no basis exists to bargain collectively for wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment. Units balanced in terms of sex
or minority composition do not necessarily share the community of interest in wages, hours, and working conditions needed for successful bargaining. 148
The Board construed the hospital's argument as a request that
the Board "abandon the traditional criteria used in making unit
146The hospital had argued that "acceptance of the PLRB-certified unit [would] ensure
discrimination because the boundaries of that unit in and of themselves [would] be the
principal instrument for discrimination." Id. at 957.

147
See generally Ridgway M. Hall, Jr., The Appropriate Bargaining Unit: Striking a
BalanceBetween Stable Labor Relations and Employee Free Choice, 18 CAsE W. REs. L.
REV. 479 (1967); Dallas L. Jones, Self-Determination vs. Stability of Labor Relations, 58
MICH. L. REv. 313 (1960); Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L. REV.
353 (1984). But see Schatzki, supra note 24.
148Allegheny General Hospital, 230 N.L.R.B. at 958.
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determinations and replace them solely and exclusively with the
criteria of racial and sexual balance.' 149 The Board claimed that
this departure would ignore not only the Board's statutory obligations but also the entire history of labor relations in the area of
employee choice and unit determination. 5 ' Importantly, however,
the Board refused the hospital's offers of proof which were intended, in part, to show that a number of job classifications not
included in the proposed unit had contents so similar to those
within the proposed bargaining unit as to require equal pay for
workers of different sexes.15 1 Consequently, the proposed unit was
problematic even under the traditional "community of interest"
approach.
The Board also rejected the hospital's argument that the
choice to organize only those classifications occupied by white
male employees evidenced intentional discrimination by the union
against women and minorities and established grounds for believing that the union would promote white male interests at the
expense of minorities and women in future bargaining. According
to the Board, this was speculation. 52 The hospital could not
"blame the Union for the racial, sexual, and ethnic composition
of the engineering and maintenance department" since it admitted
that the composition of that unit resulted from its own past
1 53
discrimination.
Moreover, since the union did not control hiring decisions at
the hospital, "the employer has the means to remedy any grievance
which might accrue by reason of its own hiring practices which
have placed minority and female employees primarily in housekeeping.1'54 Consequently, the fact that the proposed bargaining
unit would operate to restrict the union's bargaining obligations to
white male workers (since these workers constituted its only conId.

149

1So
Like Handy Andy, the Board in Allegheny General Hospital focused on the fact
that the Union's discriminatory practices were being challenged by the employer. According
to the Board, the "[u]nfortunate result is that unit employees remain unrepresented even
though a majority of them chose the Union." Id. at 955. However, the white male workers
who remained unrepresented constituted "the majority" only if the proposed unit was
appropriate. If, on the other hand, the appropriate unit included the excluded departments,
then the majority will was undetermined.
M'Id. at 964.
152 Id. at 958.
153 Id.
ImId. at 957 (quoting the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which affirmed
the PLRB, with emphasis added).
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stituency) would not "foreclose the advancement of minorities
[because such a] . . . certification [would] not preclude the Employer from protecting the rights of minorities. If [it] is concerned
•.. [it] may protect their rights by insisting on plant-wide seniority
"155

The Board's treatment of the hospital's DFR argument is
positively astounding. The integration cases, Emporium Capwell
and the Board's decision in Handy Andy invoked the unions' DFR
to justify decisions that permit the compulsory submergence of
minority workers in majority dominated unions. In Allegheny General Hospital, however, the Board considered the fact that, under
the proposed bargaining unit, the union would have no DFR completely irrelevant. The Board told minorities to seek recourse from
discrimination not in the union or its DFR, but rather in their
employer's willingness to bargain on their behalf against the
union-the same employer which the Board claimed was responsible for the race and gender segmentation of the workplace.
The practical consequences and theoretical implications of the
Board's treatment of Title VII are even more discouraging. Arguably, under the reasoning of the union integration cases, the
proposed bargaining unit constituted a blatant violation of Section
703(c)(2). 156 The question is how the union's proposed bargaining
unit would have fared if the challenge had been brought under
Title VII. 157 The answer would, of course, depend on how the
court negotiated the relationship between Title VII and the NLRA,
and more specifically, whether the segregation at issue in the union
integration cases could be distinguished from the segregation at
issue in Allegheny General Hospital.
The Board concluded that the decision to seek certification
only of job classifications in the maintenance department was not
I'- Id. (quoting the PLRB opinion with emphasis added).
1S6Section 703(c)(2) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization... to limit,
segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify
or fail or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would

limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(c)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
1571 have been unable to find any cases challenging a proposed bargaining unit in an

action brought under Title VII.
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itself evidence of discrimination. According to the Board, the community of interests among the workers in those departments provided an independent and reasonable basis for the union's decision, so reasonable, indeed, that an inference of discriminatory
motive would be pure speculation. In ILA Baltimore, on the other
hand, the court found that:
black and white gangs possess equal abilities and are
capable of doing the same work. Gangs from both locals
work for the same stevedores on the same ships and in
the same hatches. Since there is no substantial difference
in the locals except race, we conclude that the evidence
fully substantiates the trial court's finding that the ILA
maintains segregated locals in the Port of
chartered and
158
Baltimore.
It might, therefore, be argued that in the union integration
cases, the racially segregated locals violated Title VII because
blacks and whites were doing the same work. However, the plain
language of Title VII does not refer specifically to race-based
classifications, but to any classification that would tend to adversely affect any individual's employment opportunities because
of such individual's race or sex. To the extent the race and gender
segmentation of the hospital workforce is the work-product of prior
discrimination against women and minorities, the union integration
cases and Allegheny General Hospital can be reconciled only by
importing a "formal race" vision of Title VII's anti-discrimination
mandate.1 59 While this approach might make the cases appear
158ILA
159Neil

Baltimore, 460 F.2d 497, 499 (4th Cir. 1972).
Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color Blind", 44 STAN. L. REv.

1, 43-45 (1991):
Race, as formal-race, is seen as an attribute of individuality unrelated to social
relations .

. .

. Racism is irrational because race is seen as unconnected from

social reality, a concept that describes nothing more than a person's physical
appearance .

. .

. The Supreme Court's use of formal-race unconnectedness is

consistent with their view that the particular manifestations of racial subordination-substandard housing, education, employment, and income for large portions
of the Black community-are better interpreted as isolated phenonomena than as
aspects of the broader, more complex phenomenon called race. This disaggregated
treatment veils the continuing oppression of institutional racism. It whittles racism
down to the point where racism can be understood as an attitude problem amenable
to formal race solutions. . . . Even if one admits that large numbers of the
unemployed and undereducated youth in the inner cities are Black, unconneetedness hinders the government's ability to use that correlation as a basis for
attacking social ills.
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analytically consistent, it would also serve significantly to perpetuate race/gender stratification by establishing a legal structure in
which unit determinations based on segmented occupational structures are upheld on the theory that these structures are not race/
gender based, while separate representational structures affording
minority workers the opportunity to assert effective institutional
power are struck down because they are race/gender based. From
the perspective of the women of color who must inhabit the workplaces constructed through this legal house of mirrors, Title VII
and the NLRA become worse than empty formalities; they operate
through this network of decisions to ensure, cumulatively and
interactively, the concentration of institutional power in a white/
male majority.
Within this legal structure, women of color have no right to
prevent the certification of a union as their exclusive representative
even though it threatens to discriminate against them, nor any
right to compel their inclusion as constituents in a bargaining unit
that proposes to organize "around" the occupations into which
they have been steered. Whether we are unionized or not is a
decision made independent of and without any consideration of
the impact that unionization will have on our employment opportunities. Thus, our collective identity is institutionally determined
to a large extent by the strategic choices of the union that decides
whether and what segments of a workplace it will organize. The
union can choose to include us (when it organizes occupations
into which we have only recently been admitted) or exclude us
(when it refuses to organize occupations where we predominate).
D. Structural Closure: Substantive Fictions and
RepresentationalStructures
I have argued that the fragmentation of Title VII and the
NLRA provides an interpretative context in which the distinct
interests and collective identity of women of color are systematically suppressed and negated. I have also argued that the DFR
has functioned as a legitimating image-without which many of
the avenues of agency and remedial recourse could not so easily
have been closed-and as the cement that holds together the series
of arrangements which operate cumulatively and interactively to
deprive women of color of an institutionally recognized collective
identity.
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In the next two sections, I want to sharpen the argument. The
restrictions imposed upon our agency constitute structural violence only if I can demonstrate structural closure.160 In Emporium
Capwell, the Court invoked three structural features to suggest
that the restrictions on minority agency do not constitute structural
closure: 161 the availability of remedies for breach of the DFR or
substantive violations of Title VII, the internal democratic processes of the union protected by the Labor-Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and "the community of interests"
shared by the members of the bargaining unit. 162
In the first section, I focus on the inadequacies of both the
DFR and Title VII from the perspective of women of color. To
support the weight of this institutional structure of suppressed
agency and compulsory submergence, the substantive standards
imposed by the DFR and Title VII would have to be rigorous.
However, these standards are inadequate to counteract the institutional disempowerment they legitimate. Thus, in the first instance, structural violence reaches closure in the interpretative
illusion of a duty without substance. My point of departure in this
section will be Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.' 63
In the second section, I discuss how legal interpretation of
the relationship between Title VII and the NLRA constructs the
relationship between representational authority and group membership in ways that again restrict systematically the opportunities
of women of color to exercise effective agency in the institutional
arrangements these decisions maintain. In this instance, structural
violence reaches closure in the denial of representational authority

160 "Structural closure" refers to the cumulative and systematic closure of legal avenues
of agency and recourse in the resolution of different legal issues in different cases. To say
that closure is systematic is not to imply that it operates chronologically (i.e., in real time),
nor that it is intentionally effected by some conscious and coordinated conspiracy among
judges; rather, it is simply to suggest that the legal disempowerment effected through these
structures is for the most part complete. Explaining structural closure-the how and why
of it-is an issue I address most directly in Part III. The short answer is that structural
closure is best understood as the indirect consequence of the fact that while social power
is fragmented across multiple decision-making forums and institutional roles, this power
(both institutional and interpretative) historically has been and today remains concentrated
in one contingent social group. That this asymmetrical allocation of power has produced a
structure of violence from the perspective of disempowered social groups is, therefore,
hardly surprising, for where there is no power, there is no justice. See supra note 13.
161 See also Abraham, supra note 37, at 1271.
162 See supra notes 139-157 and accompanying text.
163 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
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and the avenues for acquiring such positions within the union's
majoritarian structure.
1. The Duty of FairRepresentation as Legal Fiction
Like Emporium Capwell, Goodman arose out of minority
workers' efforts to resist union grievance processing practices
which they believed misrepresented their interests in eliminating
race discrimination from the workplace. Rather than organizing a
boycott or walking a picket line, the black steelworkers in Goodman brought suit under Title VII and the DFR, alleging racial
discrimination against their employer, 164 their collective bargaining
agents, the United Steelworkers of America and two of its local
unions. The workers claimed that, although the unions were aware
that the employer was discriminating against blacks in violation of
the anti-discrimination provision of the collective bargaining agreement, they ignored grievances which were exclusively race-based
and they regularly refused to include assertions of racial discrimination in grievances that asserted other contract violations. 165
When minority workers presented grievances based on both a race
discrimination and an independent non-race related provision of
the collective bargaining agreement, the unions would process the
grievance only on the nonracial contractual basis. When minority
workers presented grievances based exclusively on racial grounds,
the unions failed to process them at all.
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the unions emphasized
the absence of any racial animus and insisted that the failure to
include race discrimination claims in grievances alleging other nonrace related violations of the collective bargaining agreement did
not violate Title VII. The unions claimed they did not include
discrimination claims "because these grievances could be resolved
without making racial allegations" and because the employer
would "get its back up" if racial bias was charged, thereby making
it much more difficult for the individual to prevail. 166

164The employer was found liable under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) for "the
discharge of minority employees during their probationary period, the toleration of racial
harassment by employees, initial job assignments, promotions and decisions on incentive
pay." Id. at 664. Its liability was not disputed on appeal. Id.
165 Id. at 660.
16 Id. at 668.
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Adopting the district court's reasoning, the majority rejected
the unions' argument and held them liable under Section 703(c)(1)
of Title VII. 167 While the trial court was "initially impressed" by
the unions' "seemingly neutral reason" for failing to press race
discrimination claims, it ultimately found the explanation unacceptable because the unions also ignored grievances which were
based exclusively on race discrimination. 168 The court found that
the "virtual failure by the Unions to file any race-bias grievances
the Unions' explanation
until after this lawsuit started.., 1' rendered
69
for their conduct unconvincing.'
Initially, what is most curious about Goodman is not so much
what it holds but what it fails or refuses to hold. The plaintiffs in
Goodman raised two additional issues which the majority opinion
intentionally left unaddressed. First, the Court refused to decide
whether the unions had, and consequently had violated, an affirmative duty under Title VII to challenge the employer's racially
discriminatory employment practices. Although both lower courts
held that unions do have this duty, the Supreme Court refused "to
discuss this rather abstract observation" because the case against
the unions was based on more than "mere passivity."'' 70 The unions
had intentionally and knowingly chosen not to challenge the employer's racially discriminatory actions7 and were therefore liable
for their own affirmative misconduct.' '
The Court's opinion also skirted the issue of fair representation and the scope of a union's obligation to challenge an employer's racially discriminatory practices under the DFR. The unions
argued that the DFR "had no relevance to the case.' 72 The maunions' liability
jority simply avoided the issue by stating that the
173
VII.
Title
of
703
Section
under
established
was
In his dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Scalia and
O'Connor, addressed the issues avoided by the majority. According to Powell, unions have no duty to affirmatively oppose an
shall be an unlawful employment
'67 Title VII Section 703(c)(1) provides that "[i]t
practice for a labor organization to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise
to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex or national
origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1) (1988).
Goodman, 482 U.S. at 668.
at 669.
170 Id. at 666.
"68

169Id.

171Id.

172
173

at 665-66.
Id. at 667.
Id.
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employer's racially discriminatory practices under Title VII 174 or
the DFR. Moreover, "[i]n the absence of a clear statement of
legislative intent," the Court should refrain from imposing such a
duty because it would have a disruptive impact on the "basic
policies" underlying American labor laws.1 75 Thus, Powell would
have the Court limit the unions' Title VII obligations (and the
correlative rights of its protected classes) in order to preserve the
structure of governance established by the labor laws. According
to Powell:
A union, unlike an employer, is a democratically controlled institution directed by the will of its constituents,
subject to the duty of fair representation. Like other representative entities, unions must balance the competing
claims of its constituents. A union must make difficult
choices among goals such as eliminating racial discrimination in the workplace, removing health and safety hazards, providing better insurance and pension benefits, and
increasing wages. The Court has recognized that "the
complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly
to be expected." For these reasons unions are afforded
broad discretion in the handling of grievances. 76
Under Powell's interpretation, the unions' grievance practices
should be upheld as a reasonable exercise of union discretion to
choose among the wide range of "causes" to be fought for in the
workplace. The elimination of racial discrimination, like the enforcement of workplace safety rules and the negotiation of higher
wages and benefits, is just one of the many causes competing for
the unions' attention and resources. The unions' decision to prioritize interests other than the black workers' interest in eliminating
racial discrimination was not invidiously discriminatory, presumably because elimination of race discrimination is not the black
workers' only interest; black workers benefit from the unions'
activities in these other areas. Thus, the unions could legitimately
174Id. at 687-88. Powell's Title VII holding is based on his interpretation of Sections
703(c)(1) and (3). According to Powell, Section 703(c)(1) "prohibits direct discrimination
by a union against its members; it does not impose upon a union an obligation to remedy
discrimination by the employer." Id. at 688.
17-Goodman, 482 U.S. at 687-88.
176Id. at 688 (citations omitted).
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conserve their resources by choosing to pursue only those interests
77
which the majority of workers had in common.1
Under Powell's interpretation of the DFR, unions would be
legally authorized to ignore many workplace practices that burden
only the "minority interests" of subordinated individuals, so long
as they do not deliberately, intentionally and/or repeatedly refuse
to process all racial grievances. Problems not experienced by a
white or male majority (for example, an employer's race-based
discrimination or harassment, wage discrimination or sexual harassment) could be lawfully neglected pursuant to the union's
discretion to determine, prioritize and channel its resources to
further "the common good" and/or the interests of the most privileged workers with "the most to lose."1 78
Powell's approach represents yet another instance where the
relationship between Title VII and the NLRA is manipulated to
the detriment of minorities. While Title VII does not expand our
rights under the NLRA, the NLRA may contract them under Title
VII. The question, of course, is whether Powell's interpretation
will prevail when a majority of the Court deems the issue ripe for
determination. Neither the interpretative practices through which
the relationship between Title VII and the NLRA has been previously resolved,179 nor the current debate over the substantive
standards governing the DFR provide any basis for expecting that
Powell's interpretation of the requirements of fair representation
will be rejected. 180 On the contrary, there is a significant body of
DFR precedent which, like Powell's opinion, subordinates the

171
In fact, Justice Powell's rationalization is even more problematic than the one I
suggest. Powell justified the unions' practice by arguing that some workers were entitled
to more protection than others. According to Powell, unions could legitimately choose to
privilege workers "with the most to lose." Id. at 685. To the extent that what you "have
to lose" depends on what you were allowed to acquire, Powell's rationalizing principle
means that individuals whose advancement in the workplace has been obstructed by
discrimination may once more be discriminated against in favor of those who have advanced
because of the opportunities they were not denied. See id. ("The Unions' policy against
pursuing grievances on behalf of probationary employees [who were disproportionately
black] also permitted the Unions to focus their attention on members with the most to
lose.").
178 See id.

'79
See supra parts II.B & C.
"0 Lower court opinions suggest that the distinction between a union's affirmative
discrimination and union passivity in the face of employer discrimination will have to be
resolved. See, e.g., Woods v. Graphic Communications, 925 F.2d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 1991);
Johnson v. Palma, 931 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1991); Alsup v. International Union of Brick
Layers and Allied Craftsmen, 679 F. Supp. 716, 722 (N.D. Ohio 1987).
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protection of minority interests to the preservation of maximum
union discretion. 181
The key case is Vaca v. Sipes, 18 2 in which the Supreme Court
held that breach of the DFR was not established by evidence that
the union failed to process a grievance that was subsequently held
to be meritorious: "[A] breach of the statutory duty of fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member
of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory or in
bad faith."'1 83 This standard constitutes a major obstacle to establishing the DFR as an effective vehicle for challenging majoritarian
decisions that negatively affect the interests of racial minorities
and women of all races. NAACP v. Detroit Police Officers
Association184 and Seep v. Commercial Motor Freight,Inc. 185 are
illustrative.
In DPOA [I], the 6th Circuit reversed a lower court decision
which held that the police officers' union had violated its DFR by
failing to oppose forcefully and effectively the massive layoff of
recently hired black police officers. Most of these officers were
hired pursuant to a judicially-mandated affirmative action program
adopted in 1974. The lay-offs were made pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement between the City and the Detroit Police
Officers Association (DPOA) which required that the layoffs be
based strictly on reverse seniority, the last hired being the first
fired. Of the approximately 1100 laid off police officers, approximately seventy-five percent were black. Thus, the layoffs wiped
out most of the affirmative action recruiting that had increased
minority representation on the Detroit police force.
In holding that the union violated its duty to represent fairly
the interests of the black police officers, the lower court focused
on a number of factors. First, the court noted the DPOA's history
of racial hostility and indifference to the rights and interests of
black officers.1 86 The DPOA's hostility had prompted black officers
181

See Silverstein, supra note 24, at 1494. See generally supra note 34.

386 U.S. 171 (1967).
'

Id. at 190.
F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Mich. 1984) [hereinafter DPOA [1]], rev'd, 821 F.2d 328

184591

(6th Cir. 1987) [hereinafter DPOA [H]].
"81575 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
"8 DPOA [1], 591 F. Supp. at 1213. Despite the fact that at one point almost 40% of
its members were black, the DPOA remained vehemently opposed to any form of affirmative
action by the city and the police department. Indeed, the DPOA had spent over $500,000
financing anti-affirmative action litigation, both as intervenors with the purpose to block
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to organize two committees, the Guardians in the 1960s and, more
recently, the Committee of Police Officers for Equal Justice. The
court found that the DPOA had avoided dealing with and was
hostile to both organizations.187 The court also noted the absence
of black representation at the leadership levels of the union t88 as
well as evidence of racial bloc voting among the union
89
membership.

The court reviewed the union's response to the 1979 layoffs
of predominantly black officers and found it "totally perfunctory
and passive," in striking contrast to the efforts the union had made
on other occasions when predominantly white jobs were at
stake. 190 The first wave of layoffs began in October of 1979. The

union received a letter indicating that as of October 12, 400 police
officers, seventy-one percent of whom would be black, would be
laid off. The union did nothing to prevent the layoffs.
In August, to avert the layoff of more than 700 predominantly
black police officers, the Mayor of Detroit sent the DPOA a letter
offering to modify the reverse seniority criterion so that layoffs
could be effected from separate lists or, alternatively, to accept a
such programs, and as amici in cases not directly related to the DPOA, including suits in
three other cities. Id.
187Id. at 1213-14. The court found the DPOA's explanations for this hostility unconvincing and pretextual. According to the testimony of the DPOA officials at trial, not a
single black officer in their union was trustworthy.
118The court noted:

Throughout its entire history, the DPOA has been a white-dominated union. In its
41-year history, no black has ever been elected to any one of the top four positions
in the DPOA. Only two black members have ever served on the executive board,
and the board of directors has only 18 nonwhite members. The most significant
committee is the grievance committee, which consists of three members, who,
along with the four elected officers, constitute the bargaining committee. No black
has ever served on the grievance committee.
Id. at 1214. While one black police officer had been nominated for the office of sergeantat-arms (one of the four offices of the union), he did not run for the office after a white
member of the executive board told him that if he did, all blacks would be removed from
their committee assignments. Id. at 1213.
l8At one point, black police officers proposed amendments to the union's constitution
to limit the amount of DPOA funds spent on litigation. This amendment and others proposed
by black officers were "soundly defeated." Id.
190
Id. at 1214-15. Specifically, the court noted that, in 1975, in order to avert layoffs
of white officers, "[a]n agreement was reached that, during a period of 18 months, each
member of the bargaining unit would take 14 days off without pay, and would get an
additional ten days off with pay, and that these 24 days could be taken off during the 18
month period. Other minor concessions were made and the layoffs were averted." Id. at
1218. Again, in 1981, the union agreed to a pay freeze to protect the jobs of the predominantly white officers who were threatened with layoffs. Id. at 1219.
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13.8% pay reduction in lieu of any futher lay-offs. During the
DPOA's executive board meeting of September 2, the board received a letter from the Guardians stating in pertinent part:
We understand [the Mayor's] proposals call for the temporary institution of separate seniority lists, or a temporary reduction of work hours and pay. We believe that
either of these suggestions is reasonable and we urge you
to accept one of them or at the very least to negotiate in
good faith with the Mayor to avoid the layoffs. As...
the DPOA is the exclusive bargaining agent for all the
police officers, it owes a legal duty to fairly represent all
officers-black and white, male and female. If the DPOA
stands idly by and watches minority and female officers
be subject to disproportionate layoffs, when the Mayor
has offered reasonable ways to avert this result, the
Guardians will believe that the DPOA intends this result.
We will, therefore, view this as an intentional act by the
DPOA to violate the duty of fair representation owed to
minority and female members, and we will take appropriate action. 191

Despite this entreaty, nothing came of the subsequent bargaining between the union and the Mayor. The union rejected the
separate senority lists as well as the Mayor's pay reduction proposal, even when the proposed reduction was itself reduced from
13.8 percent to either 12 or 12.8 percent. The union also refused
to permit the membership to vote on whether to accept the pay
reduction, and the layoffs went into effect the next day.
According to the court, it was the DPOA's complete failure
to take any action to preserve the jobs of the predominantly black
officers, rather than its refusal to make any particular concession,
that constituted the breach of its DFR:
[T]he basic fact [is] that, when white officers were to be
laid off, the union did something; when the overwhelming
majority were blacks, the union did nothing. It is not the
business of this court to decide precisely what the DPOA

191Id. at 1217.
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The duty of fair representation

creates no such guidelines. The duty only commands that
the union, when racial minorities are involved, behave in
a manner that is representative, not perfunctory and
passive. 192
Having found a breach of the DFR, the district court fashioned
an unusual remedy. Instead of assessing damages against the
DPOA, the court ordered the union to integrate
black officers into
93
year.
one
within
structure
its leadership
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed both the remedy 94 and
the finding of a substantive breach.195 According to the court, under
Michigan law, the substantive standards governing the DPOA's
DFR are set by federal law and more specifically by the standards
enunciated in Vaca.196 While any one of Vaca's three elementsarbitrariness, discrimination or lack of good faith-can establish a
DFR breach, the Sixth Circuit found no basis for holding the union
liable for its failure to respond to the threatened layoffs of the
black officers. 197 In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
,91Id. at 1219.
193Id. at 1220. According to the court, integration at the leadership level of the union

was a more appropriate remedy and more likely to prevent future violations of the DFR
than a damage award. Id.
194
DPOA [II], 821 F.2d at 331.
19-Id. at 333.
196Id. at 332 (quoting Goolsby v. City of Detroit, 358 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Mich. 1984)

(quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177)):
[t]he duty of fair representation is comprised of three distinct responsibilities:
"(1) 'to serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward
any', (2) 'to exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty,' and
(3) 'to avoid arbitrary conduct."'
197First, the court noted that while the unexplained failure to act may constitute
actionable arbitrariness even absent evidence of bad faith,

under Michigan law, a public employer's initial decision to lay-off is a permissive
subject of bargaining. Therefore, the union had no mandatory duty to act on behalf
of its members in response to the threatened layoffs. Absent a duty to act, failure
to act forcefully does not breach the union's duty of fair representation.
Id. (citing Goolsby, 358 N.W.2d at 870).
Moreover, while "[t]he failure to bargain against layoffs could also have been found to
be evidence of bad faith or discrimination on the part of the union," according to the Sixth
Circuit,
the District Court did not find that the union was improperly motivated in its
reaction to the threatened layoffs. Rather, the District Court held that the union's
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completely and inexplicably ignored the extent to which the lower
court's holding was based on findings that the all-white union
leadership was affirmatively hostile towards the interests of the
black police officers and intentionally refused to act on their behalf
in the same way they acted on behalf of white police officers
threatened with similar layoffs.
The specific question raised by the DPOA cases is what evidence of improper motivation would have satisified the Sixth Circuit's analysis under Vaca. The more general question, however,
is whether the Vaca standard for breach of the DFR simply confers
too much discretion on unions to discriminate and on courts to
wash their hands in the name of preserving the integrity and autonomy of unions' internal decision-making processes. This standard has not only permitted all-white union leaderships, such as
the DPOA, to discriminate with impunity against racial minorities
of both genders but also has insulated all-male union leaderships
from liability to the female workers on whose behalf they have
failed to act.
For example, in Seep v. Commercial Motor Freight, Inc., 198
female clerical employees brought suit under Title VII against their
employer, a commercial trucking company, their union local (Local
100) and the international union (the Teamsters). The plaintiffs
also challenged a number of actions and inactions by the union
under the DFR, all of which the court rejected. 199 Perhaps most
distressing was the court's finding that the local had not breached
its duty to the female workers in the clerical unit by permitting
employees in the predominantly male dock and driver units to
cross their picket line. 200 The court reasoned that "a union has

failure to act alone constituted a breach of the DFR. Absent a finding of intentional
discrimination or other improper motivation, the union's mere failure to bargain
forcefully enough in a permissible context does not by itself constitute bad faith
or discrimination.
Id. at 333.
198575 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Ohio 1983).

I" The plaintiffs alleged the following breaches of the DFR: (1) failure to include the
plaintiffs' predominantly female bargaining unit, the clerical workers unit, under the Na-

tional Master Freight Agreement which resulted in lower wages and less favorable fringe
benefits, seniority rights and transfer privileges; (2) execution of the 1973 contract without
ratification by the unit; (3) the union's refusal to request weekly strike benefits for the
striking clerical workers; and (4) its authorization of employees in the other units to cross
the plaintiffs' picket line during the 1972 strike. Id. at 1104.
mId. at 1105.
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wide discretion in its representation of a bargaining unit and, if
not acting arbitrarily, discriminatorily or in bad faith, will not be
held liable simply because some members are disadvantaged by
'20
its actions. '
Accordingly, the union's decision to permit workers in the
other all-male units to cross the plaintiffs' picket line was not
discriminatory or in bad faith because those units "represented the
overwhelming majority of the local's membership at Commercial." 202 Thus, "in those cases where the union took action which
had an unfavorable impact on plaintiffs' unit,... it was the size

of the unit ratherthan the gender of its members which influenced
was within the permissible scope
the union's decision. Such 20action
3
discretion.
union's
the
of
The court's reasoning in Seep is particularly disturbing, not
only because, like DPOA [H1], it reinforces Justice Powell's position in Goodman, but also because it suggests that decisions benefiting white/male majorities at the expense of nonwhite/female
subgroups are presumptively within the scope of the union's statutory
duty towards the minority under both the NLRA and Title
VII. 20 4 If the DFR is presumptively satisfied by decisions promoting the interests of the numerical majority and Title VII is presumptively satisified in the absence of a breach of the DFR, then
it is difficult to see how this duty can really protect the interests
of a subordinated social group when the group is a numerical
minority.
From this perspective, Seep, the DPOA cases and Goodman
all raise substantial questions regarding the extent to which minority interests will be protected through a system of exclusive
representation by majority rule and a set of legal rules which deny
subordinated subgroups the power of self-representation in exchange for the promise of a judicially enforced DFR. In these
cases, the courts refused to impose upon unions an affirmative
duty to combat discrimination, though the union's affirmative duty
to combat discrimination is the assumption that underlies a whole
series of cases that systematically suppress minority agency. This
201

Id. at 1104.

02

2 Id. at 1105.
201Id. (emphasis added).

204According to the court, the union's conduct in Seep did not violate Title VII because
"[t]his conclusion follows from the holding that there was no breach of the duty of fair
representation, since discriminatory conduct constitutes such a breach." Id.
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assumption was invoked explicitly in the union integration cases
and implicitly in Emporium Capwell and Handy Andy. If, as it
now appears, the DFR does not require unions to act forcefully
and affirmatively to promote minority interests, then the legitimacy
of the restrictions imposed upon our agency and self-representation by cases such as Emporium Capwell and Handy Andy must
be seriously reconsidered.
The DPOA cases, like Goodman, also suggest that judicial
review is a wholly unreliable alternative to the power and authority
of self-representation. The Supreme Court in Goodman ignored
the many institutional contexts in which minority agency has been
restricted on the theory that majority representatives have an affirmative duty to promote our interest in being free from discrimination. It then declared that the scope of majority obligation to
combat discrimination was an undecided issue. The Sixth Circuit
in DPOA [H] completely ignored the lower court's multiple findings
of intentional race discrimination. In light of these decisions, minorities would be justified in rejecting the offer of "fair representation" and in demanding the legal authority of self-representation,
particularly when the courts' vision of the requirements of fair
representation is markedly different from the vision of the
unrepresented. 205
2. RepresentationalStructures and the Color of
RepresentationalPower
One of the most striking things about the representational
structure established by the NLRA is the presumed irrelevance of
race/gender. 20 6 This presumption is implicit in the fact that the
205Recall the difference between the Sixth Circuit's and the Guardian's assessment of
the DPOA's DFR. See supra notes 184-197 and accompanying text. Recall also that while
the Goodman majority held the union defendants liable under Title VII, the Court's reasoning restricts union liability to cases in which a union's refusal to process any and all

race-based grievance gives rise to an inference of intentionaldiscrimination. Thus, under

Goodman, it is not clear that the grievance practices objected to in Emporium Capvell
would have been actionable under Title VII, for while the union refused to pursue the
group-based approach sought by the minority dissidents, it did, after all, process the race
discrimination grievances of two black individuals. In these instances, where the objectives
sought by minority workers differ so significantly from the requirements of law as interpreted by the courts, legal rules like Emporium Capvell, which suppress minority agency
and channel the enforcement of Title VII's anti-discrimination mandate into judicial forums,
operate directly and significantly to maintain the existing structures of subordination.
" See, e.g., Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50
(1975).
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racial/gender composition of union representatives has never affected the level of review imposed upon a union, nor has it ever
been invoked to invalidate the discretionary decisions made by
white/male representatives on behalf of-and very often at the
207
expense of-nonwhites and white women.
From one perspective, the apparent irrelevance of the race
and gender of union officials appears to be an uncontroversial
incidence of Title VII's proscription on race/gender discrimination.
In Shultz v. Local 1291, InternationalLongshoremen's Association,208 the court declared that a union by-law which allocated
various union offices among blacks and whites violated Section
481(e) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act 209
in part because the by-laws violated Title VII. Rule 3(c)(3) of the
by-laws allocated union offices as follows:
[T]he President shall be of the colored race. Vice President, white, Recording Secretary, white, 4 Business
Agents equally proportioned, 3 Trustees (auditors), 1
white & 2 colored, 2 Sergeant at Arms, 1 colored and 1
white.

2 10

According to the court, the "basic issue" was "whether Rule 3(c)(3)
is a reasonable qualification on the right of union members in good

The fact that the DPOA was controlled by an all-white leadership was never considered relevant in determining whether the union's refusal to negotiate for time share or
reduced pay in order to prevent massive layoffs of recently hired black officers violated its
duty of fair representation. See DPOA [1], 591 F. Supp. 1194; DPOA [II],
821 F.2d 328.
Nor was the composition of the all-male union leadership considered relevant to determining
the validity of the union's refusal to support a strike by the plaintiffs' predominantly female
local. See Seep, 575 F. Supp. 1097.
208 338 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
20 Id. at 1206-07. Section 481(e) of the LMRDA provides:
In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot a
reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every
member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate to hold office (subject
to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) and
shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates
of his choice, without being subject to penalty, discipline, or improper interference
or reprisal of any kind by such organization or any member thereof.
29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1959).
210This provision was negotiated as part of the merger of two formerly segregated
locals. Its purpose was to prevent the submergence of minority representation after the
merger. For an account of the use of race-based allocations of union offices in the context
of union mergers, see generally GOULD, supra note 22, at 126-35.
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standing to be candidates in union elections and to hold office
[pursuant to 29 U.S.C. Section 481(e)]." The court held that, given
the apparent conflict between the Local's race conscious by-law
and the requirements of Title VII, the rule was necessarily unreasonable. 211 The court further held the rule unreasonable because a
"reasonable qualification

. . .

must be measured in terms of con-

sistency with the Act's command to unions to conduct free and
democratic union elections. ' 212 In this case, the rule would prevent
50% of the Local's membership from holding each office, consequently "there must be a very compelling reason why it should be
upheld. '213 The court found no such reason:
The major difficulty we find with the racial qualifications
imposed by [the rule] is that there is no objective relationship between the eligibility qualifications and the duties of the office involved. Whether one has merit or
ability or experience to hold office is immaterial if the
appropriate racial characteristic is not also present. 214
Like Shultz, Donovan v. Illinois EducationAssociation2 5 involved an LMRDA challenge brought against various racial and
ethnic provisions in the union by-laws governing the election of
officers. The Association was a union of about 50,000 public school
teachers governed by a 600-member Representative Assembly
elected by the union members, and a Board of Directors, which
was originally made up of fifty members-some of whom were
elected by the Representative Assembly, others by local affiliates
of the union. In 1974, a majority of the Association's members
voted to change its by-laws in two respects. First, members of
four minority groups-blacks, asians, latinos and native americans-were guaranteed eight percent of the 600 seats in the Representative Assembly. If they did not reach this level by the ordinary electoral process, the amended by-laws directed the Board
211 See

Shultz, 338 F. Supp. at 1208. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415

U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974) (reflecting a similar interpretative relationship between Title VII and
the NLRA).
212 Shultz,

338 F. Supp. at 1206 (quoting Wirtz v. Local 6, Hotel, Motel & Club

Employees Union, 391 U.S. 492 (1968)).
213 Id.
214Id. at 1206-07 (emphasis added).
215 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982).
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of Directors to appoint enough additional members to the Assembly, "drawn from the specified minority groups," to give the groups
eight percent of the seats in the (enlarged) Assembly. The second
change increased the size of the Board of Directors by four and
reserved these new places for members of the four minority
groups-in addition to any seats they might obtain in elections.
In 1977, the Secretary of Labor filed a complaint alleging that
the Association had violated section 481(d) of the LMRDA by
appointing rather than electing its Secretary-Treasurer.216 During
the course of this litigation, the Secretary received complaints
about the minority group by-laws, concluded that they violated
the LMRDA, and asked the district court to declare them unlawful.
Instead, the district court issued an order directing that the Secretary-Treasurer election be held pursuant to the Association's bylaws.
The district court read both the relationship between Title VII
and the LMRDA and the requirements of the LMRDA itself to
support affirmative action programs for union officers. According
to the district court,
[tihe purpose sought to be attained by the candidacy
restrictions of the bylaws is legitimate and might not be
attained in any manner less destructive of other legally
protected interests. Initiation of private and voluntary
affirmative action programs such as the Plan now before
the Court are not prohibited by federal law, and need not
be the result of any judicial finding of past
discrimination.

2 17

The affirmative action program established a "reasonable qualification" on candidacy under the LMRDA because "reasonableness" must be determined in light of the purposes and policies of
Title VII since these statutes constitute a unified national labor
policy. Equally important, the affirmative action program was
found to further the distinct purposes and policies of the LMRDA
itself. Thus, the court reasoned that the

Id. at 639.
Marshall v. Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 144, 148-49 (C.D. Ill. 1981) (emphasis
added) (citation omitted).
216
217
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determination that the bylaws of the Illinois Education
Assocation impose reasonable qualifications for candidacy for union membership is in keeping with the
Congressional goal of minimal interference to the selfgovernment and internal affairs of unions .

. .

. The

legitimate and laudable goal of the union in attempting to
secure representation for the ethnic-minority members
previously denied them does not impinge upon the principle of free and democratic elections under the facts of
218
this case.
On appeal by the Secretary of Labor, the Seventh Circuit
reversed. 219 According to the court, the permissibility, indeed the
desirability, of affirmative action programs under Title VII was
quite irrelevant to determining whether the candidacy qualifications imposed by the affirmative action provisions of the union bylaws were "reasonable." That determination was instead made
exclusively in light of the policies and purposes of the LMRDA:
[t]he Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
was adopted long before affirmative action had been
heard of, and the legislative history indicates that Congress did not want to legislate with respect to the racial
practices, as such, of unions ....

We may assume that

under the LMRDA by-laws seeking to promote affirmative action are to be tested by the same standards as any
other provisions affecting union elections ....

Our con-

cern is not with the racial incidence of the restrictions
but with their impact on freedom of candidacy and
voting. 220
The court concluded that the by-laws were inconsistent with
these purposes: "We have found no recent decision upholding a
candidacy qualification that excluded a majority of the union's
membership, however reasonable the qualification may have
seemed. '221 The fact that the by-laws at issue were enacted by
majority vote was deemed irrelevant as well, because
218Id.

at 149 (citation omitted).

219See Donovan, 667 F.2d at 642.
220Id.
22 Id.

at 640-41.
at 642.
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[p]lebiscitary democracy is not the theory of the electoral
provisions of the LMRDA. If the white members of the
Association are willing to vote generously in favor of
minorities, they can be expected to elect minority-group
members to offices in the Association in sufficient numbers to make unnecessary the electoral restrictions. 222
The problem with the court's reasoning is that it ignored the
consistent, systematic and pervasive underrepresentation of minorities and women of any race in leadership positions within the
labor movement; union representatives are now and have almost
always been uniformly white males. 223 In 1974, the Association
whose by-laws were invalidated in Donovan had no minority officers and no minority members on the fifty-person board of directors. The 600-member Representative Assembly had only five to
ten minorities, or less than two percent.224 By 1980, one of the
Association's principal officers was black, the Board of Directors
was approximately fifteen percent minority and the Representative
Assembly was eight percent minority. 225 But for the affirmative
action provisions in the union's by-laws, the same pattern of racial/
gender bloc voting would have made such dramatic change an
226
improbability.

From one perspective, the irrelevance of race-that is, the
irrelevance of group membership to the legitimacy of representational authority-appears to be a non-controversial application of
Title VII's anti-discrimination policies. However, this irrelevance
2-Id.
23See generally Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1155 (1991); Michael J. Goldberg, Affirmative Action
in Union Government: The Landrum-GriffinAct Implications, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 649 (1983).
Consequently, doctrines which expand the authority of union officials have in fact expanded
the power of white males over nonwhites and white women in workplaces.
22 Goldberg, supra note 223.
225Id.

226 Professor Goldberg provides an insightful analysis of the many ways in which
redistributed representational authority might further the LMRDA's policies of promoting
internal democracy and accountability. Id. The problem with affirmative action programs
in general and the Donovan version in particular is that they substitute ascriptive representation for institutional accountability. At one level, there is a problem with a system in
which minority representatives are appointed by the Board of Directors rather than elected
by the minority. See generally Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 24; Guinier, The Triumph

of Tokenism, supra note 24. Under the at-large majority voting structure of most unions,
however, minorities are unlikely to win union offices without such programs. Consequently,
such programs should either be permitted or separate representation of some sort should

be institutionalized.
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of race represents a further incidence of the strategic fragmentation
of Title VII and the NLRA that began with Emporium Capwell,
was continued in Handy Andy and Allegheny General Hospital,
and was inverted in King; all have the devastating impact of entrenching the institutional power of white/male majorities and demobilizing and disempowering nonwhite/female minorities. Donovan carries this process even further, for while the formal/legal
structure of union representation may be race and gender neutral,
the concentration of representational power is not.
Donovan'sresolution of the nonrelationship between Title VII
and the NLRA constitutes the second instance of apparent structural closure. Donovan invokes the fragmentation of the regimes
set up by Emporium Capwell, the union integration cases, King
and Handy Andy to proscribe the implementation of the only
mechanism through which race/gender minorities can hope to obtain any degree of institutional power under the current structure
of exclusive representation by majority will-affirmative action
programs that counteract the effects of race/gender bloc voting by
white/male majorities.
The most puzzling aspect of the Donovan opinion is the
court's argument that the by-laws undermined the LMRDA's policy of preventing self-perpetuating incumbancy. According to the
court,

[t]he bylaws do not even foreclose the bizarre possibility
that the Board of Directors might fill up the bloc in the
Representative Assembly reserved for members of the
four minority groups with Asians who knew nothing about
the problems of blacks, or with blacks who knew nothing
about the problems of Asians, in order to construct a
racial coalition that would keep the present Board mem227
bers in office.
By striking down the affirmative action by-laws, Donovan
protects minorities from inadequate representation by members of
other minority groups (who do not understand their plight), only
to ensure they are represented by members of the white majority
(who presumably do). Given the majoritarian structure of repre-

227Donovan,

667 F.2d at 642.
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sentational power, the presumed irrelevance of race translates, de
facto, into the presumed competence of white male union officials
to prioritize fairly among the interests of nonwhites and white
women. This presumption, in turn, constitutes the unstated foundation of the representational structure whose legitimacy is repeatedly reaffirmed in and through the doctrine of the DFR: race/
gender is irrelevant because union representatives have the duty
and the ability (if
they are not minorities) to represent all constituents fairly. Nevertheless, the treatment of the relationship between group membership and adequate representation in the union
context differs markedly from the treatment of that relationship in
other contexts, most notably in the certification of class actions
for purposes of Title VII litigation. 228 The implications of this
difference are discouraging.
Under Federal Rule 23, courts decide who may represent
whom for purposes of challenging an employer's or a union's
practices under Title VII and enforce these decisions by granting
or withholding class certification. 229 Invoking the concept of "adequate representation, '23 0 courts have increasingly restricted the
extent to which women of color (or any protected class member)
can represent both nonwhite men and white women (or any member of a different protected class) as plaintiffs in Title VII class
actions. 231 Courts have thereby limited the kinds of employment
practices that can be challenged in any given law suit, the kinds
of remedies that can be232obtained, and the class of individuals that
will benefit from them.
Class action certification under Rule 23 is only one context in which the relationship
between group membership and adequate representation operates to restrict representational authority when the representatives are racial minorities. See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra
note 8 (heightened scrutiny applied to affirmative action set asides by local government in
which blacks wield effective political power).
229See Lawrence M. Grosberg, Class Actions and Client Centered Decision Making,
40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 709 (1989).
230See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1982); Abron
v. Black & Decker, Inc., 654 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1981), discussed at length in Crenshaw,
supra note 26.
21 See, e.g., Colston v. Maryland Cup Corp., 18 F.E.P.C. (BNA) 83 (1978) (black
female can represent only black females because of antagonism towards white females and
inability to represent adequately both black males and females). See also Majeske v. City
of Chicago, 740 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (because of class representing white police
officers restricted to whites only; if class contained anyone other than whites, court held
there would be an inherent antagonism and a divergence of arguments); Beck v. Mather,
417 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Va. 1976) (white female cannot represent blacks).
132See Deborah Rhode, Class Conflicts in ClassActions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 122128 (1982) (costs of maintaining a class action makes it difficult to obtain counsel; fragmenting
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Thus, while DFR cases reviewing union distributional decisions and administrative actions never question the competence
of the white men who control these institutions to act fairly on
behalf of groups to which they do not belong, Title VII plaintiffs
in general, and women of color in particular, are deemed incapable
of representing other individuals whose interests. may but need not
233
necessarily be in conflict with theirs.
By invoking this presumed incompetence, the doctrine of adequate representation has precisely the opposite practical effect
on representational authority in these two contexts. Whereas the
DFR, which underlies and justifies the whole network of restrictions on minorities that we have already examined, operates to
expand the representational authority of the white male union

officers, the requirement of adequate representation limits the representational authority of women of color as plaintiffs in class
action suits. 23 4 It thereby limits the scope of interests that can be
promoted and the number of discriminatory practices that can be

challenged in a particular lawsuit, requiring even victims of the
same practices to mount their challenges in different lawsuits.
The inconsistent treatment given to the relationship between
group membership and representational legitimacy is again obscured by the fragmentation of doctrinal domains. The interpre-

tation of this relationship in the DFR cases is never confronted in
adjudication by the interpretation of this same relationship in class

classes into subgroups requiring separate representation reduces likelihood that claims will
be heard).
23 See Shoben, supra note 26, at 834 (arguing that subclassing should occur only in
the event of actual conflict and preferably only at the remedial stage of bifurcated class
actions because there is no inherent conflict and the burden of subclassing is substantial).
234In a recent article, Professor Grosberg proposed adding a new rule to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct that would establish a general checklist of procedures
designed to ensure that named plaintiffs are representative of the class, increase class
members' access to information and opportunity to participate, and facilitate the identification and resolution of intraclass conflicts over remedial goals. See Grosberg, supra note
229, at 778-79. Compared to Grosberg's proposed rule, cases limiting the representational
authority of women of color do absolutely nothing to ensure adequate representation. On
the contrary, class actions in which women of color have been named plaintiffs have been
decertified under the doctrine of adequate representation even after significant benefits
were obtained for the subgroups which the women were deemed incapable of representing.
See, e.g., Payne, 673 F.2d 789; Abron, 654 F.2d 951. If the courts' purpose is really to
ensure adequate representation, they ought to focus on the relationship between the attorney and the class, rather than declare an inherent conflict among the multiple victims of
the employer's discrimination. See generally Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters:Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470
(1976); Rhode, supra note 232.
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action certifications under Rule 23. In both contexts, however, the
relationship between group membership and representational authority is an important conceptual vehicle through which institutional power is allocated among the various groups that inhabit
and attempt to construct a workplace. Moreover, it is through its
inconsistent resolution across these domains that this conceptual
relationship operates systematically to maintain the structure of
race and gender subordination, or at least to slow its transformaon direct collective action as
tion by rationalizing legal limitations
235
well as on broad-based litigation.
The interpretation of the relationship between Title VII and
the NLRA across these various domains is one vehicle through
which legal interpretation produces structural violence. The interpreted relationship between these regimes is analytically inconsistent. Cumulatively, it erects an institutional arrangement in which
women of color find themselves with virtually no avenues for
effective agency. The purported irrelevance of Title VII's antidiscrimination policies to the interpretation of the NLRA maintains
a structure in which women of color engage in collective self-help
at their peril.2 3 6 They have no way to prevent the certification of
a union that threatens to discriminate against them, 237 nor to com-

pel their inclusion in a union that seeks to exclude them. 238 Affir-

mative action programs that would afford them access to the leadership positions through which they might effect internal reform
are proscibed, on the one hand, because Title VII prohibits race-

213Based on responses I received while disseminating earlier drafts of this Article, I
anticipate that this project will generate a series of objections that can loosely be categorized
as a challenge to the practice of comparing the treatment of legal concepts (like representational adequacy) across distinct doctrinal and institutional domains. It might be argued,
for example, that the doctrines appear incoherent only because the question of representational authority has been abstracted from the specific institutional contexts in which that
authority is to be exercised. It might also be argued that there are good reasons why elected
union officials should have the power to represent members of social groups to which they
do not belong, while self-appointed class action plaintiffs are denied this authority. The
problem with this sort of argument is that the minority does not elect the representatives
whom the law invests with exclusive representational authority. Indeed, those representatives might not have been elected even by the majority. See, e.g., RCA Manufacturing
Co., 2 N.L.R.B. 168 (1936); Lemco Construction, 283 N.L.R.B. 459 (1987). See generally,
Alan Hyde, Democracy in Collective Bargaining, 93 YALE L.J. 793 (1984). In any event,
to take issue with this project at this level is, quite frankly, to miss the point. My point is
that context matters; it is simply a different context that I invoke.
236Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. 50.
237 Handy Andy, 228 N.L.R.B. 447.
138Allegheny General Hospital, 608 F.2d 965.

Structures of Subordination

1993]

conscious classifications 23 9 and, on the other hand, because the
LMRDA's purposes of promoting union democracy and accountability must be interpreted independently and apart from the Title
240
VII policies favoring affirmative action.

This substantial network of restrictions on our agency, which
is grounded in the irrelevance of Title VII to the NLRA, is supplemented by the restrictions imposed on us through the relevance
of the NLRA to Title VII, which deprives us of authority we
would otherwise have under Title VII to oppose employment
discrimination 241 and through the irrelevance of collective rights to
maintain a separate union. 242 The cumulative result is structural
violence.
III. Transforming the Structural Violence of Law
A. Structural Violence: Causes and Cures?
The institutional arrangements developed through the interpretation of the boundaries between Title VII and the NLRA
constitute a structure that suppresses the agency, restricts the
institutional authority and ignores the collective identity of women
of color. Viewed individually, there may be legitimate reasons for
defending any one of the cases I have discussed. But, when one
considers the cumulative impact of Emporium Capwell, ILA Baltimore, Handy Andy, Allegheny General Hospital, Donovan together with Shultz, Abron, Goodman and King-surely something
is wrong. The impact of these otherwise inconsistent cases is the
systematic suppression of minority agency and the elimination of
any effective recourse against the consequences of institutional
powerlessness.
Does this mean that these cases were wrongly decided?
Should they be reversed? If so, which cases should we reverse?
How can I argue, for example, that Emporium Capwell's interpretation of Section 7 of the NLRA was wrong because of the way
Section 703 of Title VII was interpreted in ILA Baltimore or the
way Section 704(a) was interpreted in King or the way Rule 23
Shultz, 338 F. Supp. 1204.
F.2d 638.
"' King, 476 F. Supp. 495.
242ILA Baltimore, 460 F.2d 497.
'9

240 Donovan, 667
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was intrepreted in Abron, or the way the LMRDA was interpreted
in Donovan or the way the DFR was treated in Goodman, DPOA
and Seeps? Is the solution to strengthen Title VII by recognizing
the collective and individual identity of women of color as distinct
remedial categories or to change the structure of majoritarian decisionmaking under the NLRA, for example by overruling Donovan to permit affirmative action programs in union leadership elections or by overruling ILA Baltimore to permit the formation of
243
separate locals?
These questions are driven by a critique that is completely
external to the terms on which any of these cases were argued and
resolved. Each case is situated in a different doctrinal domain and
decided by reference to different interests and institutional concerns. Nevertheless, the thing that holds these cases together is
the complete and total absence of the woman of color as a legitimate agent or remedial reference point and the structure of powerlessness that is thereby established and maintained. It is as
though our interests do not matter because we simply do not exist.
To the extent we attempt to locate ourselves in these cases, we
find ourselves situated in a network of interpretative practices that
appear committed to restricting our institutional authority, 244 suppressing our agency 245 and denying us a distinct identity as
247
individuals 246 or as a group.
This consistent and systematic suppression of women of color
through the interpretative practices that construct these various
doctrinal domains and institutional arrangements raises one of the
most fundamental questions of post-Foulcauldian political theory.248 The question raised by "the ironic situation [of contemporary welfare corporate societies] in which power is widely dispersed and diffused, yet social relations are tightly defined by
domination and oppression" 249 is: "why is this general pattern [of
unequal distribution of high level positions across women and men]
243 To me, it seems quite obvious that we need to do both. Even more importantly, if
both Title VII and the NLRA must be reformed, it is only because in both contexts the
rules have been interpreted at the expense of minority interests.
244See Abron, 673 F.2d 798; Crenshaw, supra note 26; Shoben, supra note 26.

245See Emporium Capvell, 420 U.S. 50; King, 476 F. Supp. 495.
246See Scarborough, supra note 26.

247See, e.g., ILA Baltimore, 460 F.2d 497.
248See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS

AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 (Colin Gordon ed., 1980); Schnably, supra note 17.
249IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 32 (1990).
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reproduced even in the face of conscious efforts to change it. ' '250
The question is particularly compelling when we consider that
adjudication occurs in many different courts, presided over by
many different judges, who have many different ideologies and
adjudicate ostensibly unrelated issues in distinct doctrinal domains. 251 How can it be that this system of decentralized power
nevertheless operates to maintain a systematic, cumulative and
interactive suppression of women of color as legitimate actors in
workplaces? Though it is much easier to answer these questions
than to propose acceptable solutions, I will attempt to do both. In
section 1, I will explain this structure of violence as an artifact of
two features of legal interpretation: the illusion of objectivity that
pervades its practice and the fragmentation of discursive domains
that obscures its subjectivity. In section 2, I offer possible ways
to transform this structure of violence through the decentralization
of interpretative power and the redistribution of institutional
power.
1. Structural Violence and the Illusion of Objectivity
To overcome structural violence against women of color (and
indeed against any other political identity that has been systematically suppressed in the practice of legal interpretation), we must
first learn to recognize it when we don't see it. This task is made
all the more difficult by the fact that structures of violence are
constructed on the absence of the suppressed interests and identities. The absence of women of color does not, however, occur in
a vacuum. On the contrary, the failure or refusal to accord us a
legally operative identity or to preserve our agency within the
institutional arrangements under review is bounded on all sides by
the illusion of objectivity. My purpose is to show that both the
fragmentation of Title VII and the NLRA and the repeated reliance
on the DFR are expressions of this illusion.
Id. at 29.
The problem is that while social control may be effectively disbursed across multiple
decision-making roles, these institutional roles are occupied for the most part by the same
people with the same values. Members of groups which deviate from these norms come to
occupy positions of authority and power only to the extent they assimilate themselves to
the governing values. See Richard Delgado, Affirmative Action as a MajoritarianDevice:
Or, Do You Really Want To Be a Role Model?, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1222 (1991). Individuals
who assimilate and later change their minds are quickly deposed or isolated by their peers.
21
15

Id.
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The illusion of objectivity does not, however, explain why
judges, agencies and arbitrators with different ideological agendas
operating in different doctrinal domains and reviewing different
institutional arrangements nevertheless produce decisions that operate systematically and cumulatively across these domains to
suppress the identity and agency of women of color. The fragmentation of discursive domains is an important factor in constituting
adjudication as a vehicle for the blind reproduction of subordination, but the opportunity does not explain the actuality. I attempt
to explain this actuality by positing and exploring what I call "the
unitary consciousness of law." I argue that legal doctrine is an
inherited artifact which articulates the perspectives, assumptions
and normative commitments of the group that has controlled the
interpretative practices through which legal doctrine is articulated.
To the extent interpretative authority has been concentrated in
one group, law (read now as the legal doctrine and the repertoire
of permissible interpretative moves already developed) is not objective; it is affirmatively subjective, an expression of the subjectivity of the group in whom interpretative authority has been
concentrated.
To my mind, there is little doubt that the structural violence
of law against women of color is perpetuated because an inherited
consciousness which devalues and suppresses the self-identity of
women of color, as much in her presence as, more commonly, in
her absence, is embedded in legal doctrines and interpretative
norms. The real question is whether the redistribution of interpretative power can transform the subjectivity of the unitary consciousness we have inherited into the objectivity of a multipleconsciousness, whose substance we have yet to fully comprehend.
There are reasons both to hope and to doubt.
a. The Ideology of Objectivity and the Institutional
Structures of Subjective Power
To understand the role the illusion of objectivity plays in
erecting the institutional structure of powerlessness, I want to
return to the debate over the substantive legal standards which
define the DFR. The vast majority of scholarship on the DFR has
focused on debating the appropriate standards for reviewing the
actions of elected union officials. Rather than attempting to address
all of this scholarship directly, I want to focus on a recent article
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by Professors Harper and Lupu in which they discuss alternative
legal standards and conclude that equal protection should be the
exclusive norm in fair representation cases.252 Harper and Lupu
invoke a model of "principled democracy" to support their claim
that union actions should be reviewed solely to ensure that the
decisions and activities of union representatives are based on principles that accord all persons "equal respect. 253s They then illustrate how cases decided under alternative substantive standards 254
would be more satifactorily resolved under the principle of equal
respect.
Harper and Lupu argue that a legal standard based on the
model of principled democracy would ensure majoritarian representatives the range of discretion necessary to develop, negotiate
and implement some acceptable conception of the common good
on behalf of their constituency, limited only by the condition that
their determinations "make no distinction that rests upon the identities of particular persons. ' '255 They then derive a commitment to
the principle of equal respect, which requires that
all decisionmakers must regard all persons on whose behalf they are authorized to act as having equal and positive value. The principle proscribes . . . decisions that

are motivated by animus toward a disfavored group. It
does more, however; the principle forbids any decision
that counts some persons as more worthy than others
even if the decisionmaker has no animus toward those
others.256

While Harper and Lupu's approach is superior to the two
alternate DFR models they reject, 257 it is still inadequate. Indeed,
252Harper
23

& Lupu, supra note 34.
1 d. at 1225.
2-'
These standards include the principles of contract law, procedural due process and
tort principles that have been used to elaborate the requirements of "fair representation"

and to require unions to "faithfully assert employee interests secured by collective bargining
agreements ....afford employees certain opportunities to be heard, and... [refrain from]
negligent [conduct] in their protection of employee interests." Id. at 1217.
Harper and Lupu contrast two models underlying the alternative substantive standards
that have been applied in DFR cases and defended in the legal scholarship. The first rejected
model is "unconstrained majoritarianism"; the second is "the stringent DFR." Id. at 121516.
2Id. at 1225.
25 6
Id.

2" For Harper and Lupu, unconstrained majoritarianism "would leave workers at the
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they share more in common with the approaches they criticize
than they may realize. Like those approaches, Harper and Lupu
say nothing about the structure of powerlessness erected on the
foundations of the DFR, nor do they say anything about who holds
power in the union or question the legitimacy of the majoritarian
processes through which those individuals acquire and maintain
their power.258
What makes their article valuable is that Harper and Lupu
make explicit the assumptions underlying their approach (and,
indeed, underlying any strategy to promote fair representation
through external standards rather than the redistribution of power).
Under the principle of equal respect,
[d]ecisionmakers may distribute goods between individuals on the basis of an individual's divergent intereststhe level of an individual's need for a good, for instancebut not on the basis of personal identity. Decisionmakers
therefore must act as if from behind a "veil of ignorance"
of their own identities and of those who might be affected
by their decisions.... [Such a requirement] assist[s] in

determining whether a particular decision fall[s] completely outside the set of acceptable principles of
justice.259
The problem is that we have no reason to believe that decisionmakers in any forum (whether in a union, a legislature or a court)
can ignore their own identities, that they can in effect escape the
"constitutive group relations" in which they are embedded. 260 Inmercy of union majorities and insiders," while the stringent DFR "would unreasonably
weaken the power of unions to negotiate with employers." Id.
21 Their approach presumes that the way institutional power is distributed across the
race and gender subgroups that constitute the union's membership is irrelevant to the goal
of arriving at an objective assessment of competing claims or, as sometimes stated, "the
common good." Rather than offering some proposal to redesign the structure of institutional
power in the workplace so as to increase the opportunities for self-determination for all
workers, particularly for the minority workers whom the DFR purports to protect, their
project, once again, is to articulate some "objectively" defensible principle of fair representation that can be enforced by invoking an external, theoretically neutral and objective,
arbitrator or judge.
29 Harper & Lupu, supra note 34, at 1225 n.57 (emphasis added).
m I use the term "constitutive relations" in the way Michael Sandel defines it in his
critique of the Rawlsian original position, upon which Harper and Lupu rest their model
of principled democracy. See Michael Sandel, The ProceduralRepublic and the Unencum-

bered Self, in

THE SELF AND THE POLITICAL ORDER

83-84 (Tracy Strong ed., 1992).
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deed, if my analysis of the politics of interpretative fragmentation
at the boundaries of Title VII and the NLRA shows anything, it
shows that the concentration of interpretative power makes legal
interpretation a highly subjective medium-a medium whose subjectivity becomes apparent only in the incoherence of the conceptual relations courts deploy across doctrinal domains and in the
cumulative impact of their decisions on those who are most apparently its "others"-the most damning evidence of which may
be the fact that courts positively do not indulge the illusion of
objectivity in institutional contexts where racial minorities exercise
261
representative power.
From this perspective, Harper and Lupu's model of principled
democracy operates to rationalize the presumption which is institutionalized in the fragmentation of Title VII and the NLRA-a
presumption that the commitment to race and gender equality has
no implications for the structure of majoritarian institutions. It
assumes that distributional choices can be fairly and objectively
made through majoritarian processes, which are constructed without reference to Title VII policies, so long as the DFR and Title
VII are available as external limits on the arbitrary or discriminatory exercise of union power in particular cases. Racial minorities and women of all races need not worry that institutional
decisionmaking power is concentrated in the hands of a white/male
leadership accountable to a white/male majority because white/
males have a legal duty, which is reviewed and enforced in other
external forums (mainly by other white/males who inherit their
interpretive resources from other white/males) to grant the interests of women and nonwhites equal respect to the interests of
white/males. NOT.
b. The Intersubjectivity of Equals: Moral Imperative and
InstitutionalBlueprint
The illusion of objectivity that is invoked in legal discourse
and institutionalized in some representational structures was shattered by the Legal Realists. 262 Their insights triggered a crisis of
261See

Aleinikoff, supra note 8 (discussing the treatment of "racial politics" in City of

Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989)).

262See, e.g., KARL LLEWELYN, BRAMBLE BUSH 74 (1960) (celebrating the decisional
flexibility afforded by the possibility of reading precedents narrowly or broadly).
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legitimacy from which we have yet to recover, for if legal doctrine
is truly indeterminate, then we can never be sure that judicial
decisions turn on anything more "objective" than the judge's fabled
breakfast, or, even more alarming, his prejudices, stereotypes and
26
the limited perspectives of his contingent life experiences.
A recent essay by J.M. Balkin has dealt the claim of objectivity another major blow. According to Professor Balkin, claims that
legal doctrine is or can be made objective by community oversight
neglect "the social construction of the subject. ''2 64 Once we recognize that
individual preferences, and indeed, individual perceptions
of social reality . . .have already and necessarily been
constructed by social forces ...the problem of the rogue

judge would fade into the background of jurisprudential
concern. It would be replaced by the problem of the
sincere judge, who desires to interpret the law faithfully,
but nevertheless is destined to see the law according to
her own ideological perceptions and beliefs. Once the
social construction of the subject becomes the basic assumption of jurisprudence, one is less concerned with
how constraint is possible than with how undesirable
2 65
forms of blindness can be avoided.
Professor Balkin's account has important implications for any
project aimed at constructing institutional arrangements to deter-

26 In response to this assault, numerous scholars rushed to rebuild and refortify the
legitimacy of legal interpretation. Karl Llewelyn argued that legal doctrine was not all that
indeterminate. Like any tool, only the best and the brightest judges could effectively
manipulate the indeterminancy of legal doctrine; lesser judges would be bound to follow
the trodden paths of established precedent for want of imagination and analytic agility. Id.
at 75. This account provides no great reassurance since there is little reason to believe that
the best and the brightest are also the wisest and noblest of our judges. For an interesting
and recent re-reading of Llewelyn's Bramble Bush, see William Twining, The Case Law

System in America, 100 YALE L.J. 1093 (1991).

Owen Fiss has also taken pains to refortify our faith in the objectivity of judicial
decisions. In Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982), Professor Fiss
invokes the notion of an "interpretative community," whose practices of review and argumentation render judicial opinions subject to criticism and reversal. This community
operates as an external restraint on the discretion which doctrinal indeterminacy affords
individual judges, thereby detering arbitrariness, discrimination and corruption in judicial
decisionmaking.
264See Balkin, supra note 25, at 1142.
265Id.

(emphasis added).
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mine and implement an "objective" vision of the common good.
Blindness is not something that can be avoided by an individual
act of will. As Balkin recognizes, the social construction of the
subject means that "individual choice is never purely individual;
it is shaped and structured before the individual begins her conscious deliberation, and before she experiences the pull of conscience." 266 Nevertheless, Balkin insists that individuals are aware
of and can presumably work to alter the structures that determine
their preferences and expectations. 267 1 embrace both propositions.
However, while Balkin accounts for this possibility by invoking
the analytical instability of thesis and counterthesis within dominant ideological systems, 268 I locate our hope for overcoming ideological blindness in the increasing empowerment of subordinated
social groups. Karl Mannheim has said it best:
In a well stabilized society the mere infiltration of the
modes of thought of the lower strata into the higher would
not mean very much since the bare perception by the
dominant group of possible variations in thinking would
not result in their being intellectually shaken .... [I]t is

not until we have a general democratization that the rise
of the lower strata allows their thinking to acquire public
significance. This process of democratization first makes
it possible for the ways of thinking of the lower strata,
which formerly had no public validity, to acquire validity
and prestige. 269
Individual consciousness is a social construct, which neither
pre-exists nor stands apart from the social relations in which we
2
6

Id. at 1149.

s2
Id. at 1149 n.63.
268

Id.

m' KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 8-9 (1940).

Mannheim continues:

When the stage of democratization has been reached, the techniquies of thinking
and the ideas of the lower strata are for the first time in a position to confront the
ideas of the dominant strata on the same level of validity. And now, too, for the
first time these ideas and modes of thought are capable of impelling the person
who thinks within their framework to subject the objects of his world to a fundamental questioning. It is with this clashing of modes of thought, each of which
has the same claims to representational validity, that for the first time there is
rendered possible the emergence of the question ....
Id.at 9.
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are embedded. However, as subordinated individuals acquire and
exercise the power to articulate their contingent experiences and
project their socially constructed interests and values as operative
reference points in legislative, judicial and other constitutive processes, both legal and institutional arrangements, as well as normative discourse, become the segmented work-product of competing political communities. Rather than representing, as some
scholars argue, the destruction of a moral consensus, 270 this segmentation is itself a first step towards overcoming the forms of
blindness that limit our ability to approximate objective justice and
achieve a genuine and inclusive community. It is precisely through
exposure to and confrontation with the world experiences and
values of competing political communities that individuals first
acquire access to alternative perspectives from which to engage in
genuine self-criticism and forge an agenda of transformation for
themselves and the society in which we are embedded.
Mannheim's account of the preconditions of transformation
pushes us beyond the insights of those who have only recently
discovered the distinct perspective of socially marginalized groups
and acknowledged the contributions these perspectives may make
to the project of evolving a more just society.271 The basic problem
is that just as our approximations toward "objective" understand272
ing depend upon the further emancipation of oppressed voices,
the actualization of "objective justice," an aspiration simultaneously invoked and misused in the concept of the common good,
depends fundamentally and ultimately on the redistribution of effective social and institutional power. This should be no surprise,
for it is simply to recognize that actualization of the transformative
possibilities discovered in the voices of the oppressed must be

2' See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 1520 (1992), discussing Alisdair Maclntyre's famous argument that

collective moral discourse and rational choice is impossible in conditions of modem societies precisely because people interpret conflicts against a background of
distinct, rival normative traditions that are themselves incommensurable. For
MacIntyre, the absence of a single, unified and shared moral tradition-what less
charitably might be called a totalistic moral environment-in modern pluralistic
societies makes moral conflict pervasively unresolvable.
Id. at 1529 (discussing ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 238 (1981)).
271Alienikoff, supra note 8.
272See Fajer, supra note 8.
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based on a social reality more stable than the altruism and empathy
of dominant social actors.
Explicit in Mannheim's account of social transformation is the
recognition that the other's way of seeing has no ability to shake
the dominant group unless that way of seeing controls effective
power. When power is centralized and monopolized by dominant
interests, the degree to which the privileged are shaken depends
on the continued openness or sensitivity of the powerful to the
claims of the powerless. The privileged, however, may perceive
and resist the perspectives and claims of the marginalized as nothing but an assault, a destruction. As theologian James Cone has
recognized, liberating the oppressed may necessitate destroying
the oppressor or, more precisely, destroying the way of life, the
institutional arrangements and the conceptual structures through
which the oppressor oppresses. 273 It is too much to expect that the
fundamental changes necessary to achieve objective justice can be
attained through appeals to the goodwill, altruism and empathy of
those who are privileged by the oppression of others. We as a
society must ground social transformation on something more reliable than the empathy of the privileged. Redistribution of power
is essential not only to obtaining social justice but also crucial,
even before that, to obtaining objective understanding, for individuals easily misunderstand the claims we refuse to hear, and we
refuse to listen to the claims that most threaten the theoretical
commitments and institutional arrangements that support our privilege-whenever we can.
The implications of this account of objectivity are far-reaching
and profound, for it entails a reconceptualization of the purported
tension between individual liberty and social equality as well as
the supposed conflict between the common good and the existence
of factions. According to philosopher John Rawls, the first tension
is fundamental in modem democratic theory. 274 If, however, liberty

is the power of authentic self-determination, then my liberty depends upon the equality of others. Only an equal can confront me
effectively, and only through the confrontation of an equal can I

273CONE, supra note 13; Martha Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and
Theory: A Reply to Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 1993)

(white women must recognize that they are as much agent/oppressors as victims/oppressed).
24 John RawIs, Justice as Fairness:Politicalnot Metaphysical, in THE SELF AND THE
POLITICAL ORDER 97-98 (Tracy Strong ed., 1992).
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be shaken free from the limitations imposed upon my understanding by my own, and otherwise inevitable, contingency. Only
through the other can I come to understand the common good.
Thus individual liberty and social equality are not truly in conflict
but rather mutually interdependent.2 75
Similarly, the structural suppression of factional claims undermines, rather than enhances, the achievement of a genuine
common good by limiting effective access to the experiences and
perspectives of the others whom interpretative power constructs
as factions. Through the suppression of the other, we are all denied
the opportunity to transcend the limitations of our contingent perspectives. We are denied, in short, the opportunity for authentic
self-determination grounded on the objectivity of a collective truth.
2. Toward Self-RepresentationalStructures
The structure of representational authority that is maintained
by the fragmentation of Title VII and the NLRA and legitimated
'through the invocation of the DFR is based ultimately on the
strategically manipulated illusion that the distribution of institutional power among the various socially constructed race/gender
groups is irrelevant to achieving an "objective" resolution of conflicting claims. This illusion tells us that the common good can be
objectively determined despite the concentration of effective
power in one of these groups (namely and almost uniformly white
men). By way of contrast, I want briefly to explore three alternative models of representational authority which would much more
readily establish the conditions for objectively identifying the com276
mon good.

The first model, proposed by Eileen Silverstein, establishes a
procedure for the certification of interest groups within an exclu27 What are not interdependent are equality and privilege, which is so often confused
with liberty. Certainly, to achieve equality, we must reorganize the structures of privilege.
Yet, it is privilege itself which reduces liberty and further imprisons the privileged in the
delusions through which their privilege is rationalized.
276A fourth model would be to redistribute representational slots to ascriptive representatives through affirmative action programs like the one invalidated by Donovan v.
Illinois Educ. Ass'n, 667 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1982). I believe that the three models I examine
below are all superior to the approach used in Donovan because they increase representational accountability and establish an institutional context for the potential formation of
interracial and cross/gender collectivities. In the models I prefer, groups may but need not
be formed or represented on the basis of race or gender. The basis of group formation will,
instead, be the common experiences and interdependencies that bring us together.
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sive bargaining unit.277 In Professor Silverstein's system, workers
with common economic interests affected by a union's collective
bargaining agenda can form interest groups which the union is
required to deal with in good faith, subject to the NLRB's jurisdiction. 27 After they are certified as interest groups, 279 the groups

possess a limited right to veto collective bargaining decisions made
by the majority. A veto by the majority vote of any certified
interest group constitutes a binding rejection of the proposed collective bargaining agreement, and forces the union to reopen negotiations with management. Once a second agreement is reached
between the union and management, interest groups have only a
limited veto subject to a super-majority override. The novel feature
of Silverstein's proposal is that it attempts to achieve fair representation through the construction of a procedural mechanism that
permits the redistribution of institutional power among self-identified subgroups within the union, rather than through some judicially enforceable standard of fairness.
A second possible model for achieving the redistribution of
institutional power draws on the work of Lani Guinier. In two
remarkable articles, 280 Professor Guinier launches a compelling
critique of the assumptions underlying the purported legitimacy of
majority rule281 and persuasively defends a series of proposals for

277Silverstein, supra note 24.
278The basic provisions of Professor

Silverstein's proposal are explained more fully in
id. at 1519-23.
279Certification requests would, initially, be directed to the national leadership and
would include three items:
(I) the names of the group leaders; (2) the common economic interest defining the
group; and (3) the common negotiation issues on which the interest group disagrees
with the union leadership position. Within some specified time period, the national
union leadership would have to decide whether to certify the interest group. If
denied certification, the interest groups could petition the NLRB. If the union
granted certification, the interest group members would be assured a voice in the
formulation of contract demands.
Id. at 1520-21.
moGuinier, No Two Seats, supra note 24; Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra
note 24.
281 See Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 24, at 1437-43. Professor Guinier notes that:
[s]imple majority rule assumes that the majority and minority are fungible, meaning
that the outcome of voting procedures depends solely on the shape of the distribution of the preferences, and not on which voters hold certain preferences. The
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resolving the problem of unfair and nonresponsive political representation through a system of proportionate interest representation. 282 Under Guinier's proposed cumulative voting system:
the threshold for election would be reduced from 51% to
something less. In the case of a four person at-large council, the threshhold would be 21%. Voters would each be
given the same number of votes as open seats (four in
this case) so that they could distribute by their choice
among the competing candidates. If black voters are a
politically cohesive interest constituency, they might use
all four of their votes on one candidate. In a 100 voter
jurisidiction, where each black voter gave all four of her
votes to one candidate, a 25% black minority could elect
a representative. The intensity of their interests and their
political cohesion [as well as the increased potential for
23
developing coalitions with politically allied non-blacks]
would ensure black voters the ability to elect at least one
284
representative.
Professor Guinier's model for achieving fair representation though
of union officials
cumulative voting could be used in the election 285
to redistribute institutional power within unions.
scheme assumes further that the minority will support the majority's decision for
reasons of stability, efficiency, reciprocity and accountablity.
Id. at 1437. These assumptions presuppose, among other things, the lack of a permanent
majority. "The 51% are legitimate in the eyes of the 49% because the 49% has the opportunity to attract defectors and become the next governing majority." Id. at 1438. Under
pervasive and prevailing conditions of racial bloc voting, however, these assumptions are
highly questionable. "[A] system in which a permanent and homogenous majority consistently exercises disproportionate power is neither stable, accountable, nor reciprocal." Id.
at 1441.
Id. at 1458-82. See also Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism, supra note 24, at 113653.
n Id. at 1463 n.187. Because of the lowered threshold for election,
any politically cohesive interest constituency sufficiently numerous to organize
[the required percentage] of voters cannot be denied representation. White women
or moderate white voters normally subsumed by the majority or Latino voters
sufficiently numerous but dispersed may also gain representation without straining
their political alliances with blacks.
Id.

284Guinier, No Two Seats, supra note 24, at 1463.
Although an in-depth review is beyond the scope of this Article, preliminary research
suggests that unions could voluntarily adopt a system of proportional representation under
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The third and perhaps most radical model follows Professor
Schatzki's proposal to abolish exclusive representation altogether,
to eliminate the Board determination of "appropriate bargaining
units," and to establish a system of self-determined representation. 286 According to Schatzki,

employees would be free to select their representatives
without being subjected to a political majority which is
unsympathetic to the minority's desires ....
[C]onflicts
created by individuals' need for fair treatment at the
hands of the union could be greatly reduced if exclusivity
were abandoned and employees were allowed to be represented by their own individually chosen agents. 28 7
While a system of self-determined representation may reduce
the value of the strike, 288 encourage strategic bargaining by employers, 289 and produce a network of unions segregated on the
basis of race and/or gender,290 these consequences are neither

the LMRDA. See, e.g., Lear Siegler Inc., v. International Union, UAW, 287 F. Supp. 692
(W.D. Mich. 1968) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 419 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1969) (separate
ratification procedures for skilled workers were permissible as part of union's effort to
adequately and fairly represent all employees within the bargaining unit). However, to
mandate proportional representation and make it effective would require legislative modification of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1959) (regulates voting only in cases where union
constitution or by-laws require voting). This approach would avoid the obstacles which
cases like Shultz and Donovan have created for affirmative action programs designed to
redistribute leadership positions.
16 Shatzki, supra note 24, at 897-900.
28 Id. at 903. Professor Schatzki's proposal is rather detailed. It provides that: (1) every
employee should be permitted to select her own representative; (2) the employer would be
obligated to engage in good faith collective bargaining with each of the agents authorized
by its employees; (3) unions could engage in coalition bargaining, and the employer would
be required to bargain on that basis; (4) restrictions would be placed on the number of
times employees could switch bargaining agents; (5) a procedure would be implemented to
inform the employer of the unions to which its employees belonged; (6) unions would be
free to refuse to represent the employees of a single employer, but once the union agreed
to represent one or more employees of an employer, they would not be allowed to refuse
to represent any employee of that employer (contrast Allegheny General Hospital); and
that (7) unions would be able to require any represented employee to join the union; the
sanction for not joining would be to exclude the individual from enjoying the contractual
benefits of the collective bargaining process in which the union engaged. Id. at 919-20.
Items (4) and (7) clearly and favorably distinguish Schatzki's proposal from the voluntary
associationalism advocated by scholars like Charles Fried, Individualand Collective Rights
in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and Its Prospects, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 1012 (1984).
msSchatzki, supra note 24, at 927.
89Id. at 929.
m Id. at 934.
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inevitable nor unequivocally undesireable. Calling an effective
strike may simply require more political coordination and compromise among the various unions. 291 Inter-union competition may
ultimately benefit employees more than the employers who seek
to divide them, for it may induce unions to demand more favorable
terms in their effort to attract and maintain their memberships,
while the opportunity to organize around race and gender-based
interests may promote the elimination of discrimination. 292 On the
whole, Schatzki predicts that if the relationship between unions
and their members were more voluntary, employees would be
more likely to participate in their unions, thereby increasing both
the unions' understanding of employee preferences and their political power. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, a system of
free representation would eliminate the need for Board involve'293
ment in the determination of "appropriate bargaining units.
Each of these three models has advantages and disadvantages
that require further examination. Professor Silverstein's model
certifies groups on the basis of their common interest in a single
issue, like a provision in a particular collective bargaining agreement. This requirement may prove too burdensome to be effective.
Certain groups, like women of color, may share a whole range of
interests, and yet be required continuously to reconstitute themselves as an interest group with respect to each issue. On the other
hand, single issue interest-group certification may avoid the insti291 Compare CHARLES

C. HECKSHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT

IN THE CHANGING CORPORATION (1988) (goal of labor movement must be to develop a
broader basis of power including an expansion of individual and group rights which secure
the basis for new forms of collective action).
292Schatzki, supra note 24, at 934.
293According to Schatzki, in determining appropriate units,
the Board does not consult the employees or attempt to ascertain their wishes.
Rather, the Board looks to many "objective" factors in any given case to make
the determination. While some factors may indirectly reflect individual employee
preferences, and while much of the Board rhetoric in defining the appropriate unit
is about the community of interests among the employees, in truth most of the
factors ... reflect either the structure the employer has given its business or the
wishes of the petitioning labor organization, or both ....The determining factor
is the Board's view of what ought to be, or might be, or is, a community of
interests among employees.
Id. at 897-98. If this is a fair assessment of the Board's "appropriate bargaining unit"
determinations, then Allegheny General Hospital is all the more disturbing. Allegheny
General Hospital, supports Schatzki's claim, for it excluded from the certified unit job

classifications that would have been subject to the provisions of the Equal Pay Act if
performed by workers of the opposite sex.
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tutionalization of rigid race/gender-based groups and is, in theory,
more consistent with my vision of individual identity as multiple
294
consciousness and intersecting group memberships.
Professor Guinier's model of proportionate interest representation through cumulative voting may increase the political accountability of elected union officials, but may provide minority
groups like the Guardians in the DPOA cases and the female
clerical workers in Seep with less direct control over the union's
bargaining agenda than Silverstein's veto proposal. Professor
Schatzki's proposal for self-determined representation has the
unique advantage of externalizing the impact of democratizing the
union's internal procedures. Since employers must bargain in good
faith with all of the unions chosen by their employees, and since
any one union has the independent right to call a strike and to
persuade any of the others to join it, employers have an incentive
to resolve inter-union differences to achieve an acceptable consensus. By contrast, under Silverstein's proposal, employers might
simply refuse to meet the demands of the interest group and, if
the union acquiesced, leave the group with no effective recourse. 295
Despite their differences, all three models share one common
feature-they all strive to resolve the problem of fair representation by facilitating the formation of self-identified collectivities and
by creating structural arrangements through which institutional
power may be more effectively and equally distributed among
these various self-determined groupings. All three reorganize the
structures of representational power. Their approach is entirely
different from and infinitely more promising than the search for
substantive standards and the dead-end debate it has spawned.
My review of these models has been admittedly sketchy, first
because they have been so thoughtfully expounded by their original proponents, second because I believe the precise details of
any legislative reform can be worked out later if there develops
some general consensus that the redistribution of institutional
29 See supra notes 22-23 and infra notes 328-338 and accompanying text. See generally
infra part III.B.
2- See Silverstein, supra note 24, at 1526. If a union decides that an interest group's
veto "is beyond the legitimate scope of their interest," it may refuse to recognize the veto.
The group's only recourse is to appeal to the NLRB; this appeal would probably fail in the
face of the union's claims that the employer would not budge. See Seep v. Commercial
Motor Freight, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (failure to achieve bargaining
demands of female clerical workers did not violate DFR where failure was due to employer's
intransigence).
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power and the decentralization of representational authority is a
more fruitful endeavor than the further articulation of substantive
standards for the DFR, and, most importantly, because there is no
such consensus. 296 I find myself in the unhappy situation of being
at odds with some of the most admirable and otherwise progressive
labor law scholars in the country, 297 some of whom have already
demanded to know: Why separate representation? Why women of
color? Why not simply demand more appropriate standards for the
DFR and Title VII or focus on the redistribution of interpretative
power?

298

To address these questions I want to focus on the two basic
reasons underlying the almost uniform commitment to maintaining
a centralized structure of representational power based on majority
rule and the institutional suppression/demobilization of minorities
both as individuals and as groups. The first reason for this commitment is a deeply philosophical, but ultimately inadequate, vision of political identity formation and the conditions of collective
solidarity, most explicitly articulated in a recent article by David
Abraham. 299 His work provides a useful vehicle for exploring the
promise of this vision and, by drawing on the work on Third World
Feminists, to attack its limitations, for his account presupposes
that decentralized power structures necessarily produce strategic

2 Some have asked how we can expect a general consensus to develop when the
majority has power and no incentive to give any of it up to "the other." The short answer
is we all want peace.
See Abraham, supra note 37; Richard Michael Fischl, Self, Others and Section 7:
Mutualism and Protected Protest Activities under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 789
(1989); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer:FurtherReflections on the Distinctive Character
of American Labor Law, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1 (1990); Katherine Stone, Labor and the
Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CH. L.
REV. 73 (1988).
2" The short answer is that the redistributionof interpretative power may simply not
be adequate to achieve objective justice. For example, the DFR operates in legal interpre-

tation as a structural slot that is repeatedly invoked in allocating institutional power without
any examination of the duty's substantive content nor any considerations of the structure
of.powerlessness it is used to construct and legitimate. Judges work with inherited doctrines
and canons of construction. Embedded in both are a whole range of assumptions and
normative commitments that determine how a court will read a case and limit the uses to
which most judges can put a particular case. This unitary consciousness limits any strategy
of social transformation that relies on the appointment of a token number of women and
nonwhites to positions of interpretative power as a vehicle for developing a multiple legal
consciousness. Rather than ensuring "objectivity," the fact that legal doctrine is, for anly
individualjudge, an external given or restraint, ensures the continued reconstitution of the
law's subjectivity, except by the most self-conscious and analytically proficient judgesand then only to the extent their decisions are sustainedon appeal.
299Abraham, supra note 37.
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self-interested behavior rather than facilitate the articulation and
resolution of genuine differences about what constitutes the com300
mon good.
The second reason is an instrumental concern that the decentralization of union decision-making authority will upset the balance of power between labor and capital to the detriment of workers as a class. 30' If this were entirely and necessarily true, then
women of color would have very little reason to believe that the
labor movement or its institutions could ever be an effective vehicle for liberation from the practices through which we are op30 2
pressed and exploited in the workplace.
But this is neither entirely nor necessarily true, for these
scholars underestimate the fragmenting impact of concentrated
power and overstate the fragmenting impact of redistributed
power. If race and gender are neither natural nor essential divisions
of humankind, but rather socially constructed categories established and maintained through relations of power and powerlessness, then the redistribution of power across race and gender
groups is our only hope for finally and fully transcending these
divisions and achieving genuine solidarity. To put it differently:
inter-racial conflict, like the gender war, is not caused by the fact
that some people are white and others are not, nor by the fact that
100
As Professor Casebeer

has written:

In opposing to the universality of dialogue an ideal of critical social integration,
the focus shifts to what to become collectively, and is thus distinguished from the

old notions of integration founded in economic reductionism. The problematic of
this stance seems to require conceiving of a collective experience of decentered

subjects without a concept of the universal which destroys difference. That is, a
meaning of collective experience which is the underpinning of individual and social
differences within an equality which doesn't restrict the significance of those

differences .... In this way a universal need to achieve recognition in authentic
social meaning for an individual set of life experiences is subsumed in the social
integration of an unalienated political organization .

. .

. [I]ntegration on these

terms respects mutuality of difference more than a communicative universality
which, because it lacks an account of power, cannot escape the disruption implied

by a division of labor necessary to reproduce the conditions in which dialogue is
historically embedded.
Kenneth Casebeer, Work on a Labor Theory of Meaning (1988) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
"I'See Emporium Capwell v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975);
Abraham, supra note 37; Harper & Lupu, supra note 34; Stone, supra note 297.
102 1 cannot accept a vision of community which is so threatened by the prospect of
my empowerment that it must constitute my efforts to institutionalize my equality as a
destruction of community. If your community can exist only on the basis of my inequality
and powerlessness, then your community ought, in truth, to be destroyed.
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some are male and others are female. It is caused by the fact that
the concentration of power generates relations of subordinationsubordination generates resistance-and resistance generates reaction. To put it bluntly: No power, no justice. No justice, no
peace. It is to these issues I now turn.
B. Toward a Genuine Solidarity Beyond the Individual and
Collective Rights Conflict
The institutional suppression of minority agency and denial of
collective political identity that was effected through the interpretative manipulation of the relative priority of individual and collective rights in the union integration cases and Emporium Capwell
is profoundly disturbing because it suggests that women of color
are situated in a Catch-22. Located at the intersection of multiple
practices of subordination and competing political communities,
women of color are as much oppressed by collectivist regimes
which proceed through the external imposition of a group identity
as by individualist regimes which restrict the opportunity for collective alliances and ignore the material reality of our group interests. Despite the competing claims made for and against these
alternative regimes, the social reality of women of color negates
this dichotomy because this dichotomy negates our reality. 30 3
While the experience of multiple consciousness teaches us the
interdependence of individual and collective identities and the importance of both individual autonomy and group solidarity to our
liberation, interpretative practices at the intersection of Title VII
34
and the NLRA affirm each-only at the expense of the other. 0
m The mainstream left disparages legal rules that establish and maintain the conditions
of individual autonomy on the grounds that these rules undermine group solidarity and
collective power, see Abraham, supra note 37, while the right affirms individual autonomy
by ignoring inter-group assymetries of power and intra-group dependencies. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1387-94 (1983).
104 My purpose is not to empower and protect groups for their own sake (which often
only means for the sake of the leaders who define the group's agenda and control its
political processes) see, e.g., King, supra note 22, but for the sake of individual group
members, whose full human interest cannot be protected except by protecting the common
interests through which the group is constituted. I am not as interested in helping groups
maintain their "groupness" as much as in reconstructing the social structures that imprison
individuals in externally imposed groupings, obstruct regrouping, and disable individuals
from acting collectively to transform society and the intermediate groups in which they
find themselves. Only individuals are situated at the intersection, and it is from the intersection that individuals transform the various political communities that constitute us.
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For women of color, liberation will require a reconstructed relationship between the individual and collective, both as this relationship is ideologically conceptualized and as it is institutionally
constituted.
My account begins, in section one, with a recognition that
individuals are in fact embedded in constitutive group relations,
that these relations can be as negative and life destroying as they
are positive and community building, and that the preservation of
a space for the formation and expression of individual identity is
crucial to our ability to mediate and ultimately transcend the constitutive relations that otherwise imprison our agency. By authorizing the formation of more fluid yet institutionally effective alliances among individuals whose social reality may call them to
organize across multiple political identities, legal regimes like Silverstein's interest group certification, Guinier's system of proportionate representation and Schatzki's system of separate respresentation create the institutional context for self-determination and
transformative political alliances. They empower individuals to
negotiate for themselves the way the competing claims of their
different political identities should be resolved on specific issues
of concern in the workplace. 0 5
While legal rules furthering individual autonomy are an important avenue for overcoming the structural violence effected by
judicial decisions that prioritize the collective rights of white/male
majorities in the workplace, we are quite rightly skeptical of proposals to reconstruct the current system of exclusive representation by majority rule-if the ultimate consequence of these proposals would be to undermine the collective power of American
working people. In the second section, I challenge this assumption.
301Professor King provides a powerful illustration of the way the social reality of
women of color requires that we have the autonomy to negotiate our own political alliances:
[D]uring the suffrage debates, it was routinely asserted that only one group might

gain voting privileges-either blacks or women, that is black men and white
women. For black women, the granting of suffrage to either group would still
mean our disenfranchisement because of our sex or our race. Faced with this

dilemma, many women and most black men believed that the extension of suffrage
to black males was imperative in order to protect the race interest in the historical
period of the postbellum America. But because political empowerment for black

women would require that both blacks and women gained the right to vote, some
of these same black women also lobbied strenuously for women's suffrage.
King, supra note 22, at 51-52 (emphasis added).
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The future vitality of the American labor movement depends
on our ability to design a new representational structure that preserves the efficacy of collective action while simultaneously promoting internal democracy, equality and the development of alternative bases of collective power.30 6 While the system of exclusive
representation based on majority rule is an arrangement through
which working people have secured significant benefits, further
concentration of union authority is only one possible model for
30 7
the future.
Multiple bargaining among institutionally empowered self-determined groups is a different and more promising trajectory for
race/gender minorities, for local communities whose interests have
not been adequately represented by unions and for the evolution
of a genuine economic democracy. 30 8 This new representational
structure would need to effect the redistribution and decentralization of institutional power across race/gender subgroups in ways
that increase the incentives and opportunities for the inter-moveGould and
ment linkages which scholars like Professors William
311
310
Herbert Hill3 09 and, more recently, Professors Klare and Pope
have so rightly advocated. Jurisprudentially, this new structure
would be grounded in a re-unification of Title VII and the NLRA.
While the current system of exclusive representation is based on
the fragmentation of these regimes (and the strategic subordination
of Title VII), a structure of multiple representation would be
grounded in a genuinely unifed labor policy committed to the
ultimate priority of Title VII on the understanding that solidarity
presupposes political equality.
1. Of IndividualAutonomy, Multiple Consciousness and the
Dream of a Centered Self
Professor Abraham has elaborated a sophisticated argument
in support of exclusive representation and the priority Emporium
30

See generally BUILDING BRIDGES: THE EMERGING GRASSROOTS COALITION OF

LABOR AND COMMUNITY (J. Brecher & T. Costello eds., 1990); HECKSCHER, supra note
291; DAN LABOTZ, A TROUBLEMAKER'S HANDBOOK: How To FIGHT BACK WHERE YOU

(1991).
307See Rogers, supra note 297.
3w See HECKSHER, supra note 291.
309See generally GOULD, supra note 22, at 37-38; William B. Gould, LaborArbitration

WORK-AND WIN!

of Grievances Involving Racial Discrimination, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1969). See also
Hill, supra note 97.
310 Klare, supra note 35.
311 James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitionsand Boycotts: The Old Labor Law,
the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 899 (1991).
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Capwell accords to the majority's collective rights. 31 2 His arguments parallel, deepen and provide a richer and far more compelling social and theoretical context for the Emporium Capwell decision. Thus, to see the limitations of Abraham's arguments is to
make significant strides towards understanding the limitations of
Emporium Capwell itself.
For Abraham, the fundamental object of labor law is to "recognize and try to reduce the tensions between the abstract conception of individual freedom the law systematically prefers and
the concrete group dependencies that characterize societies such
as our own." 313 Like the Emporium Capwell decision, Abraham
resolves this inherent tension by privileging collective over individual rights. Indeed, his whole argument may be viewed as an
effort to situate the NLRA's system of exclusive representation
within a group-based, neo-corporatist Hegelian legal theory in
which groups, as opposed to individuals, are the relevant legal
subjects.
This section focuses on the single most significant feature of
his argument: his decidedly negative view of individual autonomy.
Abraham's article is a frontal assault on the entire liberal legal
project of establishing rules that protect the exercise of individual
autonomy. His attack on Justice Douglas's dissent in Emporium
Capwell is likewise based in large part on the exclusively negative
role Abraham assigns to individual autonomy; a close reading of
Abraham's article suggests that there is no value in maintaining
such rules. Abraham's position is grounded in part on the consequences the legal protection of individual autonomy has had for
unions in the workplace.
According to Abraham, individual autonomy has been the
primary conceptual vehicle through which collective rights and
power have been undermined in recent legal doctrine. 314 In this
context, individual autonomy appears to be a strategic image invoked by courts to undermine union power. Accordingly, he argues
that
the key assumption behind the exclusive majority representation principle of section 9(a) is that assertion of individual right for momentary individual gain will inevita312Abraham, supra note 37.
313Id. at 1273.
4
31 Id. at 1275.
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bly lead to the weakening and ultimate destruction of the
collective and thus to a recurrence of the naked weakness
of the individual employee .... As against management

there is but one voice, as to labor, management has but
one ear to lend ... Congress has in open and purposive

aid of the individual worker established the collective
principle. 315
More generally, Abraham argues that "individual free choice
reduces the possibility of generating an ideology that would provide a shared conception of collective identity. 31 6 Legal rules
protecting individual autonomy serve no function other than to
preserve the opportunity for individuals to engage in selfish pursuit
of short-term interests. Abraham does not object simply to the
fact that the union's power is undermined; he has a general distaste
for the conception of individual autonomy on behalf of which that
power is undermined. Abraham argues that the power of the union
is undermined simply to impose upon our social relations once
again the conception of selfish atomistic individual units. Thus, in
Douglas's Emporium Capwell dissent, Abraham sees only an "unmitigatedly atomistic conception of action. Collective action is
essential,.., but it should only be instrumental. Collective action
is undertaken by individuals whose connection to each other is
presumed to be limited to the workplace,
unrelated to the concrete
'317
live.
they
which
under
conditions
This vision of us is wrong, Abraham argues, for it ignores the
"connection between individual freedom and community 318 and
reduces the content of our social relations into a model of human
interaction that leaves us paralyzed between our need to associate
in community and our fear of each other. Relations of solidarity
and mutual interdependence are replaced with "[tlhe legal image
of free and isolated individuals ...[that is] ultimately drawn from

and reinforces the market image of atomized persons-fearful of
each other, but willing to enter contracts of mutual advantage
"319

315

Id. at 1294.

31

6 Id. at 1289.
317Id. at 1281.
318

319

Id. at 1282.
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Abraham's assault on individual autonomy in general and on
Justice Douglas' Emporium Capwell dissent in particular is itself
grounded, initially and fundamentally, on an inadequate account
of collective identity. Indeed there is a perspective from which it
is the Emporium Capwell majority that sunders our social relations
and collective identity into an aggregation of individual workers,
while Justice Douglas' dissent affirms the connection between individual freedom and group solidarity. This alternative perspective
affirms precisely that which Abraham suppresses: a recognition
that the social reality of race/gender-based subordination has made
these socially constructed categories a collective political identity
around which individual workers will seek to and must be permitted to organize. In Emporium Capwell, it is the majority's refusal
to afford the black workers Section 7 protection which fragments
the minority group into a collection, a mere aggregation, of isolated
individuals asserting individual Title VII rights, while Justice
Douglas's dissent seeks to promote their ability to act self-consciously as a group by preserving their legal authority to do so
without fear of retaliation.
Abraham's assault on individual autonomy is, thus, based on
a vision of collectivism which, like Emporium Capwell and the
union integration cases, neglects the existence, the very real pull
of competing political communities on the formation of an individual identity and collective alliances. According to Abraham, group
identity is "[tlo a certain extent, of course,

. . .

a matter of worker

volition. Workers must choose.., among their various identities
(worker, consumer, taxpayer, patriot, ethnic, male/female, Christian, etc.), and between individual and collective calculi of 'success."' 320 However, later he posits the demise of ethnicity and
other "non-contractual relations" that claim "the allegiance of individuals. ' 32 1 Ironically, Abraham's attack on individual autonomy
is thus based on the presumed absence of any constitutive group
relations. Lacking such relations, the legal protection of individual
autonomy simply furthers a tendency towards social disintegration
and the fragmentation of communities into individual units, each
pursuing his or her own interests.
This account is problematic for three distinct but related reasons. First, it ignores the extent to which race and gender are
310Id. at
321 Id. at

1288.
1291.
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constitutive relations-individuals are their race/gender and cannot, of and by themselves, transcend these categories by sheer act
of will. Thus, Abraham's account ignores the fact that race and
gender discrimination operate to construct individual interests in
such ways that individuals can hope to overcome their own subordination only through the formation of race/gender based collectivities and the remedial recognition of their common group interests. Second, it ignores the important role that individual
autonomy plays in resolving conflicting claims of competing communities that bear upon the individual and the transformative potential of individual self-conscious assertion on the resolution of
these conflicts. Third, it amounts to little more than a blatant and
unsupported assertion that class, rather than race or gender are
the most appropriate or authentic relations around which collective
identity should be legally recognized and reinforced through restrictions on individual autonomy.
Professor Abraham is right to argue that the image of the self
that underlies a particular institutional arrangement is crucial to
any task of regulating how that institution operates. He is also
right to argue that a system of exclusive representation makes the
most sense given his account of the individual self and its relation
to others. 322 However, it is precisely this account which I challenge. Abraham advocates the superiority of group-based legal
rights and institutional structures without resolving the conflict of
multiple and equally compelling group identities or considering the
possibility that these group identities can be affirmatively oppressive and destructive.
Like Professor Abraham, I invoke an account of the individual
self as the foundation for the institutional structures I advocate;
however, mine is an account which draws on the recent works of
Third World Feminists, who describe the reality of women of color
situates his attack on individual autonomy against an account of working
which
is in turn situated within an analysis of "the social realities of
class solidarity
asymmetrical power relations" between labor and capital in a capitalist system. He then
links his account of group solidarity and individual autonomy in a defense of Emporilum
Capivell's system of exclusive representation and majority rule by arguing that under social
relations of asymmetrical power, group solidarity and collective empowerment depends
upon the suppression of individual autonomy. This link, like the predominance afforded
class over race and gender, is, however, little more than a blatant, unsupported assertion.
Compare infra Part III.B.2. (arguing for multiple bargaining structures). More disturbingly,
the assertion that collective power can only be asserted through centralized authority
suggests that there is no genuine solidarity among individuals. Solidarity is simply an
322 Abraham

artifact of power.
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as they inhabit the ideological and institutional structures of the
dominant society. For example, Gloria Anzaldfia, a professor of
Chicano and Feminist Studies, writes of the fragmentation she
experiences as a chicana lesbian-as an individual situated in and
called by the claims of multiple communities, each of which negates and devalues the claims of the other communities in whose
liberation she is deeply invested. Her efforts to specify the oppression she experiences as a lesbian earn the wrath of Marxists and
Chicano Liberationists, who would have her focus exclusively on
the economic and cultural oppression of her people. 323 The feminist
community affirms her opposition to oppression as a lesbian, even
as it negates and rejects her opposition to racism, imperialism and

poverty. 324 Like the black woman in Professor King's account, 325

the chicana lesbian finds herself situated at an intersection where
different communities give fundamentally conflicting accounts of
the value of the same activity of identification and opposition.
Through the social categories of race, class and gender, she is
offered competing alternatives of self-identification, collective alliances and political agendas, but none of these alternatives respect
her integrity as a concrete individual and a unified self.
To experience this fragmentation is, from Professor Abraham's perspective, simply to experience the necessity of resolving
the competing demands of multiple social roles.3 26 To experience
it as an existentialcrisis, however, is to be fully and fundamentally
torn between competing worlds, each projecting its own internally
coherent vision of reality, of moral truth and human objective,
each laying claims and offering aspirations we cannot forsake ex-

313 Gloria

Anzalddia, Race, Identity and Feminist Struggles, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN
supra note 19, at 278.
324 See id. at 322. See also HOOKS, supra note 22. Addressing white feminists, hooks

AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM,

argues that "[w]omen will know that white feminist activists have begun to confront racism
in a serious and revolutionary manner when they are not simply acknowledging racism in
feminist movement or calling attention to personal prejudice, but are actively struggling to

resist racist oppression in our society." Id. at 55. Similarly, she argues that "[u]ntil we
focus on class divisions between women, we will be unable to build political solidarity,"
id. at 61, for "[t]o the bourgeois 'feminist,' the million dollar salary granted newscaster
Barbara Walters represents a victory for women. To working class women who make less
than the minimum wage and receive few if any benefits, it means continued class exploitation." Id. at 59. Her arguments are as well addressed to the mainstream left, who would
ask us to postpone our struggle against sexism and racism until "after the revolution." As
someone must have already said somewhere: By then, mister, we'll all be dead.
32 King, supra note 22.
326See Abraham, supra note 37, at 1288.
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cept to lose the self we are for ourselves and assume, instead, the
self that others would have us be for them.327
In describing her situation, Anzaldtia asserts the individual
self as the vehicle through which these competing claims are resolved and something new is envisioned; it is the centered self
which negotiates, resolves and ultimately transforms the fragmented claims into a unified vision of an alternative reality. Thus
she writes:
As a mestiza I have no country, my homeland cast me
out; yet all countries are mine because I am every woman's sister or potential lover. (As a lesbian I have no race,
my own people disclaim me; but I am all races because
there is the queer of me in all races.) I am cultureless
because, as a feminist, I challenge the collective cultural/
religious male-derived beliefs of Indo-Hispanics and Anglos; yet I am cultured because I am participating in the
creation of yet another culture, a new story to explain
the world and our participation in it, a new value system
with images and symbols that connect us to each other
and to the planet. Soy un amasamiento, I am an act of
kneading, of uniting and joining that not only has produced both a creature of darkness and a creature of light,
but also a creature that questions the definitions of light
and dark and gives them new meanings ....

We are the

people who leap in the dark, we are the people on the
knees of the gods. In our very flesh, (r)evolution works
out the clash of cultures. It makes us crazy constantly,

327In Black Theology & Black Power, supra note 13, theologian James Cone comments
on the existential absurdity that confronts us when competing communities would define
our identity, one in the image of God, another an object of domination and exploitation:

[M]ost existentialists do not say that "man is absurd" or "the world is absurd."
Rather, the absurdity arises as man confronts the world and looks for meaning.
The same is true in regard to my analysis of the black man in a white society. It
is not that the black man is absurd or that the white society as such is absurd.
Absurdity arises as the black man seeks to understand his place in the white world.
The black man does not view himself as absurd; he views himself as human. But
as he meets the white world and its values, he is confronted with an almighty No
and is defined as a thing. This produces the absurdity.
Id. at 11. No less for the woman of color Cone ignores.
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but if the center holds, we've made some kind of evolu328
tionary step forward.
Situated at the intersection of multiple political communitiesall making conflicting claims on her identity-and compelled to
inhabit institutional arrangements that organize a range of options,
both limited and contradictory, the individual woman of color has
two basic choices. She can deny, suppress or attempt to change
those aspects of her conscious self-identity that white/male power
constructs as absurd. She might, on the other hand, claim herself
as legitimate and whole, identifying the source of her self-conscious conflicts in the institutional arrangements that fragment her
being and that seek to affirm only those aspects of herself that
3 29
It
cohere with the interests which dominate those institutions.
is only through the latter stance that she makes herself a political
subject, an agent of social transformation.
The work of scholars like Gloria Anzaldtia and Deborah King
takes us into our own experience as individuals in order to bring
us out as political agents. Situated at the intersection of competing
realities, indeed, constituting its consciousness, we assert the importance of the individual self-conceptualized not as a free market agent, but as a concrete context in which a center is forged
and made to hold: "if the center holds" we affirm a new.realityif the center holds. To form this center requires withdrawal from
the ways and the values which would persuade us that there is
only one way, only one role, only one set of relations. Ironically,
the white man's education and the image of an autonomous identity, a free market agency, was for many of us the point of
330
departure.

128 GLORIA ANZALDIJA, BORDERLANDS: LA FRONTERA, THE NEW MESTIZA 80-81
(1987). See also DAVID ABALOS, LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE SACRED AND THE
POLITICAL 38 (1986).
'2 Recall the impossible fragmentation created for women of color at the intersection
of Emporium Capwell and King.
330See, e.g., ANZALD(JA, supra note 328, at 15. Anzaldtla states:

To this day I'm not sure where I found the strength to leave the source, the
mother, disengage from my family, mi tierra, mi gente, and all that picture stood
for. I had to leave home so I could find myself, find my own intrinsic nature buried
under the personality that had been imposed on me.
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Individual autonomy and the legal rules which empower its
assertion provide a space for the individual who is bombarded by
the claims and perspectives of competing political communities to
forge a center. Without this centered self, one set of interests
would have to prevail ultimately or the individual would go crazy
as she shifts arbitrarily, operating first from her class, then from
her color, then from her gender based identity and alliances. Even
more radically, the space created for individual autonomy is the
place from which we draw the vision and the energy to resist and
transform the constitutive relations in which we are simultaneously
embedded.
To be a woman of color not at the intersection of Title VII
and the NLRA is to be situated in a network of institutional
arrangements and conceptual structures that intersect in conflicting
ways and operate, ultimately, to cancel out our agency, suppress
our identity and restrict our representational authority. But to selfidentify-not as a woman nor as a hispanic, but as a woman of
color, a person who is both and to affirm the integrity of this self
and the right to be whole-is to demand of these institutional
arrangements that they be redesigned, that the contradictory
claims be resolved, that these discontinuous and self-contained
interpretative domains open up, speak to each other and resolve
the contradictions through which they paralyze our
33
individualities. 1
In short, then, individual autonomy is both the vehicle for and
the ultimate objective of our efforts to transform the conditions of
domination, and it is crucial to the development of empowered
solidarity. 332 Indeed, there is no inherent conflict between the legal
protection of individual autonomy and the promotion of group
solidarity and/or the common good, though it may well be that
individual autonomy is operating in legal interpretation like majority will-as a legal fiction strategically deployed to maintain the
current structure of economic and political power. To posit such
conflicts as inherent and inevitable is to presuppose, on the one
hand, that individual resistance to the collective agenda must nec-

331 See

(1990).

generally ROBERT MEISTER, POLITICAL IDENTITY: THINKING THROUGH MARX

332See HOOKS, supra note 22, at 43-52 (distinguishing genuine solidarity based on
justice and equality from sentimental "Sisterhood" based on the suppression of conflict,
controversy and dissent).
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essarily reflect illegitimate self-interest rather than legitimate selfassertion (the "I am and I count" to which everyone is equally
entitled) and, on the other hand, that the group process has necessarily produced an accurate vision of the common good, rather
than simply expressed the interests of those who control the
group's political processes and monopolize its agenda. If, however,
group solidarity is based on a commitment to accomodate the
interests of all group members, then the opportunity for effective
dissent is not an obstacle so much as the crucial vehicle through
which we continually approximate the common good. But effective
dissent presupposes institutional power.
From this perspective, the legal regimes proposed by Silverstein, Guinier and Schatzki are superior to the system of exclusive
representation by the majority rule precisely because they institutionalize various mechanisms for redistributing effective institutional power across the various groups we might establish in our
efforts to transform the multiple conditions and eradicate the different practices through which each of us is oppressed and exploited in the workplace. Nevertheless, while legal rules furthering
individual autonomy are important for integrating our fragmented
individualities and fragmenting the majoritarian collectivities
which constitute our institutional submergence and demobilization, these objectives will ultimately fail if the necessary consequence of our individual empowerment is our collective disempowerment. Fortunately, this is not a necessary consequence.
2. Of Solidarity, Subordination and the Legal
Reconstruction of Segmented Social Structures and
FragmentedPoliticalCommunities
Karl Klare has argued persuasively that both the labor and
the civil rights movements have been weakened by their failure to
develop a cooperative political agenda. 333 More recently, Alexander Pope has illustrated how certain legal doctrines at the intersection of First Amendment and the NLRA may present significant
obstacles and potentially undermine current efforts to unite these
movements in their common causes. 334 These scholars are right to

333Kare, supra note 35.
334Pope, supra note 311.
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argue that the future of American working people depends on the
development of a common political agenda that cuts across the
divisions of race and gender. It is clear, however, that a vision of
working class solidarity based on the institutionalized suppression
of internal differences and dissent and the concentration of institutional power in a white male elite is an impoverished vision
indeed. The problems confronting working people in America cannot be resolved simply by asserting the fundamental priority of
class solidarity. Rather, as Joel Rogers has argued, our objective
must be to design institutional arrangements which establish the
conditions for political alliances where these alliances do not, in
335
fact, exist.
My analysis of judicial interpretation at the intersection of
Title VII and the NLRA provides a first step towards understanding how our current institutional arrangements, including the system of exclusive representation based on majority rule, undermine
the evolution of such inter-movement alliances. These alliances
will be based on a common commitment to the equality and participation of working people of all races and both genders, or they
simply will not be. 336 By constructing representational authority in
such a way that it operates strategically and systematically on the
one hand to subsume race/gender minorities as disempowered
subgroups within majoritarian collectivities and, on the other, to
deny us the authority to establish self-determined alliances to overcome our systematic subordination in the workplace, this representational structure undermines the only genuine basis for interrace/gender solidarity-that is, our political equality within the
labor movement and its institutions.
Accordingly, while the unification of Title VII and the NLRA
will entail substantial modification of the system of exclusive representation, the modification of this representational structure
would be a step in the right direction-if the objective is to overcome the political fragmentation which currently divides the labor
movement from other social movements. Institutional arrangements may either create or suppress the incentives for political
engagement. For example, shortly after Title VII was first enacted,
335See Rogers, supra note 297, at 3 n.6.
336Consider that the Wagner Act was strenuously and, under the circumstances, quite
reasonably, opposed by the NAACP and other civil rights organizations. For an account
of that opposition and the reasons for it, see Hill, supra note 97.
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Professor William Gould invoked its anti-discrimination policies in
a proposal to establish a system of tri-partite arbitration and/or
third party intervention in union grievance procedures. 337 This
proposal would have established an institutional structure through
which the civil rights movement and local community organizations might have developed a political stake in the labor movement
and its institutions through the practice of representing their individual group members at arbitration. Instead, the doctrine of exclusive representation was invoked to make arbitration, like collective bargaining, the exclusive prerogative of union officials. 338
The doctrine of exclusive representation and its institutional
ramifications appear to be fundamental obstacles to the creation
of institutional arrangements that would invite increased participation by the new social movements. Feminist and civil rights
activists have been reluctant to invest their energies or resources
in the labor movement because they are suspicious of the institutional structures which concentrate effective power in a white male
labor elite whose commitment to their agendas has been, at best,
undependable and opportunistic and, at worst, positively hostile.
Thus, to the extent the labor movement needs the participation of
these social movements and their organizations, the structure of
exclusive representation appears to be a major obstacle rather
than, as Professor Abraham argues, the fundamental prerequisite
for an empowered labor movement. In effect, exclusive representation simply institutionalizes the antipolitical ideology of American labor law which, in the name of "industrial stability, ' 339 seeks
to limit the range of voices and transformative demands that may
be expressed in the struggle over the workplace-and, most unfortunately, does so at the expense of the political alliances that
might be generated within an alternative representational structure
which offered these social movements a genuine opportunity to
assert effective power in determining the conditions of work.

317Gould, supra note 309.

311
In some instances, unions have allowed minority groups to bargain separately and
to appear at arbitration hearings represented by independent counsel or by the EEOC. See
Silverstein, supra note 24, at 1515. Nevertheless, this practice depends entirely on the

terms of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union. Devine v. White, 697
F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (third party intervention inimical to arbitral process).
339
Ironically, organizational stability (bureaucracy) is precisely what American firms
need most to overcome. ROSABETH Moss KANTER, WHEN GIANTS LEARN To DANCE
(1989).
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The long-run political viability of the labor movement has also
been hampered by the interpretative fragmentation of Title VII
and the NLRA. Through the fragmentation and strategic manipulation of these regimes, judicial interpretation has been deeply and
directly implicated in maintaining a segmented political reality in
which the labor movement and its institutions address one set of
interests and the civil rights movement and its institutions address
another. Thus, while Professor Klare is right that the labor and
civil rights movements have been politically fragmented by the
single issue, essentialistic perspective of the leaders who dominate
their agendas, 340 this fragmentation has been reified and institutionalized through interpretative practices like the fragmentation
of jurisdictional authority across different state agencies and the
34
strategic manipulation of concepts like our national labor policy. '
The political consequences of this jurisdictional fragmentation
have been apparent for some time 342 and were most recently illus-

34

See Klare, supra note 35. According to Professor Klare,

the weaknesses of the modem American labor movement stem from the narrowness of its politics, from its failure (at least since WWII) to link up the struggle to
improve working conditions with a broader, over-arching vision of how to construct a better society. One of the most important manifestations of labor's abdication on the political level is the unions' failure to make the elimination of racism
a central goal and an unwavering commitment.
Id. at 162. Discussing the civil rights movement, Kare continues:
A related political premise is that, for reasons deeply rooted in its history, the
civil rights movement has not adequately incorporated the perspectives of social
and economic class analysis. Civil rights law reflects a similarly limited perspective. It promises formal equality of opportunity within a social system that systematically generates substantive inequality. To an extraordinarily disproportionate degree, blacks are confined to an underclass status within what is an already
highly stratified system of economic domination. Thus efforts to improve conditions for blacks must ultimately confront the problem of class domination. To be
fully successful, efforts at racial remediation must be part of a total effort at social
reconstruction.
Id. at 164.
34 The concept of a national labor policy is the doctrinal construct through which
courts decide whether and to what extent the policies of one statute will inform the
interpretation of the other statute. As I have already demonstrated, supra parts II.B & C,
the relationship between Title VII's anti-discrimination policy and the institutions and
substantive rights established under American labor laws has been strategically manipulated
in ways that systematically subordinate the elimination of race and gender subordination
to the interest in preserving a thoroughly anti-democratic system of industrial relations.
342See generally GOULD, supra note 22. Professor Gould notes that "some board and

regional staff members assume that the NLRB is not a civil rights agency and therefore
ought not to be involved in racial-discrimination questions. That attitude, if demonstrated
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trated during the 1987-89 rule-making proceedings conducted to
determine appropriate collective-bargaining units in the health care

industry.3 43 During these proceedings, the Board requested coi-

ments on the impact its appropriate bargaining unit determinations

might have on equal employment opportunities in the health care
industry. 344 It questioned whether the authorization of separate
bargaining units for skilled, unskilled and various professional hospital employees would limit the opportunities for mobility across
job classifications and reinforce the race and gender segmentation
which pervades the health care industry. 345 Despite the significance
of this issue for racial minority and female hospital workers, only
four witnesses addressed the issue. Two witnesses represented the
hospital industry, while the other two represented a union. 346 Citing
"the limited substantive response" given to the Board's "express
invitation on the record for further evidence on this subject," the
Board concluded there was insufficient evidence to show that the
units found appropriate would limit the employment opportunities
347
of race/gender minorities.
This lack of attention to the Board's rule-making proceedings
by feminist and civil rights organizations is one more example of
the political fragmentation generated by the fragmentation of Title
clearly enough at the regional office, can quite easily discourage a potential charging party
from filing anything at all." Id. at 37-38. Gould attributes this attitude to the lack of input
afforded civil rights organizations like the NAACP and the Urban League in the selection
of NLRB members and its general counsel "in sharp contrast to the AFL-CIO and the
National Chamber of Commerce, both of which are significantly involved in such matters."
Id. My point is that this attitude is compelled by decisions like Emporium Capwell and
Handy Andy.
343See Notice of Proposed Rule Making, Collective Bargaining Units in the Health
Care Industry, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,142 (1987) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103-30); Second
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,900 (1988) (proposed July 2, 1987) (to
be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103-30); Final Rule, 54 Fed. Reg. 16,336 (1989) (to be codified
at 29 C.F.R. § 103-30).
'4 The units ultimately deemed appropriate for collective organization were (1) all
registered nurses, (2) all physicians, (3) all professionals except for registered nurses and
physicians, (4) all technical employees, (5) all skilled maintenance employees, (6) all business office clerical employees, except for technical employees, skilled maintenance employees, business office clerical employees and guards. See Final Rule, Appropriate Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 29 C.F.R. § 103-30(a) (1989).
345See Final Rule, supra note 343, at 16,342 (Comment 1098, Myerson & Kuhn)
(position paper by Susan Warner indicating that "RN units are dominated by females, 95%98%; physicians are dominated by males (primarily white); technicals are dominated by
females, 72%--78%, with less than 50% minorities; other nonprofessionals are predominately
female, and almost 50% white; and skilled maintenance is 85% male, 75% white").
16 Id. I am indebted to University of Miami law student John Fisher for bringing
this
to my attention in his seminar paper, fall 1991.
141 Final Rule, supra note 343, at 16,342.
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VII and the NLRA. While these groups might have raised unwelcomed objections to the appropriateness of the unit categories
supported by the participating labor unions, 48 their lack of participation suggests that the labor movement and its institutions are
perceived as fundamentally irrelevant to the work that must be
done. It is this perception that the fragmentation of Title VII and
the NLRA has wrought-ultimately to the long-term detriment of
both the labor movement and the new social movements whose
memberships do, after all, intersect.
IV. Conclusion
The practice of liberation legal theory aims at understanding
the role of law in maintaining structures that perpetuate relations
of domination and subordination in a given society for the purpose
of materially promoting that society's transformation. To the extent the structures that maintain these relations are embedded in
and articulated through the practice of legal interpretation, they
are legal structures. Moreover, these legal structures are both as
material and concrete as the economic and political institutions
they simultaneously constitute and construct and as immanent and
pervasive as the ideological presuppositions and analytic structures they simultaneously invoke and deploy.
Consequently, legal theory is relevant to social transformation. To be relevant as a liberation practice, legal theory must help
us understand in some detail the ways in which the symbolic/
analytical structure of law as a system of meanings-of practical
reason and reasoned justification-participates in maintaining the
material structures of power. Rather than debating what law is,
we need to demonstrate how it works now and how it might be
made to work differently. Rather than deep theory, we need practical knowledge.
The critique developed and the affirmative proposals offered
in this Article invoke the concept of structural violence as a way
31 The Board's review of submitted comments indicates that labor leaders favored
multiple bargaining units while hospital representatives generally supported two broad units
of professional and non-professional employees. See Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 343, at 33,966. The union preference for multiple units was based on the
greater difficulty involved in organizing large heterogeneous units, since "skilled maintenance employees usually do not wish to organize with other groups, and it is unusual for
different groups of non-professional employees to seek to organize in the same unit." Id.

at 33,921.
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of understanding the practical impact which legal interpretation at
the intersection of Title VII and the NLRA has had on women of
color who inhabit the workplaces regulated by these regimes. I
have argued that the fragmentation of these regimes operates as
an interpretative context in which the institutional agency of
women of color is analytically deconstructed and practically suppressed through incoherent interpretations of conceptual structures like the relative priority of individual/collective rights and
the relationship between group membership and adequate
representation.
I have also shown how the relationship between Title VII and
the NLRA and the relative priority accorded these regimes is
manipulated across doctrinal domains with similar consequences
for women of color in real world workplaces. Finally, I have argued
that the jurisprudential fragmentation of these regimes has operated through the jurisdictional fragmentation of the state to reinforce the political fragmentation of the labor movement and other
social movements that might otherwise converge-again to the
detriment of women of color who constitute the intersection of
these various movements.
It is fair to say, at a minimum, that the relationship between
Title VII and the NLRA as it has been analytically interpreted and
institutionally enforced has played a significant role in maintaining
the current structure of race and gender subordination in the American labor force. The jurisprudential and institutional unification
of these regimes would be a significant step forward.

